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This thesis is an ethnographic study of Year 9 school pupils' responses 
to horror films, and, in particular, The Company of Wolves (Jordan, 
1984). It employs social semiotic theory to analyse both film texts and 
audience engagements with such texts, exploring how such 
engagements involve transformations of subjectivity, particular kinds of 
competence in reading visual codes, and certain types of affective 
response to horror texts. It explores, briefly, histories of elements of the 
horror genre, especially the figures of the werewolf and the folktale 
heroine, in the period from the Enlightenment to the present day. 
The thesis develops a theory of textual pleasure in relation to horror 
films, drawing on Bakhtin's theory of carnival, Freud's theories of 
pleasure, and Bourdieu's theory of taste. It argues that fear and 
pleasure are related in this context; that such pleasures are socially 
situated; and that they relate to forms of textual identification. 
A theory of the sublime is also developed in the context of the social 
semiotics of film, exploring the history of the sublime from Kant and 
Burke to postmodernist theory. It is argued that sublime images operate 
through a dialectic of revelation and concealment, and that audiences 
replicate this mechanism in their viewing, and in the social sites in which 
they spectate. These structures are associated, furthermore, with 
socially-determined structures of aesthetic taste, and ways in which 
these in turn determine texts as popular or elite (or a hybrid of the two). 
Finally, the thesis addresses the pedagogies of English and Media 
Studies, arguing that classrooms need to become spectatorial spaces, 
open to new literacies of the visual, and equipped with the texts, 
technologies, and practices adequate to these new competences. 
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Chapter Introduction - Madness and Method 
   
Illustration 1.1: Rosaleen sleeping 
 
Illustration 1.2: Rosaleen's toys 
 
from The Company of Wolves (Neil Jordan, 1984) 
Dear John. 
You know about the work we did on the Company of Wolves, just before you left, 
well we have just seen the film. Since you missed it. I will tell you about it, because 
it's a good film. First of all you see all those mini-stories, like in the book. Except 
before that, at the beginning. there is a part where you see a girl in nowadays, 
dreaming. And then in her dream you see the story and that is how it starts off. 
The actors in the film are quite good, and the granny is that woman from 
'Murder She Wrote', remember? Anyway, the dream is all set in the woods a while 
ago in the past. like in the book. It starts off in autumn, and then ends in winter. The 
entire film is basically just like in the book, apart from the end. At the end. she (the 
little girl) ends up, supposedly. turning into a wolf herself (in the dream) and chased. 
Then she wakes up to find wolves rushing up to her bedroom and then you hear a 
poem at the very end. Oh yeah, there is another thing made different. Throughout 
the film you see these toys in all shapes and sizes from her room, in real life. Also, at 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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the end, the granny gets killed by having her head chopped/knocked off, like a china 
doll, and smashing on a wall. Funny or what?! Overall, the film is quite good, with a 
few gory bits and nice lighting techniques. 
Well, how's life in the North Pole?! Hope to see you soon so you can see this 
great film! 
Best Wishes from Leo B 
Who watches this film, and where? In some ways it is an art-house film, dense with 
obscure symbolism, derived from the self-consciously literary prose of Angela Carter, 
who co-wrote it with director Neil Jordan. But, part-funded by Channel 4, it was 
released beyond the art-house circuit, and shown on television as part of Channel 
4's innovative Film on 4 series. And it employs the themes, narratives and imagery 
of the popular horror film, particularly the werewolf sub-genre, which, as James 
Twitchell observes (1985), saw something of a boom in the early 1980s. Already, 
then, a number of possible auditoria and audiences are implied: art cinema, 
commercial cinema, and eventually, after its release on video, living-room. 
The audience central to this study, however, are very different: a mixed sex, mixed 
ability class of Year 9 school students (aged 13 to 14) in an English comprehensive 
school, watching an edited version of the film (the uncut video has an 18 certificate) 
as part of a Media Studies course on the horror genre. Leo's "letter to a friend" is a 
classroom task, set immediately after watching the film. 
The story of this course began in 1989, when my school bought a video digitiser, 
which digitised images from video and converted them into Acorn image files. We 
decided to use this for a media course we were then devising for year 9 - we would 
ask pupils to study a film, using the digitiser to grab images that they could import 
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into their desktop-published work. The film was The Company of Wolves, chosen by 
a new teacher in the department who devised the course, following the feminist 
intentions of Angela Carter's story and screenplay, to teach about changing 
representations of women in horror. It soon became apparent, though, that other 
moments in the film, in particular the werewolf transformation sequences, exerted a 
powerful fascination, and that this attraction of the horror film needed to be a 
legitimate part of the course. This kind of subject matter evokes perennial public 
disquiet, which sees such matter as deranged and unnatural. Mikhail Bakhtin (1965) 
points out, however, that such madness, the madness of the grotesque, can produce 
revelatory inversions of the "normal" (that is, the ideological) point of view: 
... the theme of madness is inherent to all grotesque forms, because 
madness makes men look at the world with different eyes, not dimmed by 
"normal", that is by commonplace ideas and judgements. (page 39) 
Chapters 7 and 8 will consider the claim that the madness of horror has a kind of 
reason, and a function in the normal workings of the human psyche, and its work to 
build productive social identities. 
The teacher who constructed the course also wanted to explore what kinds of skills 
were needed to 'read' a film, and to teach her students how to read the construction 
of images, and particularly the still images they could digitise from the film. These 
processes will be examined in chapter 3. 
Six years on, I have adopted this course as a research project. In some ways, it has 
been a convenient subject for an empirical study: the data has been readily 
available, as I took over the course when the teacher who devised it went on 
maternity leave, and subsequently left the school. In other ways, it has produced the 
familiar difficulties of participant observer research, which need to be rehearsed 
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here. Before looking at the methodology, however, I will outline the three main 
research questions, which to some extent determine it. 
The project has prompted three distinct but related questions, which form the basis 
of the enquiry in this study. 
1. The visual semiotic and the horror film 
The basic question here is: "What meanings are made, by a specific audience of 
young people in a specific social context, of this film, The Company of Wolves, and 
how do they 'read' the mode of the visual to make these meanings?" 
This question is really a three-part question, viewed from the perspective of 
Halliday's three metafunctions of language, adopted by Kress and Van Leeuwen in 
their social semiotic grammar of the visual image (1996). This study will be 
concerned, then, firstly with the ideational metafunction: how film texts, and The 
Company of Wolves in particular, represent ideas, objects, and relations; how they 
construct narratives; and what meanings might be carried, in specific social and 
historical circumstances, by the images they build. In particular, two image-
paradigms will be explored in detail: that of the werewolf, and the figure of the 
cinematic werewolf especially; and that of the heroine of the film, derived partly from 
Perrault's fairytale of Red Riding Hood (and the mediaeval folktale of which it is a 
transformation), and partly from the tradition of female heroines in horror film. 
Secondly, with the interpersonal metafunction: how texts "project a particular 
social relation between the producer, the viewer and the object represented" (Kress 
and Van Leeuwen, 1996, page 41). The study will analyse key sequences from the 
film; and also the transformations of the film produced by the young people in the 
sample - their writing and drawing, transcriptions of their talk, and observations of 
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their viewing of the film. I will see these transformations, however, not just as the 
product of a short-term semiotic exchange, produced by the visual grammar of the 
text alone, but by the long-term discursive processes of which this encounter is only 
a small instance, dialogically related to other experiences of texts in this genre. I will 
also view it as related to cultural experience in the widest sense, and to the growth 
and transformation of subjectivity in each of these young people, accomplished in 
part through engagement with symbolic media such as film. 
Thirdly, the textual metafunction: how the text is composed to produce certain 
meanings. This area of the study will re-examine classic montage theory, aligning it 
with Roland Barthes' theory of the cinematic still, and to recent social semiotic theory 
of the visual syntagm. I will also argue, however, that the horror film uses specific 
semiotic structures designed to produce the affect of horror - fear and pleasure - by a 
dialectic of concealment and revelation, echoed in the physical process of viewing 
the film, as viewers oscillate between wide-eyed fascination and closed eyes shutting 
out the horrific image. These structures I will relate to the textual and philosophical 
tradition of the sublime, constructed, from the Enlightenment through the Romantic 
and Victorian periods to contemporary versions presented by theorists of 
postmodernism, to represent and explain phenomena which stimulated a sense of 
awe, fear and wonder in the beholder. 
2. The thrill of horror: fear, pleasure, taste and the sublime 
Simply stated, this question is: "What do viewers, and particularly these school 
students, feel when watching a horror film, and this film in particular? How is this 
feeling related to the meanings they make? And what is the nature of the particular 
textual pleasure bound up in all this?" 
The study will examine the peculiar affect of horror: the thrill composed of fear and 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 11 
pleasure combined. It will argue, following Vygotsky, that affect is inseparable from 
cognition, and that these fears and pleasures are important parts of what meanings 
are made, and how they are made. Halliday (1989) also stresses the part affect plays 
in the making of meaning, suggesting, in fact, that it is not simply a dispensable 
supplement, but an integral part of the meaning: 
... one cannot draw a sharp line between the expression of meanings on the one 
hand and the expression of attitudes and emotions on the other. 
It is more helpful to think of attitudes and emotions as part of meaning; to 
consider that all intonation patterns convey meaning, and then ask what kinds of 
meaning they convey. (page 80) 
This particular affect, then, the thrill of horror, will be seen as inseparable from the 
processes of representation which explore specific social fears. It will be necessary 
to construct a theory of textual pleasure which will also accommodate the textual fear 
criterial to the effect and meaning of the horror film. This theory will need to be 
related to the notion of the sublime, again: valuable since it is a theory of 
representation which integrates the contradictory affects of fear and pleasure. Some 
notion will also need to be developed of the subjectivities which experience such 
emotions - how will such feelings affect and be affected by the individual histories of 
specific viewers? Also, textual pleasure, as Bourdieu's work (1984) demonstrates, is 
determined by socially and historically contingent structures of aesthetic taste; and 
this will have to be taken into account also. Textual pleasure is, I will argue, a 
particular problem for the classroom: it is repeatedly reified within the pedagogy of 
English as a subject discipline, and by the regulatory processes which determine 
how the subject is organised (national curricular legislation; public examination 
syllabuses and policy). Yet works of fiction have always been about pleasure, as the 
popular market emphasises; and when young people feel successful about a course 
in English, they will often begin their Record of Achievement comment with "I really 
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enjoyed this course ...", to the annoyance of teachers who insist that enjoyment is 
beside the point - they should be describing what they've achieved, as if pleasure is 
not part of achievement. 
3. Overlapping histories: the diachronic dimension 
This question asks: "What are the small and large historical processes by which 
individuals make meaning, and through these meanings, make themselves, their 
own subjectivities?" Although a good deal of the analysis of text and audience 
discourse will emphasise the contemporary moment, sometimes in very specific 
terms (minute-by-minute observations of a class watching a film, for instance), it is 
impossible - and undesirable - to escape the diachronic, as Hodge and Kress 
emphasise in their re-evaluation of Saussure (1989, Chapter 2). They point out that 
even apparently instantaneous semiotic exchanges have temporal features, however 
brief; that all signs are transformations of signs which historically precede them, and 
that this history of transformations affects present and future meanings. In this study, 
though its emphasis is not primarily historical, there are four kinds of diachronic view 
which will loosely underpin much of the analysis. 
Firstly, there will be an exploration of the diachronic syntagms of which the film text is 
constructed - and an examination of how such structures are read by school 
students. It is this kind of analysis which will appear most specific, employing as it 
does the framework of semiotic analysis outlined by Kress and Van Leeuwen. 
Secondly, there will be some research into the cultural histories of the particular 
textual paradigms with which the study is centrally concerned: simply put, Beauty 
and the Beast - or Red Riding Hood and the Wolf. This history will be largely 
confined to the period of the life of cinema, though it will also consider, more broadly, 
the history of the horror genre, and the roughly coterminous history of the 
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philosophical category associated with it, the sublime. Also, the history of the 
fairytale of Little Red Riding Hood, an important source of The Company of Wolves, 
will be considered. 
Thirdly, there will be a concern with the individual histories of viewers. This area is 
the most difficult, methodologically. These histories clearly have a determining effect 
on how texts are read, and so cannot simply be ignored. On the other hand, it's very 
difficult to obtain reliable evidence about the history of a private person. Furthermore, 
important aspects of that history are internal: the psychic history of the individual. 
The tradition of British Cultural Studies has, on the whole, preferred to omit this latter 
consideration, preferring empirical evidence of the external features of social 
identities to the apparently ahistorical speculation of psychoanalysis. In some 
respects, this preference has merits. David Buckingham (1993a) points out the 
limitations of the employment of Freudian and Lacanian perspectives in Screen 
theory, and the resultant overemphasis on text-spectator relations based on abstract 
conceptions of the ideal viewing subject, at the expense of attention to real 
audiences. Mindful of this, I will, where possible, base my account on evidence of 
social relations and identities produced by the talk and writing of actual audiences -
students in classrooms. However, Freud's accounts of the psychic processes most 
closely associated with the deliberate seeking out of distressing experiences, or the 
simulation of them, for pleasurable purposes, are often very compelling, and seem to 
fit the social experience of the horror film too well to be easily ignored. Buckingham 
himself later employs, in a discussion of young people's viewing of horror (1996) a 
psychoanalytic paradigm of the masochistic nature of horror viewers, derived from 
Carol Clover's Men, Women and Chainsaws (1993), which in many ways 
successfully synthesises psychoanalytic and cultural materialist approaches. I will 
argue, then, that it is worth speculating on the internal histories of viewers, though 
with some caution, and with the reservation that such speculations may need to be 
very broadly based - often applied to groups rather than individuals; even to the 
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whole group in the study. I will argue that such speculations are not necessarily at 
odds with a cultural materialist approach, taking my cue from Volosinov's suggestion 
(1973) that the psyche can only be understood as a complex of material signs: that 
the outer world of signs has proceeded from innumerable psyches, and will be re-
absorbed by others: 
We repeat: every outer ideological sign, of whatever kind, is engulfed in 
and washed over by inner signs - by the consciousness. The outer sign 
originates from this sea of inner signs and continues to abide there, since 
its life is a process of renewal as something to be understood, experienced 
and assimilated, i.e., its life consists in its being engaged ever anew into 
the inner context. 
Therefore, from the standpoint of content, there is no basic division 
between the psyche and ideology: the difference is one of degree only. 
(page 33; original emphasis) 
The final sense of history is almost the opposite in its range. It borrows from Bakhtin 
a sense of the sweep of cultural experience encompassed by his magisterial charting 
of the folk-rituals of carnival in Rabelais and His World (1965/1968). The attractions 
of Bakhtin's descriptions of the characteristics of carnival - grotesque realism, and 
the dissolution of boundaries between actors and spectators in the carnival arena -
are that they convincingly represent characteristic structures of popular culture in 
general, and also specific structures of contemporary body-horror. Current 
invocations of Bakhtin to describe aspects of modern popular culture associate the 
pre-industrial folk culture Bakhtin describes and the cultural politics of the 
contemporary moment, allowing for an optimistic reading of the latter. I wish to retain 
something of this optimism, while expressing two reservations. Firstly, that unalloyed 
optimism of the kind described by Jim McGuigan (1992) in his critique of the "cultural 
populist" drift in Cultural Studies is, as McGuigan argues, a stance which ends in a 
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paralysis of cultural politics, and needs to be modified by a sense of the forces which 
restrict the freedom of people to contest the meanings imposed on them. Rather, I 
intend to adopt the view of a continuum of possibilities for ideological contestation 
proposed by Hodge and Kress (1989): 
We do not assume that resistance is always successful or potent: but nor 
do we take it for granted, as many theorists of social meaning seem to do, 
that resistance is always effortlessly incorporated and rendered non-
significant. (page 8) 
Secondly, that, in a society increasingly pluralist and mobile, characterised by 
cultural forms which hybridize elements of popular and elite culture, it's an 
increasingly pointless project simply to champion the popular and fantasise about the 
abolition or withering away of elite forms, as Paul Willis does in his introduction to 
Common Culture (1992). These hitherto polarised cultural forms will continue to pull 
apart and collide, of course, offering the possibilities for polarised aesthetic 
preferences reflecting fractures, divisions and inequities in our society. But at the 
same time, they depend on and feed off each other; and increasingly seem as likely 
to merge and collapse into each other as to diverge, reflecting the kinds of rapid 
inversions of centre and margin observed by theorists of the postmodern (cf Connor, 
1990; Featherstone, 1993; Jameson, 1991). This is summarised by Featherstone as: 
the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between high and mass/popular 
culture; a stylistic promiscuity favouring eclecticism and the mixing of 
codes; parody, pastiche, irony, playfulness and the celebration of the 
surface 'depthlessness' of culture ... (1993, 7-8). 
My stance, then, will be best described as cautiously optimistic. I am, broadly, 
optimistic about the ability of young people to make their own meanings from a wide 
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array of texts, both popular and classical, and to contest meanings which are 
repressive to them. I remain very cautious, however, about social structures -
educational policy and curriculum legislation, for instance - which deny potentially 
productive textual encounters to young people, either refusing to acknowledge the 
value of the popular, or sacralizing and imposing classical culture to an extent which 
effectively shuts out a large sector of the community. In any case, I take the purpose 
of Bakhtin's vision to be less an unwarranted optimism about the future than the 
presentation of a cultural alternative, a turning upside down of the aesthetic norms of 
the dominant social groups of his (and our) times. My ideal - much more cautious! -
would look more like a hybrid, learning to live with contradiction and diversity, than a 
structure of polar opposites. 
Methodology 
The acquisition of data and the interpretive processes to which I have subjected it 
are best described as a small-scale qualitative cultural studies investigation. The 
features of this which require some detailed description, as they have a bearing on 
the conclusions reached, are: 
• the descriptive and interpretive paradigms employed 
• the range of observational methods used. 
• my role as participant observer 
The first of these is largely outlined above. This is a piece of audience research in 
the cultural studies tradition, combined with textual analysis drawing on a range of 
cultural theory, and on social semiotics in particular. This analysis will seek to 
problematize the nature of textual engagement - text will be seen as utterance, in the 
sense used by Bakhtin and Volosinov, and will embrace the film text as well as the 
transformations of it, responses to it, re-makings of it by the young people described. 
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I have taken utterance to mean any kind of behaviour whose purpose or effect is to 
convey meaning; so talk, writing, image, selection of image by computer, electronic 
page design, gesture, laughter, eye movements - all of these are treated as forms of 
utterance in specific social context, governed by the rules that determine any 
manifestation of what Volosinov (1973) calls "the little speech genre". The range of 
this domain of textuality, this exchange of voices, is difficult to confine or limit, 
whether spatially or temporally - and I will not try to do so. Rather, the thesis will 
argue that these discursive processes are best imaged by Bakhtin's dialogism, so 
that boundaries between text and reader, speaker and listener, a sign and its history, 
become difficult to maintain: 
Each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other utterances to 
which it is related by the communality of the sphere of speech communication. 
(Bakhtin, 1952/1981, page 85) 
One voice, of course, in the dialogic flow is my own - the voice of this thesis. I will 
see it as a contribution to, a reply to, an insertion into, an experience always 
structured as text, as utterance. "From the moment that there is meaning there are 
nothing but signs. We think only in signs", says Derrida (1974, page 50), a view 
consonant with Volosinov's theory of ideology and the individual psyche - so my text 
is a reading within the texts of these students, which are a reading within the films 
they watch, which are readings of earlier films and images. 
The range of observational methods is varied. What I was looking at was a text and 
an audience. The data I gathered reflect this clearly. On the one hand, I needed 
examples of the film text itself; and this is represented by images digitised from the 
film (by the school students themselves, as part of the classroom project which forms 
the basis of the study). Other materials used as data are the writings of the students 
in response to the film. As part of the project, most of this writing was completed on a 
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desktop publishing package. These texts appear in the study as they were written, 
where relevant with all the compositional features of their work (text enhancement, 
borders, different fonts, graphics, imported images). 
The social processes relevant to the viewing of this film I have seen as very diverse, 
ranging from the formal operations of classroom work, through a range of subcultural 
accommodations and contestations of these processes, to experiences outside the 
classroom, as students' social identities are acted out in numerous social encounters 
in school, and with friends and families at home. I have sought a range of 
observational methods here, which include a range of unstructured interviews (with 
individuals, pairs and groups), and journal observations of classroom viewings of 
film. There is some emphasis in these observations on the physical space of the 
classroom, as its importance as a kind of spectatorial arena forms part of my 
argument. The groups observed and interviewed mostly come from three repeats of 
the six-week course, each taught by me: one in 1995, and two in 1996. The 
interviews vary in many ways: though all generally of the open-ended ethnographic 
variety, they attempt to respond to the circumstances of the moment (as in Fontana 
and Frey's summary, 1994, of Douglas' "creative interviewing" approach). At times, 
this has meant simply switching on a tape recorder always kept ready in the 
classroom as a group of students talk spontaneously about their work. At other 
times, it has involved making an appointment with students outside the lesson, to 
develop ideas at length with minimal distraction. 
The ethical considerations of such methods need to be considered here. All 
interviews were freely given by the young people involved (all referred to only by first 
name), and I always explained to them the nature of my research, and my status as 
a researcher, before obtaining their consent to be interviewed. Even the classroom 
journals, drawn on particularly in chapter 6, were made after informing the class that 
I was observing them as they watched the film. In many cases, they seemed quickly 
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to forget that I was there as an observer, so the risk that informed consent would 
change their behaviour did not appear to materialise. The material on which we were 
working carries, also, ethical complications, in view of the kinds of disapproval of 
young people's exposure to such texts which emerges from time to time in ways 
well-documented by, for instance, David Buckingham's work (1996) on the James 
Bulger case and Child's Play 3. These ethical difficulties are not related particularly 
to the process of research, in this case, however, as much as the pedagogical 
decisions to use horror texts in the first place. My view of the ethical position here is, 
effectively, that of my school and department, which believe the public representation 
of horror texts to be distorted and simplistic, and that the responsibly-conducted 
study of texts which evidence suggests are compelling to teenagers is preferable to 
the wholesale suppression of them. 
In certain ways, this research situation bears superficial similarity to the action 
research tradition, limited as it is to a very specific case study, and featuring teacher-
as-researcher. There are clear differences, however, which distance this study from 
the action research tradition. The first is in the purpose of the research. A principal 
characteristic of action research, as described by Cohen and Manion (1994), is that it 
is practically oriented: 
It is a means of remedying problems diagnosed in specific situations, or of 
improving in some way a given set of circumstances. (page 188) 
The aim of the present study, on the other hand, is not to do with problem-solving, or 
the improvement of teaching method, but with the understanding of a particular 
cultural field, in particular cultural and social contexts, one specific feature of which is 
their location in an educational setting and set of practices. 
Secondly, Cohen and Manion emphasise the use by action research of a scientific 
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paradigm and the methods associated with it, albeit loosely. This study, by contrast, 
employs an ethnographic methodology which seeks to problematize the nature of 
discourse, the situatedness of the cultural events observed, and the subjectivities of 
both observed and observer, in the ways described above. 
My role as participant observer is ambiguous. In one sense, I am perfectly placed by 
the role of teacher to observe, interpret, analyse. I can choose my desk as I write the 
classroom journal, place it to get the best view, side on to the pupils as they face the 
TV screen. It is easy for me to set up interviews, both inside and outside the lesson: 
they are interested in the idea of my research, trusting, eager to be interviewed - in 
all these senses, I am observer rather than participant. In other ways, however, the 
teacher-researcher, in his or her own classroom, is more of a participant then the 
usual "participant observer", who becomes temporarily immersed in the culture undr 
study. The teacher, by contrast, is a genuine participant, permanently a part of the 
culture he or she is subjecting to enquiry. This causes a number of potential 
problems. I have a clear vested interest in many features of the social situation I am 
describing and analysing. I have partly determined the media studies course in which 
these students are engaged; I am in a role of authority - even, perhaps, the 
representative of the dominant culture which at times I represent as oppressive. As I 
observe processes of analysis and enquiry in these students, I am simultaneously 
intervening in them. I am involved in a number of processes of social regulation: 
organising lessons, restraining certain kinds of behaviour, promoting others, 
grouping pupils, intervening in the organisation of the physical space in which they 
work, regulating their access to resources. In all these senses, I seem very different 
from classic examples of participant observer, such as Paul Willis in Learning to 
Labour (1977), working alongside his "lads", on their side, with no vested interest in 
the regulatory systems that circumscribe their lives, and free to champion their cause 
against an Althusserian ideological apparatus. In fact, against this kind of example, I 
look more like a part of such an apparatus. 
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But the teacher's role as ideological mediator is complex, especially where the 
central project is one of cultural enquiry, as is often the case in English and Media 
Studies. The organisation of such cultural enquiry can never be neutral, is always 
ideologically weighted. Even the relatively uncontroversial analysis of the Cox Report 
described English teaching in terms of five "views of the subject": adult skills; cultural 
heritage; cultural analysis; personal growth; and cross-curricular (HMSO, 1989, 
2.20-2.27). This range clearly demonstrates the possibilities for this area of the 
curriculum both to reinforce dominant cultural meanings or to contest them; or, 
perhaps more often, to do both. Richard Johnson, in an article of Cultural Studies in 
The English Magazine (1989), sees English teachers (and others) in a more 
oppositional role, as informal employers of the perspectives and methods of Cultural 
Studies: 
... Cultural Studies is present in the curriculum as an element (irritant? 
stimulant?) 'in and against' the conventional academic disciplines or school 
subjects. It has become a perspective within subject disciplines, often a 
kind of internal critique of them. (page 11) 
I would regard myself as a teacher involved in this kind of internal critique, both in 
terms of engagement in national debates about the nature of "English" and in terms 
of the kind of direct resistance to certain forms of statutory cultural regulation as 
those described by Ken Jones in his analysis of the 1993 SATs boycott (Jones, 
1994). Nevertheless, short of resigning from teaching, we all find ourselves at the 
mercy of daily contradictions: obliged effectively to police a national prescription of 
Shakespeare, for instance, while selecting Media syllabuses that require the 
teaching of music television, comics and science fiction. 
This contradictory position undoubtedly affects my role as participant observer in this 
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project. It both alienates me from and brings me closer to the experiences of and 
allegiances to popular film that students bring to the course, and which are the 
subject of much of this study. Equally contradictory is the history I bring to the 
lessons I describe here. I can clearly recall the suppression of the popular that 
existed at the boarding school I attended as a child - I can remember reading a 
popular novel (a James Bond book, I think), disguised in the paper cover of a worthy 
Victorian novel. I can remember the ideology of "a love of literature", fostered by 
school and university, and its refusal of any pleasure I had from watching Dr Who 
from behind a cushion, or making Airfix models of horror stars of the classic films of 
the Universal Studios - Frankenstein, Dracula, the Phantom of the Opera, the 
Wolf Man. And I remember the excitement, as a young teacher, of the moment when 
the notorious Pett twins, in my first CSE English class, brought in the record of Meat 
Loaf's "Bat Out of Hell", and our agreement that, yes, this could count as a poem for 
the coursework folder. 
These histories, furthermore, are all a part of my identity as an adult male - the public 
school I attended was all-male; the films and books of my childhood were dominated 
by images of powerful men; and my early experiences of the horror genre 
represented women briefly, and as victims. The descriptions of boyhood in the 
postwar period by writers in the Cultural Studies tradition, such as David Jackson 
(1990) and Andrew Tolson (1977), relate experiences which, in many ways, I share: 
a world of comic-book heroes and sporty boys. In other ways, however, my 
experiences were different: the public school I attended showed - at least I can 
remember - less homophobia and brutality than the boarding schools described by 
Jackson and Tolson; and the prevalent mood was receptive to representations of 
emotion, and rooted in the hippie subculture of the late sixties and early seventies. 
My work as an adult with both boys and girls in schools over twenty years has left me 
sympathetic to both in different ways. Like many teachers, I find the enormous 
goodwill of many girls (such as Lucy and Jessica in this study) rewarding and 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 23 
energising. I also (again like many teachers) am drawn to, and in some ways identify 
with, different kinds of oppositional subculture in groups of boys and girls (again, 
these are referred to in the course of this thesis). 
Nevertheless, my understandings of gender relations in school, as in society, have 
always been, and will no doubt always be, problematic and contradictory, shaped as 
they must be by the legacies of feminisms, men's relation to feminism, the brief 
moment of men's groups, and current readings of gender in cultural and media 
theory. As Stephen Heath remarks, "Men's relation to feminism is an impossible one. 
... Men have a necessary relation to feminism - the point, after all, is that it should 
change them too ..." (1987). This "impossible" relationship will always be, for me as it 
is for Heath, a kind of faultline running through my commentary and point of view. It 
is clear, for instance, that as an adult male with a particular viewing history of my 
own, in an interview with two thirteen-year old girls whose fascinations lie with 
domestic contexts of horror, and character types derived from dolls and babysitters, I 
must recognise the differences of perspective and experience. The evidence of the 
study shows, however, that the boundaries blur time and time again. Carol Clover 
(1992) argues that all viewers of horror, male and female, are in certain ways 
positioned as (female) victims. And many readings of The Company of Wolves 
contradict simple patterns of gendered response. Leo's "letter", for instance, at the 
head of this chapter, is typically boyish in its enthusiasm for lighting techniques and 
gore; but more similar to girls' responses in the way it closely follows the female 
central character, and the location of her narrating consciousness - her bedroom, 
and her toys. 
All I can hope to do is to recognise contradiction rather than suppress it. The 
discourse of my study is itself hybrid: the dispassionate tones of analysis mingled 
with the more personal residue of my own involvement in the daily work of the 
classroom - the exhilaration, frustration, confusion, the changing moods of the 
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physical space and the young people and adults who use it, and the movements and 
transformations of image and word in the texts we read and make. The attempt to 
describe these young people in the act of making meanings will, inevitably, be a 
description of myself also, as James Clifford observes of ethnographic writing in 
general: 
It has become clear that every version of an "other", wherever found, is 
also the construction of a "self', and the making of ethnographic texts ... 
has always involved a process of "self-fashioning". (1986, pages 23 and 
24) 
English teachers can never escape narrative. This will be a fractured narrative of 
meaning-making in the classroom, shot through with my own hopes and ambitions, 
incomprehensions of, sympathy with, excitement about, the young people I work 
with. It will be, as Clifford remarks of ethnographic truth, "partial - committed and 
incomplete" (page 7). 
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Chapter 2: The Company of Wolves: narratives of 
transformation, and representations of women in 
horror 
Introduction 
This chapter will describe and analyse The Company of Wolves. In particular, it will 
look at two aspects of the film which are highlighted in the Year 9 Media Studies 
course on which this study is based: the figure of the werewolf; and the 
heroine/narrator figure. This chapter will explore the histories of these figures, which 
belong to two narrative traditions, one rooted in folk and fairytale, one in the horror 
film. How are the meanings accreted over the course of these histories transformed 
again in this text? And which of those meanings will be available to which viewers of 
the film? 
Within these questions, there is a more fundamental question about the nature of the 
visual image. How does it convey meaning; how is it read, by comparison with a 
verbal sign, for instance; how is a particular image selected from a particular 
paradigm; how is it composed in relation to other images; how is this momentary 
composition - say, a single frame in a moving sequence - articulated with the other 
similarly composed frames in the syntagmatic structure of the moving image? These 
questions will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 3, in the context of how images 
are read by specific viewers. 
The film was made in 1984 in the UK, directed by Neil Jordan, and written by Angela 
Carter, who based the script on a story from her collection, The Bloody Chamber 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 26 
(1981). Carter's original story takes the form of a series of cautionary tales about 
werewolves, in a mid-European peasant setting, delivered by a narrative voice that 
suggests a grandmaternal wise woman. The longest, and final tale of the series is an 
adaptation of the story of Little Red Riding Hood. There are some important 
differences, however. Carter makes the story one of female initiation into adulthood, 
in which the colour of the girl's cloak is explicitly associated with menstrual blood, 
and the werewolf with male sexuality. The passive girl of the fairytale, helplessly 
eaten by the wolf, is transformed into a strong and active heroine, who faces the 
werewolf fearlessly, and overcomes him by sleeping with him. As a transformation in 
a cultural-historical process, this textual series clearly signals the feminist intentions 
of Carter, a view endorsed by commentators on her work, such as Bristow and 
Broughton (1997), or Lucie Armitt (1997), who presents "The Company of Wolves" 
as a progressive transformation of the fairytale. However, the movement is not so 
simply from a disenfranchised past to an emancipatory present, though that's how it 
appears at first. Angela Carter was well aware of the history of the folktale she used 
as her raw material: she includes her own translation of Charles Perrault's "Little Red 
Riding Hood" in The Virago Book of Fairytales (Carter, 1991). And she appends a 
note, referring to Jack Zipes' genealogy of the story (Zipes, 1983), along with her 
own summary of the mediaeval French folk tale from which Perrault's version 
derived. In this version, as Zipes recounts, the girl is, like Carter's heroine, active, 
bold and clever. She drinks the blood and eats the flesh of her grandmother, 
preserved by the wolf; and survives, fooling the wolf at the end of the story. Zipes 
presents this as a symbolic account of a ritual peasant initiation into adulthood, in 
which the child leaves the community to find and prove her adult self, encounters the 
wolf, symbol of adult sexuality, and symbolically consumes her grandmother, whom 
she will eventually replace in the community. Carter's awareness of this version of 
the story, as well as the similarity it bears to her version, seems to show that the 
strength of her heroine depends on structures that gesture forwards to the social 
identities opened up by contemporary feminisms; and backwards to a time when 
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strong female roles were an important part of the bonds of solidarity holding the 
community together. This construction of the female was quite intolerable, as Zipes 
points out, to the bourgeois-aristocratic ideal of Perrault, who transforms the story to 
serve as a cautionary model of female passivity to the children of the courts and 
salons of seventeenth century France. 
In the film, two important changes are made. Firstly, another narrative layer is added, 
by introducing another version of the heroine, in contemporary guise - a modern 
teenager, dreaming in her bedroom. The dream produces the outer layer of the 
narrative structure - she dreams the entire Red Riding Hood story, as well as a 
number of subordinate narratives, themselves recounted by narrators within the 
dream (either the girl herself, or her grandmother). The teacher who devised and 
taught the course on The Company of Wolves was, as Chapter 1 indicated, 
concerned to make the role of the strong heroine an explicit subject of her teaching, 
and to locate it within the history of representations of women in the horror genre. 
This strategy has been, in many ways, successful, challenging stereotypical views of 
women in fantasy narratives, and in the preconceptions of many students in the 
school. However, predictably enough, the question of horror heroines is engaged 
with differently by male and female students; and a more passionate interest, as well 
as different forms of audience identification, are observable among the girls in this 
study (several of whose responses will be considered in subsequent chapters). 
Secondly, the werewolf transformation scenes, though present in the story, become 
something quite different in the film - they are considerably extended, and become, 
effectively, part of the tradition of werewolf transformation scenes so clearly 
established in the film horror genre. These scenes are close contemporaries of 
Michael Jackson's Thriller (John Landis, 1984), made in the previous year, and An 
American Werewolf in London (John Landis, 1981), made three years earlier. They 
are the sequences that exerted a fascinated attraction for successive groups of 
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students (especially boys) in this Year 9 course. Immediate responses to these will 
be described in Chapter 6; and students' writing about the transformation scenes will 
be examined throughout the study. These sequences seem important in ways which 
were not fully taken account of in the planning of the course: they provoked strong 
reactions, provided a source of (horrified) pleasure which seemed clearly related to 
the attractions for audiences of the horror genre in general; and images from the 
transformation scenes were most often chosen by students, along with images of the 
girl, to use in their work. 
Both of these changes, I will argue, introduce elements of popular cinema into a film 
which, in many ways, deploys an art-house aesthetic. Indeed, an embracing of both 
ends of the aesthetic continuum is a feature Angela Carter would probably have 
approved of, and which is noted in her work by Bristow and Broughton: 
At home in the worlds of 'high' and 'popular culture, her work refuses 
hierarchies between differing genres and forms.... because [her] works 
reach allusively into a great many spheres of culture, they hold something 
for everyone. Carter's is a distinctly democratic aesthetic. 
(1997, pages 7/9) 
Beauty and the Beast: a brief cultural history of the werewolf 
James Twitchell (1985) argues that the werewolf of the cinema is to be distinguished 
from the werewolf of folktale in that it becomes a hybrid creature, not a full wolf: 
Twitchell prefers to call it the Wolf-Man (as indeed it is termed in the Universal films 
starring Lon Chaney Jr.). Twitchell suggests that this more disturbing creature is 
necessary, as an ordinary wolf simply would not be frightening enough for the 
purposes of the horror movie. My suggestion in this chapter is different - that it is not 
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what the creature becomes that is particularly significant. Rather, it is the event of 
transformation which defines the werewolf of film: a powerful miniature narrative, with 
its own set of generic conventions, its own narrative structure, its own set of 
increasingly expensive and spectacular special effects, its own special fascination for 
horror audiences and historians of cinema. 
Twitchell rightly points out that the real ancestor of the cinematic werewolf is 
Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde; or, more influentially, 
Rouben Mamoulian's 1932 film. The transformation scenes, and the first sequence 
in particular (Illustration 1), are well-documented. Tom Milne (1969) records how 
Mamoulian refused to reveal how parts of the transformation of Fredric March 
appeared to happen before our eyes: 
To this day he has refused to reveal the secret of how the transformations 
were achieved in front of the camera. but it is not difficult to guess that they 
were done with coloured filters. changed to reveal different layers of 
makeup, and given a hallucinatory sense of actually happening before our 
eyes by the extraordinary soundtrack. (p 49) 
Illustration 2.1: Fredric 
March transforms, in Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
(Rouben Mamoulian, 
1932) 
   
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Though we are often dismissive about special effects, condemning them as 
gimmickry, and associating them with superficial viewing habits, it may be that we 
need to reconsider what is, after all, simply an extension of a medium which entirely 
consists of technologies of representation. Such dismissive attitudes may be more to 
do with socially constructed mechanisms of taste than with any intrinsic quality of the 
techniques themselves. In this case, the coloured filters, and the overdubbing of a 
soundtrack based on manipulated recordings of Mamoulian's own heartbeat, can be 
seen as a complex visual and auditory semiotic intimately concerned with, not only 
the representation of subjectivity, but the material of subjectivity. There is the 
makeup transforming the subject, the inner psyche transparently represented by the 
outer material features; Fredric March's virtuosic transformatory expressions and 
gestures (Eisenstein notes [1968, pages 28-29] how the work of the actor makes 
important contributions to the montage process); the sense of identity in crisis 
signalled by the heartbeat, metaphor of life and passion, appealing to an audience 
schooled by radio, then the talkies, in auditory representations of subjectivity (see 
Connor, 1997, on auditory constructions of modern and postmodern subjectivities). 
There are four features of this famous sequence which I want to develop. Firstly, to 
note that the transformation itself is important, as an event, a narrative. Frightening 
though Hyde might be, the real frisson comes from the agony of the change, which 
encompasses all the uncertainty of what Twitchell calls the Victorian schizophrenia, 
all the superego's guilt at the erupting id, all the horror of human bodily 
transformation, normally too slow to notice (in the aging process), accelerated 
spectacularly. But the point I wish to make here is that the transformation - and this 
film version in particular - is to become an important generic feature of the werewolf 
sub-genre, structured by a particular set of conventions, which it teaches to its 
audiences, who then delightedly respond to, and themselves transform, both its 
predictability and the unexpected variations on the theme. 
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Secondly, it is about transforming identity, and this is emphasised by the complex 
range of subjective camera shots in this sequence - shots emphasising the giddy 
exhilaration of transformation, the shock of a new identity, registered as we look, with 
Hyde, into the mirror (a combination of subjective and objective point-of-view), and 
the shots inviting the viewer to share Jekyll's memories, whirling round in alternating 
exhortations to pleasure and duty (these structures, of course, polarised elements of 
social identities important to the story's Victorian point of origin, and differently 
important to the film's American and European audiences caught at the point of the 
rise of fascism). 
Thirdly, it is about threat- as it transforms, this changing creature offers a complex 
threat to us. The threat of being like it - the invitation to see through its eyes; the 
threat it will offer to future victims, with whom we might also be invited to identify; the 
threat of transgression of the natural order. Noel Carroll (1990) describes a class of 
horror monsters he describes as "fusion" monsters, made from combinations of 
actual creatures (in Hyde's case, in a clearly Darwinian reference, a combination of 
human and ape) to create a response of disgust at the disruption of boundaries in 
the vision of the natural order available to us, even compulsory to us, since the 
Enlightenment. 
And, fourthly, it is about concealment and revelation: the thrill for the audience 
depends on the withholding of the horrific image, and its partial revelation. This 
semiotic of partial revelation applies to the syntagm of the whole film - the 
transformation scenes mustn't occur too frequently, or they lose their function as 
climactic moments in the tragic narrative of Jekyll's loss of self; and to the syntagm 
of the transformation sequence, where the transformation is anatomized for the 
viewer in a montage of closeups (face, hand, face again) and subjective shots that 
eliminate, of course, our view of the transformation altogether. 
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Twitchell's conclusion about the significance of the werewolf - and of Hyde himself -
is that it represents the incest taboo. His argument is tortuous, involving a 
complicated relation between Hyde and a paternal figure on the one hand (an 
invention of the movie versions, and paternally related to Hyde in being the father of 
Jekyll's fiancée), whom he beats to death, and a little match girl, present in 
Stevenson's story, whom he tramples, and whom Twitchell reads as an embryonic 
sister figure. In any case, to limit the representational posibilities of so potent a figure 
to one particular neurotic manifestation seems improbably reductive. It would seem 
more productive to argue that the monsters of the Gothic novel and the late-Victorian 
Gothic revival are capable of representing all aspects of human identity that cause 
concern, fear and, in equal measure, fascination in their own social and historical 
circumstances. More specifically, the figure of the werewolf is invariably associated 
with the more threatening aspect of human sexuality, as Twitchell demonstrates 
effectively. The exact nature of this anxiety, and the forms of its representation, 
change, of course, throughout history; though the images employed by successive 
societies to express it always carry the accreted meanings of earlier usage, just as 
the makers and readers of the new signs bear the marks of earlier subjectivities. So, 
as Jack Zipes (1983) notes, the werewolf through the Renaissance and Reformation 
was employed by the churches of France to identify, make concrete, and thus to 
persecute and expel those human instincts of which its teachings disapproved: 
The entire period from 1480 to 1650 can be seen as a historical transition 
in which the Catholic Church and the reform movement of Protestantism 
combined efforts with the support of the rising mercantile and industrial 
classes to rationalize society and literally to exterminate social deviates 
who were associated with the devil such as female witches, male 
werewolves, Jews, and gipsies. 
(page 22) 
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So the werewolf becomes an expression of what were previously natural sexual 
instincts, demonised by the new rationalism of the rising bourgeoisie. As Foucault 
remarks (1976) of the repressive hypothesis in general, of course, such imagery and 
the processes of social control associated with it gives rise both to a repression of 
the hated image, the figure constituted as Other; and, simultaneously, to a most 
eloquent discourse surrounding the forbidden object. 
Twitchell argues that the monstrous image of the divided self, or at least the bestial 
half of it, undergoes a series of changes from the Enlightenment to the late Victorian 
period, in which it is successively viewed sympathetically (as in Mary Shelley's 
creature), enthused over as a dynamic natural energy (as in the romantic sublime), 
repressed (as in mid-Victorian realism, in the novels of the Brontës and Dickens, for 
instance), and delighted in (in the fin-de-siOcle 'decadence' of Jekyll and Hyde and 
The Picture of Dorian Gray): 
What the neoclassicist attempted to reconcile and the romantic 
acknowledged, the mid-Victorian tried to repress and the late Victorian 
delighted in, or at least pretended to. 
(page 232) 
So the figure of the werewolf arrives as raw semiotic material on the doorstep of the 
modern horror movie, replete with a history of animal passions and repression, 
leading to opaque codings of those aspects of selfhood successive societies found it 
hardest to speak of - and thus were powerfully compelled memorably to represent. 
Before looking at other examples of werewolves in film, and then at The Company of 
Wolves in more detail, it's worth repeating the four features I have stressed in th 
Mamoulian transformation scene: transformation; identity; threat; 
concealment/revelation. A common characteristic of these is their dynamic structure - 
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they all operate as the equivalent of verbs in the syntagm of the film, the verbs "to 
change", "to be", "to threaten", and "to conceal/reveal". The agents of these actions 
operate at different levels in the text, however. The agent of the first three is the 
fictional character; the agents of the third are the authors of the text. The sum of 
these actions constitutes the cinematic werewolf: a construct of fluidity and liminality, 
difficult to pin down, even to see properly, always on the move, occupying a shadowy 
borderland, here one minute, gone the next, defying nominalisation, noun become 
verb, agent become action. I want to relate this quality to two theories, which will be 
more fully explored in later chapters. The first is the theory of the sublime. The 
second is social semiotic theory of visual communication. 
The category of the sublime, and how it might be synthesised with a social semiotic 
understanding of young people's uses of horror films, will be developed more fully in 
Chapters 7 and 8. It is necessary to anticipate these here with a brief summary of the 
salient points. Derived from the Enlightenment, then Romantic notion of a 
phenomenon inspiring awe (terror and pleasure) by its measureless extent or 
intensity, the sublime is a philosophical category well-placed to provide an account of 
the contradictory emotions of the horror viewer, and of the images which provoke 
them. The version of the contemporary sublime developed later in this study 
borrows from the pre-Critical writings of Immanuel Kant (1763/1960) an image of an 
empty desert, populated by the human imagination with ghouls. My argument is that 
both parts of this double structure function in the horror genre: the empty space is 
terrifying because of what it might conceal, and because it represents the unknown 
and unknowable by images of absence; the spectacular monsters of fantasy are 
terrifying because of the spaces they inhabit and because they represent the 
unknown and unknowable by images of presence. Furthermore, as Kant made clear, 
the entire phenomenon of the sublime can only be understood in terms of 
subjectivity: it is the human subject who feels belittled by immeasurable spaces, and 
terrified by the monsters s/he invents to fill them. 
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Secondly, I argue that these poles of the sublime - the empty and the replete - can 
be aligned, historically, to poles of aesthetic pleasure: the empty sublime to the 
sublimated, ascetic preferences associated by Bourdieu (1984) with the Kantian 
"pure gaze"; the replete sublime to the popular pleasures he associates with Kant's 
"barbarous taste", and with Bakhtin's carnival (1965/1968). 
Thirdly, I follow other commentators (Donald, 1992; Connor, 1995) in seeing the 
sublime as a structure determined by liminality: etymologically, it refers to the lintel 
(limen), beyond which we strive to see, know; yet which simultanously inhibits our 
view. It is, thus, likely to be brought into play to represent the unknown - either 
repressed past knowledge, or new possibilities, as yet unexplored. 
Fourthly, I suggest that the two poles - and the patterns of aesthetic pleasure 
associated with them (especially in the context of modern film) can't be divorced, but 
stand in a dialectic relation. This relation, furthermore, isn't characterised only by a 
mutual informing and determination of one pole by the other, but, in the postmodern 
moment, by ambiguity and inversion. 
How does the sublime relate to the dynamic of the transformation sequence? Let me 
consider each of the visual verb-equivalents in turn, in relation to a sequence from 
another film, the 1950s horror film, I Was a Teenage Werewolf (Gene Fowler, Jr, 
1957). The four structures I have noted in Mamoulian's film are all in place in the 
transformation scene: the disturbing nature of change itself, and its pain; the crisis of 
identity; the threat of the emergent werewolf; the simultaneous concealment and 
revelation of the sublime image, again by a mixture of closeup and subjective 
camera. 
1. To change ... 
Illustration 2.2: the end of the 
second transformation sequence in / 
Was a Teenage Werewolf (Gene 
Fowler Jr, 1957) 
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The change is the moment which constitutes the werewolf in the visual semiotic. This 
presents an image which functions both as what Kress and Van Leeuwen, in their 
social semiotic grammar of the visual image (1996), call an analytical image and a 
narrative image. An analytical image has a classificatory purpose, which is, here, to 
construct the werewolf, referring to the werewolf paradigm, embedding this paradigm 
in the syntagm of the filmic sequence. The classification operates in two ways. In 
one, the emphasis is on the synchronic, as in Illustration 2, and assembles the 
attributes which constitute the visual representation of "werewolf": hair, teeth, and 
elements of the human form (in this case, the collar of the baseball jacket). What the 
single frame can't show, however, is the transformation, the painful yoking of man to 
wolf implicit in the composite noun "werewolf" (man-wolf); or the painful division or 
collision of aspects of the psyche which this might represent. This can only be shown 
diachronically: hence the syntagm which assembles images of the human in various 
stages of transformation. So the assembling of classificatory attributes depends 
partly on a narrative process: noun becomes verb, suggesting the exciting and 
troubling unstable nature of the paradigm. It is a narrative image in the sense that it 
is part of a dynamic structure in which the actions of the narrative are projected by 
the text. If it were a sentence in language, it might be that "transform" would be the 
main verb, governing a sequence of subordinate clauses, whose finite verbs might 
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denote the noise which triggers the change, the growth of hair on the boy's face, the 
agonised twisting of his features, and the turning towards the prospective victim as 
the transfomation concludes. 
If it is a verb-equivalent, it becomes necessary to ask about agency and transitivity, 
or their visual equivalents. In this sequence, the immediate agent of the 
transformation would seem to be the werewolf, and it would seem an intransitive 
process: he transforms. However, in this as in all werewolf films, the transformation 
is clearly signalled as reluctant, and involuntary - in this sequence it is triggered by a 
loud noise, the school bell. So the question of an absent agency is provoked, the 
original cause of the werewolf's malady. In this film, it is a ruthless psychoanalyst, 
whose ostensible motive is to 'cure' the boy of his delinquent tendencies, whose 
actual motive is unscrupulous research into the primitive foundations of human 
behaviour. Here, then, the structures of agency suggest a cruel adulthood, whose 
concern, faced with the threat of teenage rebellion, is to intensify it, expose it, expel 
and destroy it. 
2 To be ... 
In tandem with, and closely related to the transforming process, are the processes 
signalling identity, the equivalents of the verb "to be". The verbs which state 
existence, the relational and existential structures of language, are embedded within 
narrative processes, telling us who the heroine is, for instance, but don't usually 
contribute to the dynamic narrative process. In the werewolf transformation 
sequence, because it is the question of identity that is at issue, the normally static 
nature of these relational processes are disrupted. In verbal terms, it is as if the 
clause "He is a typical High School teenager" has to be succeeded in rapid 
succession by "He's a teenager with rapidly growing facial hair"; "He's a hybrid, part-
teenager, part animal"; "He's an animal - but with some human characteristics". In 
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short, the usual processes of identifying a secure identity with relatively stable 
attributes becomes destabilised, "to be" turns into "to become", and even the final 
stages of the transformation are marked with contradictory signs of hybridity and the 
promise, from the genre and the individual text, of further reversals and repetitions of 
the process. In this film, then an image with an apparently stable identity marked by 
a set of easily recognisable attributes (baseball jacket; jeans; Tony Curtis hairstyle; 
and matching circumstantial attributes in the High School location) is replaced by the 
classificatory attributes of the werewolf (hair, teeth), though not his usual location. 
The juxtaposition must have seemed startling to '50s audiences, accustomed only to 
the werewolf in traditional Gothic settings. The questions to ask here, perhaps, and 
which I will address in the context of The Company of Wolves, are: what 
transformations of subjectivity might these images represent? how will these 
represented identities interact with the social identities of viewers? 
2. To threaten ... 
Illustration 2 shows a frame in one of the transformation sequences, at the point 
where the werewolf, a high-school teenager, has just finished the transformation and 
is about to attack a girl in the high-school gym. The action signalled most clearly here 
is the threat. Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) describe how a direct gaze at the 
viewer constitutes an image act of demand - in this case, it is the affect of fear that's 
demanded of the audience. The audience is, however, identified with the victim, a 
teenage girl in the high school gym, whose point-of-view, upside down on a vaulting 
horse, is represented by the inverted image. The significance of the image won't be 
understood, though, by any audience, as a single frame. It is likely to register, and be 
remembered, as part of a composite image made up of other images in the 
sequence, other images of the transforming werewolf elsewhere in the film, and 
other images from the werewolf paradigm familiar to particular viewers. It is this kind 
of impact on the viewer of particularly powerful images, whose significance derives 
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from sources in the text and discourse wider than the frames of the individual image 
would permit, which social semiotics describes as characteristic of synchronic 
syntagms (Hodge and Tripp, 1986; Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, 1996). Any audience of this film will remember the first transformation 
scene in the film, where the point-of-view is exactly reversed: we see through the 
werewolf's eyes, and, though contradictorily, are invited to identify with him, an 
identification strengthened by other features of the film's narrative which presents 
the boy as a victim of the adult world. The synchronic syntagm, then, will serve as a 
touchstone for bundles of meanings diachronically accreted, as well as its own 
synchronic impact. Our fear of the werewolf, in line with the victim's, will be 
effectively merged with sympathy, an instance of the complex audience identification 
typical of horror, emphasised by Carol Clover: 
... just as attacker and attacked are expressions of the same self in 
nightmares, so are they expressions of the same viewer in horror film. We 
are both Red Riding Hood and the Wolf; the force of the experience, in 
horror, comes from knowing both sides of the story. (1993: page 12) 
This threat can be seen as archaic in certain senses. How exactly we come know 
"both sides of the story" could be explained in different ways. We could refer to 
Freud's theory (1919/1990) that our sense of the uncanny comes from repressed 
parts of our own psychic development; or from the repression of archaic beliefs 
which permitted the existence of the supernatural. Freud, in effect, both distinguishes 
between and simultaneously associates the archaic history of the individual and of 
the society. We could refer to Bakhtin's construction of an aesthetic of grotesque 
realism, inverting modern structures of taste, and proclaiming the value of a 
gloriously grotesque, defiantly material aesthetic associated with the social structures 
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of mediaeval peasantry. The supposition of a folk-aesthetic of this kind, resurrected 
in the excess of popular cinema (an explanation of the popular adopted, for instance, 
by Fiske, 1989), helps to explain the pleasurable aspect of the threat of horror. And 
finally, Clover's remarks, employing the archetypal narrative of Red Riding Hood, 
remind us of the mediaeval provenance of the werewolf narrative, strengthened 
deliberately in Angela Carter's Company of Wolves, and perhaps, though less self-
consciously, by the visual aesthetic of popular horror cinema. 
If contemporary horror reawakens archaic structures, though, it also transforms 
them. It can afford, secure in our knowledge of the genre, to invert images for 
contrastive effect. So, in this particular sequence from / Was a Teenage Werewolf, 
we see a contrastive location - the sublime creature is out of place here. Viewers will 
know from earlier films and from elsewhere in this film that his proper place is the 
sublime space of the night-time forest. This odd location - the daytime high school -
has a multiple effect. Firstly, it could serve to heighten the sense of the werewolf as 
victim, and, indeed, after the attack on the girl, he immediately becomes a lost, 
persecuted figure, pursued by a vengeful crowd, bemused by the daylight. Secondly, 
it may serve the odd flipover effect of the sublime image, in which the traditional 
terrifying space, which is typically exotic and exterior (Gothic castles, forests, 
oceans, mountains) becomes, in the modern horror movie, increasingly domestic 
and interior (especially the bedroom, in films such as Hallowe'en, The Exorcist, 
Poltergeist, or Nightmare on Elm Street) as if to emphasise that the fears 
represented by the sublime, while terrifyingly unfamiliar in some ways, derive from 
the intimately familiar in other ways, as Freud argued in his essay On the Uncanny 
(1919/1990). 
4. Concealment/Revelation 
The previous features of the transformation sequence are part of the textual 
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metafunctions described by Kress and Van Leeuwen (following Halliday) as 
ideational and interpersonal: they govern the way the text represents objects and 
processes, and how it constructs audience readings. The process of concealment 
and revelation is more to do with textual composition: the textual metafunction. 
This final characteristic most immediately suggests the sublime: an image whose 
very semiotic construction makes us intimate with detail and point of view, and 
simultaneously denies us a complete view. / Was a Teenage Werewolf operates both 
ends of this structure of the sublime: the first werewolf transformation completely 
omits any revelation of the werewolf by a use of subjective camera: we only see the 
sublime empty spaces of the forest, replete with the signs of the invisible werewolf: 
jerky camera, breathing, frightening music, and finally the terrified face of the victim. 
The second sequence, from which the illustration is taken, shows a full frontal 
transformation, and then the reverse perspective of the first sequence: the victim's 
point-of-view. The poster of the film (Illustration 3) employs both poles of the sublime 
semiotic: concealing the werewolf's face, his back to us; but revealing a detail, the 
wolfish hand in the foreground, the closeup simultaneously obscuring the rest of the 
creature. 
So, we see that the idea of "werewolf", and any synchronic syntagm that might be 
carried away by the viewer, or selected as a still, to represent it, will imply, or recall, 
the intense activity of the transformation sequence. The dynamic nature of the 
construct - action rather than agent - also suggests the liminality of the sublime - a 
creature in the process of becoming, and then the reverse. The nature of the identity 
in crisis here, threatening itself as much as the actual victim, is clearly signalled by 
the film. The boy who transforms is already an adequate representative of that 
domestic monster so feared by bourgeois America in the '50s - the newly-emergent 
teenager. Michael Landon relates, then, to the general - mostly male - iconography 
of teenage rebellion of the period. Mark Jancovich (1996) points out how novel the 
film's adoption of the teenage point-of-view was, however; how the small 
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Illustration 2.3: the poster of I Was a 
Teenage Werewolf 
  
   
independent studio, AIR was able to depart from the conventional Hollywood 
omission of troubling teenagers, and, by use of a camp B movie style, to circumvent 
the usual processes of censorship. 
The 1 980s inherits, then, a well-established cinematic werewolf, by way of other films 
in the sixties and seventies, such as Hammer's Curse of the Werewolf (1960), which 
again represented the werewolf as youthful, though references to the contemporary 
are obscured behind Hammer's period Gothic setting. Structures of gender, as 
Twitchell points out, derive from a pattern established early in the Jekyll and Hyde 
tradition - in Mamoulian's film, in fact, in which an opposition is constructed between 
a virtuous, redemptive, middle class fiancee and a prostitute, making, in Twitchell's 
words, a four-term structure of gender in which the two women represent polarised 
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aspects of female sexuality to match the two identities of the male central character. / 
Was a Teenage Werewolf also features a virtuous girlfriend and a number of more 
girls (associated with rock 'n' roll and parties in the barn!). Curse of the Werewolf 
contains a redemptive fiancée and a prostitute who becomes first victim of the 
werewolf. These structures of gender, in which women's roles are passive and 
marginalised, as well as serving as simple extensions of the contradictory sexuality 
of the male lead, are still observable in werewolf films of the '80s (An American 
Werewolf in London, The Howling (and its several sequels), Thriller), in which 
representations of gender remain an exploration of male sexuality. The Company of 
Wolves, a contemporary of these, is quite different. 
The Company of Wolves: sublime monsters, sublime spaces, carnival bodies 
I intend only to look in detail at the very end of the film, which includes the climax of 
the Red Riding Hood narrative, in the grandmother's cottage; and the final switch out 
of the dream sequence which forms the bulk of the film, and which is based squarely 
on Angela Carter's story (1981), into the 'outer' narrative envelope of the dreaming 
girl, which is an invention of the film, importing a different set of modalities and 
generic references. 
Of these two sequences, I want to ask: 
• how do they connect the literary source of the story with the paradigm of the 
cinematic werewolf? 
• what are the consequences of the transformation of the text into a visual medium 
(what does the visual sublime look like?) 
• what representations of the self are carried by the figure of the werewolf and the 
heroine? 
• what kinds of reading are made possible/likely by such a text; and for what kinds of 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 44 
reader? 
First, the transformation sequence. The film composes the syntagm of the young 
man, the Hunter/wolf, out of a combination of signifiers from the two paradigms of 
wolf and man, beginning with the phosphorescent eyes, mentioned in the story (and 
also a common initial signifier of impending transformation in vampire and werewolf 
movies). The hair, teeth, hirsute nakedness are all retained in the film image. What is 
different is the actual transformation, which does not happen in the story: the 
process, that is. One minute he's a man with some attributes of wolf; the next, he's a 
wolf. The film foregrounds the process of transformation itself; but not the end part of 
the process. It's as if the process produces the monster - a creature neither animal 
nor human, drawn from a paradigm of horror creatures, characterised by visual 
repulsiveness, and a series of signifiers of pain; so that the effect of horror lies as 
much in the agony of the creature as in the threat it poses. Signifiers of pain are the 
sound effects (such as agonised howling), straining, bursting, tearing effects, and 
signifiers of birth traumas - the emergence of the wolf muzzle from the mouth of the 
transforming man, and the wolf-neck from his shoulders - a sliding of newborn parts 
from the cruelly-stretched apertures of the old body. And an abundance of mucous 
and blood; so that the monstrous creature's body has a surface that looks like flayed 
flesh; or like the inside of the body, a body unnaturally inverted. This paradigm of 
transformation receives considerable semiotic underlining: it's made up of a number 
of shots, in slow-motion, from several angles (Illustrations 4 and 5). 
This is an image of the sublime which fills out the space of mystery with 
uncompromising and savage plenitude. It exemplifies a feature of the modality of 
such images in the horror genre, which is that, in order to operate properly, they 
need to maintain a high modality in two respects: on what Hodge and Kress call the 
semiosic and the mimetic planes (1988). These planes refer to the signification of 
Illustrations 2.4 and 2.5: the final transformation scene of The Company of 
Wolves 
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ideas and material referents respectively - perhaps roughly corresponding to 
Barthes' connotative and denotative planes (Barthes: 1978). So on the semiosic 
plane, this image is clearly representative of abstract ideas (the threat of male 
sexuality, for instance) through a syntagm composed of signifiers which, in terms of 
Hodge and Kress's continuum of transparent-opaque, come about midway, or 
thereabouts, depending, of course, on the experience and social context of the 
viewer. Also on the semiosic plane, the syntagm is a transparent signifier of the 
genre, so that it will be perceived as part of a paradigm of monster images itself 
subject to specific diachronic transformations. 
But the history is more complex than that of the transformation paradigm invoked in 
the '50s by I Was a Teenage Werewolf. It is related to a more recent class of fantasy 
monsters in films whose particular aesthetic of spectacular excess has been made 
possible by a new generation of special effects in latex, pneumatically-operated 
prosthetics, and, more recently, computer-generated morphing techniques. This 
often produces creatures whose full shape is ill-defined, or never fully revealed, or 
whose surface is never completely resolved. This links the wolf-monster in this film 
with the creature in Alien (whose whole body we never see till the sequel - and then 
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it is parasitically conjoined with, dispersed throughout, the ship, the building. Or with 
the Brundle-Fly in David Cronenberg's remake of The Fly (1986). This particular 
paradigm, distinctive enough to have become criteria! to a virtual sub-genre, is 
sometimes referred to as body-horror. Mark Jancovich (1992) reads this as a 
typically postmodern signifier of identity in crisis - the creature (sometimes a 
transformation of a 'normal' human character) shows signs of physical dissolution 
representative of psychic disintegration or at least uncertainty: boundaries between 
physical categories (such as the inside and outside of the body) become unclear. 
Jancovich also notes the frequent use of birth imagery: 
As Barbara Creed points out, Cronenborg often presents the body as a 
kind of womb which gives birth to a new life-form which discards the 
original body and gives birth to a new life-form which discards the original 
body and the original self; although it comes from within. Concentration on 
the process of bodily fragmentation and transformation is a way of 
representing and examining the crisis of identity within contemporary 
society. (page 113) 
Jancovich makes two other points of direct relevance to this study. The first is that 
sexuality is deeply implicated in many of the films he discusses; and that, since it 
also dissolves boundaries between bodies, it can provide images which disturb 
settled notions of identity. 
The second is the question of pleasurable responses to these apparently shocking 
and disturbing images. He is insistent that there is a pleasure; and he relates it to a 
sense of liberation from the twin restrictions of bourgeois individualism and state 
regulation and control of the kind Foucault described - especially regulation of the 
body: 
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The forces of transformation within The Thing not only provoke fear and 
repulsion, but also pleasure and excitement. They not only threaten 
engulfment and assimilation, but they also offer the possibility of liberation 
from the conventional limits of the body and the self. (page 114) 
To return to Hodge and Kress's semiosic and mimetic planes: it is clearly a feature of 
these images that, while their meanings operate powerfully on the semiosic plane as 
signifiers of genre and its associated systems of metaphor, they are also powerfully 
anchored in the mimetic plane. While images of the sublime at the other end of the 
spectrum might operate strongly on the semiosic plane with quite low modality on the 
mimetic plane (mist, insubstantial ghosts, allusive images) these images of body-
horror, the extreme form of the plenitude paradigm, need a high modality on the 
mimetic plane, demand to be read as real, down to the last physically correct (if 
displaced) detail, obsessive as Michelangelo about anatomical veracity. 
Similarly, the images of transgression, in which the hypotactic structures of the 
narrative syntagm break into each other, and the modality of the 'real' world is 
disrupted by that of the dream, the nightmare, require high modality on the mimetic 
plane, signifying that the dream has, horrifyingly, become real - and that's where the 
horror lies. This shocking collision of two modalities, and the systems of referentiality 
underpinning them, is a feature of the genre, and relates this film to others. So, the 
penetration sequences remind us of the rupture between reality and the supernatural 
in the Poltergeist (robe Hooper, 1982, and sequels) trilogy, where walls buckle, bend 
and split in the same way, where apertures (TV screens, open fridges, reflections in 
puddles, mirrors - like the windows and mirrors in The Company of Wolves) erupt 
with signifiers of the sublime void and the goblins and ghouls (Kant's terms!) who 
inhabit it. Or the intrusion of nightmare into the waking world in Nightmare on Elm 
Street (Wes Craven, 1984), where Freddy Kruger's presence intrudes into the 
serene and daylight world of smalltown America, his tongue emerging surreally from 
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the telephone, his trademark metal claws surfacing from nowhere in the bath. 
A final perspective to bring to bear on the aesthetic of shocking excess evident in the 
transformation scene is that of Bakhtin's "grotesque realism" (1965/1968). This 
notion presents a vision of the body as visceral, abundant, excessive, fecund, the 
"material bodily principle" which Bakhtin perceives in Rabelais, and which he invokes 
as an antidote to the contemporary tyranny of the bourgeois aesthetic, which has lost 
sight of the vitality of the grotesque, the folk spectacle. Bakhtin describes grotesque 
realism thus: 
The essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the 
lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the 
material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity. 
(page 19) 
Bakhtin perceives the grotesque body as a characteristic repertoire of gestures 
which oppose the sanctimony of official culture and its account of the worldm 
substituting its own irreverent representations of the cycle of life and death. He refers 
to marketplace performances in a way which sounds remarkably similar to the 
writhings of the werewolf transformations in American Werewolf and The Company 
of Wolves: 
... the great majority of these traditional popular comic gestures and tricks 
is based on the mimicking of the three main acts in the life of the grotesque 
body: sexual intercourse, death throes ... and the act of birth. Frequently, 
these three acts are transformed or merged into each other insofar as their 
exterior symptoms and expressions coincide (spasms, tension, popping 
eyes, sweat, convulsions of arms and legs). (pages 353-354) 
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Allied to Bakhtin's image of the reversal of bodily topography, in which birth can take 
place through the mouth or ear, the resemblance to this werewolf transformation in 
which the wolf is "born" through the mouth of the man is striking. 
In some ways, this applies very well to Angela Carter's original story. The werewolf 
is presented as violently material, and the emphasis is clearly on "the lower stratum 
of the body", as his "huge genitals" are described. Furthermore, the sweeping away 
of the protective devices of childhood, along with the spineless heroine of Perrault's 
cautionary tale, give way to a rebirth for the heroine, the onset of her menstruation 
heralding sexual satisfaction in the arms of the wolf. 
The rules of the visual semiotic in cinema result in something different, which fits 
Bakhtin's account differently. To begin with, the conventions of genital 
representations result in the visual equivalent of euphemism as far as the "lower 
stratum" is concerned. Most shots are from the waist up; the girl's nakedness is not 
represented; and the erect phallus of the wolf is clearly prohibited by current 
censorship regulations. In this respect, the literary text enjoys a more liberated play 
with Bakhtin's aesthetic. However, the film's transformation imagery is better placed 
to construct a "grotesque realism". The sense of a bodily destruction which is also a 
rebirth, the turning inside out of the body, the birth of the wolf's head from the man's 
mouth, recalling Bakhtin's account of the stomach replacing the head, the 
succession of swellings and eruptions of skin and muscle - all of these, and their 
defiant refusal of the sublimated aesthetic of the Kantian pure gaze, suggest the 
terrifying but intensely pleasurable creative power of Bakhtin's carnival hell: 
Carnival's hell represents the earth which swallows up and gives birth, it is 
often transformed into a cornucopia; the monster, death, becomes 
pregnant. Various deformities, such as protruding bellies, enormous noses, 
or humps, are symptoms of pregnancy or of procreative power. (page 91) 
LONDIK. 
LINIV 
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Oddly, the consequence of the horrific transformation is a tame wolf. The two 
remaining elements of the first part of the ending syntagm are Rosaleen's embedded 
narrative, in which she becomes the storyteller, telling the wolf a tale of a female 
werewolf, and thus replacing her grandmother as village storyteller (as in the 
mediaeval folk tale which was Perrault's source) ; and the contrasting flurried 
sequence in which Rosaleen's parent and the villagers arrive, the father attempts to 
shoot the wolf by the hearth, is prevented by her mother who recognises that it's her 
daughter by the cross on the necklace around the wolf's neck, while the 
wolf/Rosaleen leaps through the window and into the forest, following her mate and 
the other wolves. 
This seems to signify a shift from plenitude to emptiness: the excessive and fantastic 
detail of the transforming monster gives way to the more naturalistic modality of the 
actual wolf; and this leaps through the window, a repeated sign of boundaries 
between the mundane and the sublime, into the night, again, a repeated sign of the 
sublime as void, empty. The leap through the window also forms the syntagmatic link 
with the final sequence of the film, in the bedroom of the sleeping girl, as she 
awakes, and her dream narrative erupts into the waking world. 
The Ending: the domestic sublime 
This ending, located in the waking world with its naturalistic modality, provides the 
point of transition between the narrative structure based on Carter's original story 
and the new outer narrative envelope the film provides, like a giant speech bubble, 
or, more accurately, a dream bubble, enclosing all the narrative of the original story. 
The sequence shows, then, the following events: 
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• the wolf who was Rosaleen follows the other wolf (the Hunter), leaping out of the 
grandmother's cottage into the forest. 
• the scene switches to the inside of the 'real' Rosaleen's house. in which she is 
dreaming, upstairs in her bedroom: the wolves stream though the door 
• wolves are seen bursting through a portrait on the wall of the landing on Rosateen's 
floor at the top of the house (Illustration 6) 
• inside the bedroom, Rosaleen awakes as a huge wolf smashes through the 
bedroom window, breaking the childhood toys (Illustration 7) 
• the film ends on Rosaleen's screaming face. (Illustration 8) 
Illustration 2.6: wolves are seen bursting 
through a portrait on the wall of the landing on 
Rosateen's floor at the top of the house 
Illustration 2.7: inside the bedroom, Rosaleen 
awakes as a huge wolf smashes through the 
bedroom window, breaking the childhood toys 
Illustration 2.8: the film ends on Rosaleen's 
screaming face 
The external void into which the wolves leapt now seems to be identified by their 
trajectory with the internal space of Rosaleen's house and bedroom, themselves 
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replete with signifiers of (and thereby functioning as an extension of) Rosaleen's 
subjectivity and the socially-constructed sexual identity which expresses it. In this 
way, the signifiers of the empty (and external) sublime from which the wolves leap 
(the streaming blue tonality, the night, the forest) are identified with the internal 
space which is Rosaleen. Similarly, the wolf who is actually breaking through her 
window could be the wolf who, in her dream, was herself: or it could be the 
Hunter/werewolf. 
This syntagm is full of contradictory signs. The wolves themselves have represented 
the threat of death (to her sister, and to herself); but also love (the tame wolf); they 
have been at times the source of fear, at other times opposed to the real fear - the 
transformation monster. The bedroom has been a refuge, stocked with comforting 
images of secure identity; but each of these images now carries more disturbing 
significance, having been transformed in the dream sequences. The bedroom itself 
has become partially transformed from an signifier of interiority into one of exteriority. 
The signifiers of dream and nightmare have become part of the waking world. No 
resolution is offered, which in itself operates as a marker of the modern horror genre, 
which frequently disrupts closure, at least partially, often by a twist-in-the-tail (such 
as the ending of A Nightmare on Elm Street, where Freddy unexpectedly erupts 
again in a fleeting image, suggesting a circular return to the beginning of the 
nightmare cycle). 
The intention of Angela Carter and Neil Jordan seems to have been a representation 
of the liberating power of sexuality for the girl emerging into adulthood. Catherine 
Neale (1996) quotes Carter's commentary on the scene: 
The reason why the girl is pounced on by the wolves at the end is pure 
contingency, since the original ending that Neil wanted turned out to be 
impossible, literally not possible. He said that it must end on an 
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'extraordinary image' - an image of repression being liberated by libido - in 
which the girl would wake up and do the most beautiful dive into the 
floorboards ... there didn't seem any point in writing things he didn't want 
to film. In the final analysis any film is the director's movie. But the 
impossible remains impossible. (page 106) 
Neale cites this passage as part of her argument that Carter, in a project which 
aimed to unite effects of defamiliarisation with contrary effects of pleasure, which she 
hoped would be accomplished by the combination of literary imagery with the 
seductive and communal pleasures of cinema, fails to achieve her goal. The film 
betrays its literary provenance; the cinema is technically incapable of delivering the 
images she and even Jordan want. She finds a collision of the different levels of 
reality here, suggesting that the more realistic nature of the ending collides with the 
desired fantasy. The problem with Neale's analysis, I think, is that its point of 
departure is uniformly from the perspective of literary theory, so it's not surprising 
that the filmic proves troubling. The text has to be seen as a complex hybrid, 
combining elements of popular and elite literature (the folktale and the literary short 
story), and arthouse and popular film. The two voices of her tale - a hybridization 
(Bakhtin (1981) used this term to describe a dialogic fusion of social languages in the 
novel) including a literary voice and a demotic voice of folk-wisdom, the 
representation of oral narrative that Bakhtin calls skaz - are transformed in the film 
into a visual narrative of, on the one hand, obscure symbolism and art-house 
references in the set design to Breughel; and on the other, into the spectacular 
sequences of popular body-horror of which the transformation scenes are the best 
example. 
The upshot of this is, I suggest, that the film 'betrays' its cinematic origins as much as 
its literary ones. It needs to be read in terms of film history and the visual semiotic as 
much as with reference to its literary antecedents. Rather than suggesting that it 
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accomplishes some kind of ideal blend of these features, as well as an ideal balance 
of popular and elite references, I'd prefer to suggest that at least it productively 
problematizes the textual relations between these, opening up, certainly, the 
possibilility of confused and contradictory audience reactions (as will be apparent in 
other chapters in this study); but also opening up a text which grapples with the 
complexities and contradictions in the real world which story and film need to 
represent. The site of such contestations of reality is most often the self: and in this 
film, subjectivity is most eloquently represented by the figure of the girl, which will be 
considered next, in the final section of this chapter. 
Red Riding Hood: modality; taxis; the representation of gender 
The introduction in the film of the outer narrative layer has three effects I would like 
to consider: 
• it adds a different modality to the folktale/fantasy of the Red Riding Hood story 
• it adds another layer of complexity to the story, increasing the hypotactic nature of 
the narrative structure 
• it transforms the figure of the girl 
First, the question of modality. The sequence of the ending is less puzzling, perhaps, 
than it seems. The collision of modalities noted by Neale is, after all, no more 
confusing than the same structure in a number of popular horror films, such as 
Nightmare on Elm Street (Craven, 1984). But the sense of the sequence is to be 
made through the main participant, the figure of the girl, who, like Clover's "Final 
Girls", fuses the function of victim and heroine - and, in this film, narrative 
perspective. This last device ensures that the demotic voice of advice, folk-wisdom 
and exemplary narrative is displaced from its position as the meta-narrative voice of 
Carter's story. It is, partly, subordinated to become the voice of the Grandmother 
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character, played by Angela Lansbury (this character's speech, both dialogue and 
voice-over narrative, contains key extracts from the story). But the main reason for 
the much reduced modality of this voice's message is its syntagmatic subordination 
to the outer narrative of the film, the naturalistic layer in which the figure of Rosaleen 
carries a high modality (named, very specifically located in space and time, with a 
profusion of attributes signalling her particular status and function with considerable 
redundancy). This subordination contains the syntagm derived from Carter's story, 
as it contains the Perrault syntagm, and the folk tale it derives from, like four Russian 
dolls. The outer layer invests the subordinate syntagms with the modality of dreams, 
reinforced by the representation of the mental process of dreaming (images of 
Rosaleen tossing feverishly in bed), of the mood of dreams (especially a blue 
tonality), and the imagery of dreams (exaggerated size, surreal anachronisms) and 
cinematic signifiers of dream (slow motion, soft focus, melodramatic lighting). 
But, just as the hypotactic structures of the syntagm are disrupted, so, of course, is 
the modality of dream/waking. The interpenetration of signifiers of dream and 
signifiers of waking confuse and disrupt the modalities associated with them. So the 
modality of Rosaleen's 'real' bedroom is disrupted when she 'wakes' from the 
'nightmare' of the priest's child, a boy who becomes a werewolf after his encounter 
with the Devil in the wood (one of the subordinate narratives in the dream, presented 
as a tale told by her grandmother). The signifier of 'dream', and hence, of disrupted 
reality, is the residual image of the boy in the nightmare, still visible in the mirror in 
Rosaleen's bedroom. 
More dramatically, at the end of the film, in the second part of the double syntagm of 
the ending, the wolves of the dream sphere literally penetrate Rosaleen's bedroom, 
carrying with them other signifiers of dream (slow motion, dream music, blue tonality, 
the impossible penetration of the portrait on the wall and the wall behind it). This last 
image, the paper-like tearing of an apparently solid wall (Illustration 6), is the 
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equivalent in the semiotics of film of Prospero's "We are such stuff as dreams are 
made on". In both, the modality of naturalism is subordinated to the modality of the 
dream, where anything is possible. There's a danger, though, of suggesting that this 
modality belongs to the world of make-believe. If we accept more complex theories 
of realism (such as Brecht's, 1977, referred to briefly in Chapter 7), it becomes 
possible to read these dreamlike images as representative of a deeper reality, in 
which the apparent solidity of the family home melts before the invasion of adult 
sexuality. This ideological reversal, the stripping away of the old securities and the 
revelation of the brutal realities, is more evocative of Marx and Engels' famous 
pronouncement (similar to Prospero's in its imagery, different in its perspective): 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind. (1976: page 83). 
These powerful fantasy sequences, synchronic syntagms of collapsing reality, should 
be read alongside the other powerful synchronic syntagms that stitch together the 
generic fantasy fabric of the film: the werewolf transformation sequences. Both 
clusters of images serve to disrupt any modality of 'naturalism' surrounding them; to 
represent the double paradigm of the sublime, and to evoke the characteristic 
response to the sublime (fear, excitement, pleasure) traced back in Chapters 7 and 8 
of this study to Kant's account of a degenerate version of the terrifying sublime. 
Whether or not it is true that postmodernism is characterised by a confusion between 
popular and elite culture, as, for instance, Strinati suggests (1992), it looks as if we 
can take for granted, certainly among young people, a general literacy in the 
conventions of fantasy and horror, so that a film like The Company of Wolves, while 
many of its structures might suggest art movies, constructs synchronic syntagms to 
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be read according to the generic rules, modality systems and reception regimes of 
more popular forms. So these sequences of transgression and transformation relate 
to paradigms in other horror movies (discussed later in the context of images of the 
sublime). In effect, the known, transparent rules of genre serve to raise the modality 
of such sequences (yes, it is like this, in this world of fantasy we're all familiar with); 
thus, to reassure - though not to neutralize the effects of fear, pleasure and the 
possible unsettling of feelings of reality and subjectivity. 
Secondly, there is the question of taxis. Kress and Hodge's discussion of hypotaxis 
and parataxis (1988: pages 107 ff) is located within an exposition of their theory of 
how semiotic codes might be read as symptomatic of certain features of the society 
in which they were produced. They ground their theory in a re-reading of Durkheim, 
and specifically of his view of society as structured round the dimensions of power 
and solidarity. His distinction between mechanical solidarity, "where social bonds are 
strong but not complex or highly organized", and organic solidarity, "when there is a 
high degree of differentiation and subordination" (Hodge and Kress, page 108), is 
related by Hodge and Kress to the semiotic categories of parataxis (signifying 
mechanical solidarity) and hypotaxis (signifying organic solidarity). Hypotaxis, then, 
expresses features of a society which is highly organized through complex vertical 
systems of regulation; where solidarity between groups in the society is low, since 
the elaborated codes of communication and social allegiance distance members 
from each other. Two other important assertions are that disruption to these 
structures is expressive of crisis in the society (as in the extreme form of suicide, 
which Durkheim's study analyses into three forms); and that the ability to transform 
structures is expressive of freedom: 
Transformational variety, in the syntagmatic or paradigmatic plane alike, is 
a transparent signifier of both freedom and power for those in control of 
them. (Hodge and Kress, 1986: 109) 
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What might this form of social semiotic diagnosis offer a reading of the 
transformations of The Company of Wolves? 
The main development from the folktale or Perrault's story to Angela Carter's story 
is an increase in the complexity of the hypotactic structures, both in the narrative and 
the sentential syntagms. As might be expected, the structures expressive of our own 
society are likely to reflect a highly complex, differentiated character, in contrast to 
the less complex, more paratactic structures of the original story, expressive of the 
strong social bonds of the mechanical solidarity of a peasant society. But, as Hodge 
and Kress suggest, along with complexity goes a weakening of solidarity, and more 
hierarchical forms of regulation. So, in Carter's more complex story, the reader is 
invited to sympathise with the peasant society represented in the story; but is 
distanced from them by the high degree of stylization, even idealisation; while the 
hypotactic structures of the language and the narrative offer most confident access 
to a literary elite. 
In some ways, the film echoes, even strengthens these transformations, transcoding 
them into other semiotic codes (the visual semiotic, dress, speech and accent, 
music). The boundaries of social class, for instance, appear repeatedly in the 
complex paradigm of the girl (now named, Rosaleen). This heroine figure is now 
multiply divided into a series of syntagmatic bundles. The one at the centre of the 
'realistic narrative syntagm is markedly middle class and prosperous. The one at the 
centre of the main 'dream' syntagm is apparently peasant; but a series of modality 
cues (idealised costume, set, speech and accent) reveal this to be a thin, folksy 
fiction. The boundaries between social groups are marked in both narrative 
syntagms: between the 'real' Rosaleen's house and the rest of society (by its size 
and isolation); between the dream Rosaleen's family and the others in the village. 
Further, however, a series of boundaries are erected within each syntagm between 
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Rosaleen and other individuals: she resists the boy who courts her, refusing a kiss; 
she refuses a kiss to her grandmother; her rivalry with her sister leads to the latter's 
dream-death; the 'real' Rosaleen is isolated from her family by a feverish teenage 
sulk, and by the doors and walls of the house, accentuated by low camera angles. 
The syntagmatic logic of this series of severances leads to the most powerful affinity 
within the film - with the Hunter/Wolf. This both disrupts signifiers of solidarity in the 
film (particularly the family in the dream narrative), and intensifies signifiers of social 
betrayal/mobility: the 'peasant' Rosaleen (who we knew all along was really a lady) 
bonds with the aristocratic (and vaguely foreign) Hunter. Her real allegiance, then, is 
to the dark side of male sexuality (demonised and mythologised in the figure of the 
werewolf) and to the social level above her (to which her 'real' self actually belongs). 
At the same time, the hypotactic structures of the film, even more complex than 
these of the Carter story, are fractured, increasingly so as the film progresses. The 
three main syntagmatic clusters leak into each other, until we can no longer tell what 
is dream and what is 'real'. In Hodge and Kress's terms, the combination of the 
disruption of structures of social cohesion and the disruption of the hypotactic 
structures of the narrative would signify a society characterised by certain kinds of 
crisis: Durkheim's egoism and anomie, expressive of a degree of breakdown in 
mechanisms of regulation and of social solidarity. In some ways, this doesn't come 
as a surprise: the film clearly shows how the tumultuous onset of sexual desire in 
adolescence can cause disorder, alienation, and the weakening of parental authority 
in the modern family; and how awakening sexuality is constructed for girls in images 
of social glamour and idealised masculinity, which they are obliged both to assent to 
and resist to win social approval. 
To turn now to the representation of gender in the figure of Rosaleen. There are 
transformations here, of both literary and filmic antecedents, which suggest more 
optimistic readings of signs of power and solidarity. In the paradigms derived from 
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the werewolf genre, the film genre is the key referent. So Rosaleen relates, in terms 
of appearance and dress, to former heroines of werewolf and vampire movies, a 
combination of the virgin-bride and the seductive-temptress paradigms, but, like the 
heroine of Carter's story, is transformed from victim to heroine, altering, in particular, 
the syntagm of the ending. In this way, she also relates to other horror heroines, who 
play increasingly powerful roles, sometimes excluding men as powerful figures 
altogether, such as Carrie in Brian de Palma's film of Stephen King's story, Ripley in 
the Alien trilogy (Ridley Scott, James Cameron), or Clarice Starling, the female 
detective in The Silence of the Lambs (Jonathan Demme). This shift in gender 
relations is not always unequivocal, as Carol Clover suggests (1993) - these newly-
empowered heroines tend to display signifiers of ambiguous sexuality, such as 
boyishness, sexlessness, inverted use of phallic weapons. This last is true of 
Rosaleen: she accomplishes her triumph over the wolf - in film but not story - by 
appropriating his clearly phallic rifle and using it against him. 
The sense of subjectivity offered by the Rosaleen paradigm to spectators 
(particularly, we might imagine, female spectators) is much more complex, 
ambigous, contradictory, expressive of dangers as well as opportunities (the freedom 
and power consequent upon transformational variety) but with a price to pay. This 
price is represented powerfully by the scream in the final image of the film - a scream 
contradictorily suggesting pleasure (it comes as the climax of a series of gasps 
suggesting sexual arousal) - but also terror. 
Conclusion: representations of subjectivity; constructions of audience 
My remarks on this subject will be part tentative observation, part hypothesis. 
Contemporary theories of subjectivity are so complex that any easy answers must be 
suspect - rather, I prefer to speculate, and attempt to link speculations as 
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productively as possible with the small-scale audience research of the third part of 
this study. 
In the first place, The Company of Wolves seems to me to be emblematic of the 
paradox which dogs postmodern and post-Freudian accounts of subjectivity and 
identity: that the dissolving boundaries of the self are simultaneously a threat and a 
liberation. Jancovich's account of body-horror (1992) as a metaphor for the fear and 
pleasure occasioned by liberation from the safe-but-imprisoning unified self is a good 
example. Donald's account (1992) is an optimistic one: that the uncertainty of 
identity imaged by horror films allows for the new politics of community with which he 
identifies a postmodern popular sublime. Carol Clover's account (1993) is extremely 
sensitive to the ambivalence and ambiguity of horror films and the ideologies which 
produce and receive them; but in the end, her reading is also more optimistic than 
otherwise, cautiously identifying a progressive redefinition of gender relations in the 
genre, as well as a productive transparency about the representation of gender 
relations and the psychosexual drives that form them than elite cinema, which, she 
argues (pages 231-236) is repressive and deceitful. 
In The Company of Wolves, similarly, we have grounds for both optimistic and 
pessimistic readings of the politics of gender and subjectivity. The onset of adult 
sexuality is associated with dissolving subjectivity: the loss, burning or breakage of 
icons of childhood and puberty (toys, the granny, the red cloak); blurring of bodily 
boundaries between the girl and the wolf, between the girl and the elements of Anton 
Furst's darkly beautiful set designs in which aspects of her self are projected (the 
house; the forest; the well). This dissolution appears one moment as a triumph of 
feminist role reversal (clearly the intention of Angela Carter's story); the next as a 
traditional generic representation of the girl as victim. On the other hand, the figure of 
Rosaleen holds a powerful unity throughout the film, which is likely, perhaps, for 
younger views especially, to prove the dominant image. She is rendered more 
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specific than the anonymous (therefore mythic, universal) heroines of the source 
texts simply by being named; but also by being visually anchored in the conventional 
icons of female teenage identity, which reassure viewers that she's an 'ordinary' 
teenage girl - but at the same time allow her to represent, almost stereotypically, any 
teenage girl. 
The question of the subjectivities of the viewers is even more complex. In Clover's 
account, this is rendered in terms of a discussion of the psychoanalytical concept of 
the 'gaze', described by Freud (1991), re-theorized by Lacan (1979), and famously 
employed by Laura Mulvey (1975) as a masculine gaze which is either 
sadistic/voyeuristic or scopophilic/fetishistic. Clover's critique rests on identifying a 
gap in the accounts of Mulvey and Christian Metz (1982), which, argues Clover, fail 
to recognize that the spectator's gaze is two-way - that, in effect, the screen is 
gazing back. Accordingly, she constitutes, not only horror audiences, but all film 
audiences, as typically positioned in a sado-masochistic relation to the screen, in 
which the element of masochism, constituted by the vulnerability of the receiving 
eye/mind/viewing subject, and its thirst for sensations of pain and pleasure, relates to 
the repressed connection of pain and pleasure in each viewing subject's 
psychosexual history: 
It is ... true ... that themes and images of painful looking and pierced eyes 
have long been a staple of the tradition, and that it is not possible to look at 
many horror movies from any era without confronting the idea; and there 
was Peeping Tom, a film that from its first image (the pierced bull's-eye) to 
its last (the darkened screen, as Mark's own vision is extinguished by 
suicide, and the voice-over of a frightened boy saying "Good night, Daddy -
hold my hand") insists that the pleasure of looking at others in fear and 
pain has its origins in one's own past-but-not-finished fear and pain. (230) 
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On its own, this psychoanalytic reading of the spectatorial response would be 
vulnerable to criticisms of omitting any consideration of history and society. Clover 
harnesses it, however, to a brief account in her Afterword of changes in socially-
constructed versions of subjectivity, and especially gender identity. These she 
attributes to major events critical to perceptions of masculinity (the Vietnam war), and 
to changes in the family and other social structures; all of which allow for a changing 
politics in the making and viewing of films. It is still a weakness of her argument that 
no link is made between the psychoanalytic account and the historical-social 
account, other than their immediate juxtaposition in the final two chapters of the 
book. Nevertheless, as complementary versions, they are attractive, and offer an 
explanation of the pleasure of horror more convincing than Jancovich's rather too 
neat and reductive analysis. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 6 in particular will ask the question of how young people's 
readings of The Company of Wolves and other horror films are affected by social-
historical contingencies, and by the social identities they live out, in this act of 
spectatorship as in every other action of their lives. In asking this, I will need to 
recognise the relationship between the outer world of signs and the inner world of 
their own subjectivities - a world which, as Volosinov argues, is also composed of 
signs, also ideological. The constant, transformative, two-way movement between 
these outer and inner worlds will frame the explorations of their readings and uses of 
the film. 
These chapters will examine how different pleasures in the film are associated with 
different social positionings, different subjectivities. For instance, those elements of 
the film that operate as markers of popular horror, associated with popular taste, 
uninhibited pleasure (and the pain of the visual assault noted by Clover) might be 
expected to appeal, in young audiences fully literate in the genre, across social 
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boundaries. These, in effect, are the transformation sequences. For some viewers, 
these might be expected to be the most appealing elements - clear islands of generic 
pleasure in a text which otherwise abounds in puzzling hypotactic structures and 
opaque references uncharacteristic of the horror genre. For others, the sequences 
least like horror, more suggestive of fantasy, allegory, or the logic of surrealism might 
appeal at the other end of the spectrum: the empty sublime; narrative hypotaxis, 
'pure' taste. And this range of pleasures, of understandings, might be explained, at 
least in part, by contradictory constructions of the sublime, from Bakhtin's visceral 
and gleeful material sphere to Kant's refined, sublimated images of emptiness. 
The film's metasigns of social class might address different viewers in different ways. 
The signifiers of middle class status in the representation of Rosaleen (accent, 
clothes, material wealth) might suggest power to some viewers, solidarity to others. 
Similarly, the representation of gender in the film, in which matriarchal structures are 
strong, and the, albeit equivocal, triumph of the heroine over the male threat is 
marked on frequent occasions, might invite relations of solidarity between some 
viewers and the represented participants in the semiosic process (especially the 
figure of Rosaleen); and the reverse in others. This might well not simply be 
determined by the biological sex of the viewer or viewer group; but also by belief 
systems (religious, political, social) operating in families, peer groups, ethnic groups) 
and social class or social aspirations, and the norms of taste they adhere to. 
Chapter 3 will begin to differentiate, looking at individual spectators' reworkings of 
details of the film - the material process of traffic between the inner and outer world 
of signs. 
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Chapter 3: Reading the Image: 
horror freezeframes and the cinematic still 
The use of the still has always appeared natural and simple - a visual quote, 
anchoring the point made in a review, proposing a distilled version of the film in a 
press kit, or enticing us into the cinema in a poster. In fact, of course, it is a complex 
historical process of selection, representation, and certain forms of discursive 
empowerment, offering, I will argue, important clues about the way in which we read 
the images of a film: how we anticipate it, respond to it at the moment of viewing, and 
later recall it. 
In the school project which forms the object of enquiry in this study, students use a 
video digitiser, which simply allows them to grab images and drop them into their 
own work - in effect, to make their own stills, and use them for the kind of purposes 
that film commentators and critics have used them for throughout the history of the 
cinema. The importance of this eluded me at first, because it seemed such as small 
part of the process of response, interpretation and elaboration. This chapter will ask 
what this act of appropriation means, what it makes possible, what it determines. It 
seems a small moment in the story of the digital revolution; but I will argue that it 
allows for certain kinds of amplification of the ways in which we read, interpret and 
transform the films we watch. 
I want to look at three broad areas, and the questions that arise from each. The 
questions are prompted partly by observation of the way young people deal with still 
images from the film; and partly by certain points in the history of the theory of the 
cinematic image, from Eisenstein's montage theory to contemporary social semiotic 
theory. In particular, I am thinking, at least as a starting point, of the remarks made 
about the cinematic still by Roland Barthes in his well-known essay, 'The Third 
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Meaning' (1978). 
• The first is the question of the single image in a moving sequence, and how this is 
read by school students - the image as a unit of meaning in the grammar of the film. 
• The second is the image as a condensation of the film, a significant image that 
stands metonymically for whole sequences, important themes, perhaps even, as in a 
film poster, for the whole film. 
• The third is the social use of what Barthes calls 'this major artefact', the cinematic 
still: in what conditions is it used; what variations are there on the basic idea of the 
still; what new social practices are permitted by the still as video freezeframe? 
The still: vertical montage, synchronic syntagms 
Barthes speculates on the nature of the cinematic still at the end of 'The Third 
Meaning. There are two points he makes there that I want to explore. The first is his 
account of the construction of the still image, which he derives from Eisenstein's 
montage theory (1968). He concurs with Eisenstein's notion of the cinematic image 
as doubly articulated, both horizontally in the sequence of frames and shots, and 
vertically, where the elements of the individual frame are orchestrated, in 
Eisenstein's musical analogy, both with each other and with the soundtrack: 
Of course, there is no audiovisual montage in the still, but SME's [Sergei 
Mikhailovich Eisenstein] formula is general insofar as it establishes a right 
to the syntagmatic disjunction of images and calls for a vertical reading of 
the articulation. (page 332) 
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This suggests a number of ideas which we might consider against the history of 
visual semiotics, and against the preoccupations of the classroom. 
Firstly, Barthes is clearly suggesting a grammar of the single frame, below the level 
of the shot. Although this kind of detailed analysis has become unfashionable in 
some areas of film theory and cultural studies, it is resurgent in the frameworks of 
analysis offered by social semiotics referred to in Chapter 1 and eslsewhere, on 
which I intend to draw. It raises questions in the context of education about the 
nature of children's visual literacy - indeed, whether such a term is itself valid - and 
how such skills are best addressed in the classroom, in ways which have extensive 
analogies with debates about the teaching of reading print. 
Secondly, Barthes suggests that the disjunction of the horizontal syntagm which the 
cinematic still constitutes is productively subversive. He argues that it allows a 
disruption, suspension, even rejection of narrative time, revealing what he describes 
as the "indescribable meaning": 
Finally, the still throws off the constraint of filmic time; which constraint is 
extremely powerful, continuing to form an obstacle to what might be called 
the adult birth of film (born technically, occasionally even aesthetically, film 
still has to be born theoretically). For written texts, unless they are very 
conventional, totally committed to logico-temporal order, reading time is 
free; for film, this is not so, since the image cannot go faster or slower 
without losing its perceptual figure. The still, by instituting a reading that is 
at once instantaneous and vertical, scorns logical time (which is only an 
operational time); it teaches us how to dissociate the technical constraint 
from what is the specific filmic and which is the "indescribable" meaning. 
(pages 332/3) 
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We need to think what might be meant by subversion, and what kinds might be 
productive in the classroom; but part of his sense is of a textual subversion, in which 
the governing structure of temporal development of the film, the horizontal axis, is 
refused or denied by the reader. One question, then, about how young people read 
still images from film, would be 'How, in their reading of the still, do they read, 
register, interpret, transform, the temporal qualities of the film?' Also, is Barthes' 
notion of an indescribable meaning, qualitatively different from the mundane semiotic 
of the film, tenable, or observable in the work of these school students? 
For Eisenstein, this 'scorning' of time would have been unthinkable. The image 
presented by his vertical montage is of harmonious orchestration of elements in the 
single frame which all belong indissolubly to the horizontal axis also: 
This correspondence, or relationship, could be just as successfully 
described if, for the image of the orchestral score, we had substituted the 
montage structure of the silent film. 
In order to do this, we will have to draw from our silent film 
experience an example of polyphonic montage, where shot is linked to shot 
not merely through one indication - movement, or light values, or stage in 
the exposition of the plot, or the like - but through a simultaneous advance 
of a multiple series of lines, each maintaining an independent 
compositional course, and each contributing to the total compositional 
course of the sequence. (pages 64-5) 
This suggestion of an orchestral arrangement in some ways anticipates the work of 
later semiotics, which sees the single frame as a syntagmatic arrangement, with its 
own grammar of elements. The difference between Eisenstein on the one hand, and 
Barthes and later social semioticians on the other, is in Eisenstein's ideal of a 
production of meaning in which author and reader form a harmonious unity - a 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 69 
necessary ideal in the context of Eisenstein's political project. The dissonance 
between text and reader, the unpredictability of the reader's meanings, are what 
characterise the semiotic theory of Barthes and his successors; again, a view of the 
act of reading appropriate to the social and political context of, in particular, France in 
the 1960s. 
Social semiotic theory provides further insights into the nature of the cinematic image 
which help in the understanding of the still. Robert Hodge and David Tripp consider 
the synchronic syntagm as a unit of meaning in their exploration of the American 
cartoon, Fangface, in their social semiotic study of 42 Australian schoolchildren's 
television viewing (1986). They define it in two ways: firstly, as a single image where 
the visual elements are arranged in a syntagmatic organisation that is read (virtually) 
instantaneously by the viewer; secondly, as a kind of image which carries particularly 
powerful ideological meanings for the viewer. This takes us a step further than 
Barthes, who, though endorsing the idea of vertical montage, stops short of 
describing the still as a syntagmatic structure. Although Hodge and Tripp are not 
describing the still, their notion of the synchronic syntagm applies in two ways: firstly, 
it offers a theory of a syntagmatic arrangement at rightangles, as it were, to the 
diachronic flow of the film, as well as a theoretical separation of synchrony and 
diachrony in the film's 'grammar'. Secondly, it offers an explanation of why certain 
images offer particularly powerful meanings to viewers, meanings whose sense is 
dependent on social contexts and structures of ideology. 
We can ask, therefore, of the still image: how do children read this syntagm when it 
is abstracted from the moving sequence; and how and why have they been 
motivated to choose this particular image in the first place? 
Hodge works further on the idea in his collaboration with Gunther Kress in Social 
Semiotics (1988). Hodge and Kress, in their consideration of synchronic and 
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diachronic syntagms, also use Eisenstein as one of their points of departure. They 
endorse his concept of shot-montage, as they see such a procedure of juxtapositions 
of image as a series of semiotic transformations, socially situated in ways that 
importantly determine the meanings it can produce. And, like Hodge and Tripp, they 
emphasise that, because the effect of the synchronic syntagm is instantaneous, it is 
peculiarly powerful, and resistant to analysis, thus particularly well suited to carry 
powerful ideological meanings, or meanings central to a text. 
Another set of insights into the syntagmatic structure of the image, though in this 
case it is not the cinematic image, is offered by Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996), who 
analyse images in terms of a grammar of visual design, where each element 
operates as part of the grammar of the image, in analogy to the elements of 
Halliday's systemic-functional grammar. In this visual grammar, the objects and 
people in the picture function as participants, subjects of the action signalled by 
vectors of movement, and the angles and perspectives of the picture signal point-of-
view, so function as deictics, or the system of person in language.The question here 
is, how does this theory develop when we look at the moving image? And what 
evidence is there of young people using such a grammar in their own comments on 
cinematic images; and, related to this, what kind of pedagogic practice could use 
such a grammar? 
Kress and Van Leeuwen structure their account around the founding categories of 
Hallidayan linguistics (briefly described in Chapter 1 of this thesis) - the premise that 
all acts of communication can be described in terms three semiotic metafunctions -
the ideational, the interpersonal, and the textual. In examining one boy's readings of 
an image from The Company of Wolves, I will focus on the first two of these, to see 
how he reads the text's structures of signification, and how he positions himself in 
relation to them. To briefly describe them: 
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- the ideational function refers to the property of semiotic systems which represents 
the world, encompassing, importantly for this study, objects/characters and their 
relations; and that important patterning of represented experience, narrative; 
- the interpersonal metafunction refers to the way semiotic systems project relations 
between the partners in the communicative enterprise; and they distinguish between 
the 'interactive' participants, that is, the actual producers and readers of the texts, 
and 'represented' participants, the characters depicted in the text, who also enter 
into relationships of various kinds with the reader. 
So, Ben has chosen an image of a werewolf (illustration 1) in the final stages of 
transformation. The choice itself is significant, for reasons outlined in Chapter 2: this 
is an image in which usually stable identities are replaced by disturbing processes of 
transformation, an image which carries accreted historical meanings from traditions 
of cinema and folktale. How does he read this image? 
The Narrative 
First, how does he deal with the 'represented participant', the wolf? It becomes 
immediately apparent that the elements Kress and Van Leeuwen describe as 
properties of the still image are there, but everywhere informed by a knowledge, or 
set of understandings of, the moving text. For instance, the function of the 
represented participants in a narrative image are analysed in two ways by Kress and 
Van Leeuwen - as objects of classification, carrying particular attributes; and as 
actors in the dynamic processes of the narrative. 
In constructing the carrier/attribute function, Ben uses a number of words to describe 
the creature in the image - that is, he transforms the visual sign and its nominal 
function into a number of nouns of his own. His first sentence is: 
Illustration 3.1: Ben's image of the 
transforming werewolf 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 
	
72 
In this image the man is in the final stages of turning into a wolf. 
This sounds simple enough - but already, one noun will not suffice for the creature, 
but two are needed: "man" and "wolf" signifying both the syntagmatic structure of 
this brief narrative sequence that covers the werewolf transformation; but also a 
paradigmatic understanding of the genre conventions that produce both the creature 
that is man/wolf, the werewolf; and the characteristic sequence of transformation that 
is a hallmark of the subgenre, described in the previous chapter. 
Elsewhere in his commentary, Ben refers to the creature as "the monster (almost 
wolf)", a complex nominal group that articulates cultural echoes of the spectacular 
nature of the creatures of the Gothic tradition, "monster" literally signifying a showing, 
a demonstration, with a parenthetic representation of the dynamic process of the 
transformation, "(almost wolf)". Later, he calls it "the 'thing' " , perhaps indicative of 
uncertainty about its ever-transforming nature; perhaps an echo of an older sci-fi 
horror tradition which did indeed label one of its most celebrated inventions "The 
Thing". Elsewhere he calls it "the beast" - another choice resonant with apocalyptic 
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horror imagery. A significant point, perhaps, about all these selections is that they 
relate to the genre, their ruling paradigm, in a way that the everyday word - which 
Ben never uses - doesn't: the word "animal". It's clear that the processes of re-
lexicalisation Ben uses to transform the transforming werewolf aren't by any means 
random, but carry the social history of meanings Vygotsky describes in Thought and 
Language (1962) : 
The primary word is not a straightforward symbol for a concept but rather 
an image, a picture, a mental sketch of a concept, a short tale about it -
indeed, a small work of art. In naming an object by means of such a 
pictorial concept, man ties it into one group with a number of other objects. 
In this respect the process of language creation is analogous to the 
process of complex formation in the intellectual development of the child. 
(page 75) 
Furthermore, this production of the image of a werewolf, the idea of a werewolf, the 
understanding of a werewolf, is a semiotic act moving simultaneously in two 
directions, made possible only by the joint work of the outer world of signs from 
which the image, with all its historically accreted meanings, proceeds, and the inner 
world of signs - Ben's mind - which absorbs, transforms, re-produces, those images 
as he works, transformatively, on his understanding of the world and his own 
subjectivity. This two-way movement, referred to in the last chapter and elsewhere in 
this thesis, is borrowed from Volosinov's view of the relation between ideology and 
the psyche, in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973). 
The other function of participants in a narrative image in Kress and Van Leeuwen's 
account is their part in the processes of the text. In a still image, these are realised in 
vectors, lines of movement that relate the participants in terms of action and power. 
In a moving image, such vectors become signs of actual movement, of course, which 
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may be present in a freezeframe if it shows something in mid-movement. In this 
image, there are no such vectors, and the movement can only be read by reference 
to the whole diachronic syntagm, for which the still image stands in metonymic 
substitution. These movements, translated by Ben into verbs, of course, give some 
indication of how narrative processes are read. So, we have a recognition of the 
process in which the major participant, the werewolf, is the dominant Actor. An 
interesting question, in terms of the main process, the event that takes up most of 
the narrative time in this sequence, the transformation, is who functions as the Goal -
who is on the receiving end. The verbs make it clear that Ben perceives three Goals. 
One of them is the represented participant in the image - the werewolf himself. That 
he is simultaneously the actor and the goal, the monster and the victim, is registered 
in the implied reflexivity of the verbs in the first few sentences: "the man is in the final 
stages of turning [himself] into a wolf. He has developed [in himself] his muzzle and 
teeth and all that remains is for him to get his fur." As has often been noted in the 
imagery of divided identity in the horror film (Jancovich: 1992; Clover: 1993), the 
monster is here literally divided against himself. That he appears as victim in the 
affective structures of the sequence is all too plain in Ben's commentary in an 
interesting sentence which makes an affective articulation of the three victims of the 
horror - monster, the woman in the sequence, and the viewer: 
This image is particularly gory because the monster (almost wolf) is 
obviously in quite a lot of pain and as the lady keeps screaming and the 
music is becoming quite intense it is quite distressing [to the viewer]. 
As this sentence indicates, the other Goals of the transformation process are the 
woman, the other represented participant, not in this image, but in other the parts of 
the sequence which Ben is obliged to describe to make sense of the threat of the 
creature; and the viewer, whose position is of central concern in Ben's piece. Such 
monster-victim relations are, of course, characteristic structures of the horror genre, 
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especially in this triple formation, where the spectator's sympathies and points of 
identification are divided between the actual victim and the monster-as-victim, a 
paradox reaching back to Mary Shelley's creature. 
But there is more than just the transformation - there is the intention of the creature 
to do harm to its victims when the transformation is complete. At this particular 
moment in the sequence, this intention of the werewolf can be reasonably deduced 
from its threatening behaviour and expression, and by our knowledge of the genre. In 
this case, Ben knows from his previous viewing what is going to happen in any case. 
Reading mental processes like intentions or thoughts in general is harder than 
reading physical actions; but Kress and Van Leeuwen assign it a place in their 
scheme, using Halliday's term 'projective structures'. Where the projection of such 
processes in a still image could only refer to what the image itself contained, this 
image contains expressions of threatening intent syntagmatically connected to many 
other such images - snarls, growls, showing of teeth, and so on - as well as to the 
shots of the screaming woman intercut with the transformation - and to the ending 
part of the structure, where the beast's purpose is frustrated by its decapitation. Ben 
registers an awareness, in particular, of a how the creature's intentions are 
represented by the image itself: 
You can tell that this wolf is out for the kill from its expression and this 
makes you think of it as being evil and horrible! 
The Interpersonal 
Let's move on, then, to the interpersonal metafunction employed by Kress and Van 
Leeuwen. I've already noted that part of the film's effect is to position the viewer as 
victim of the horror. In this frame, Ben has chosen an image that addresses the 
viewer in a particularly direct way. Kress and Van Leeuwen describe this kind of 
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image act as a 'demand' which establishes a specific relation between the 
represented participant on the screen and the interactive participant who is the 
viewer: 
... the participant's gaze ... demands something from the viewer, demands 
that the viewer enter into some kind of imaginary relation with him or her. 
(page 122) 
They also note that, in part at least, this relation is analogous to the system of person 
in language, in such a way that the image is addressing the viewer in the second 
person. They also relate it to Halliday's four basic speech acts, different kinds of 
demand and offer. So we might see this image as demanding a particular service 
from the viewer, in fact, the dominant imperative of the horror genre, encapsulated in 
that memorable catchphrase of modern horror in David Cronenberg's remake of The 
Fly, when one potential victim commands another: "Be afraid. Be very afraid". It's 
revealing, I think, to look at how Ben has registered this relation between 
represented and interactive participant in his commentary. To begin with, he 
observes the nature of the 'demand' image quite explicitly: 
As the monster is looking almost straight at the viewer it gives the viewer 
the feeling that the beast is looking at them personally! 
In this sentence Ben conceives of the viewer in the third person, as if he is describing 
the process by which the implied viewer, the general audience the film is addressing, 
becomes the actual individual spectator - as indeed it does in the next sentence, 
where the third person viewer gives way to the first person Ben: 
I really felt that the 'thing' was looking straight at me. 
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As if to complete the trinity of persons, the next sentence positions the viewer in the 
second person: 
This image has great significance on the film because you can suddenly 
believe that it is possible for a man to transform into a wolf in a few 
seconds. 
This shifting of pronouns which represent the viewer goes on through the rest of the 
piece, suggesting, perhaps, the multiplicity of positions Ben can, and does, take up -
as an individual, positioned against his knowledge of this text and others like it; this 
viewing situation and others; as a member of a class who've shared their responses 
to some idea; as a pupil, discussing his response with a teacher-reader; as a 
member of a viewing public who might choose horror films. So we get: 
/ didn't know how the makers of the film would cope with the 
transformation scenes 
You can tell that this wolf is out for the kill 
you think of it as being evil" 
/ think it makes her seem innocent 
When we watched the film /was not aware of thinking this but I am sure 
that the whole class were unconsciously aware of this. 
This last sentence also raises explicitly the levels of consciousness involved in 
reading and interpretation, which I will return to later. 
As I have suggested, Ben has registered the affective nature of his response, and 
recognised the peculiarity of a genre which deliberately sets out to distress its 
viewers. The nature of this distress is one of the forms of pleasure provided by horror 
movies, and extensive accounts are given of it by other commentators. Carol Clover 
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(1992) describes it as a masochistic pleasure, and her account of the characteristic 
'assaultive gaze' of horror is recalled by this image, and by Ben's awareness of how 
he is addressed by it. Oddly, though Ben uses words like 'distressing' to describe 
the effect of the music and the scene in general, he claimed earlier not to have been 
frightened at all by the sequence, in a piece written immediately after watching it for 
the first time: 
I thought that the transformation sequence was very unrealistic. I wasn't 
really scared. I almost though it was funny. I clapped my hands (don't ask 
why) and laughed. It was too unrealistic to make me scared but I thought it 
was funny. 
This kind of disputing of the film's credibility is a final feature of the interpersonal 
aspect of the text, again described by Kress and Van Leeuwen - its modality: the 
extent to which its claim to truth, its believability, is accepted by the reader. In many 
ways, Ben's commentary, unlike his first reaction, signals a high modality, an 
involvement in the text which doesn't question the credibility of the fantasy images 
on offer, unlike some other pupils in this study, who question the fantasy sequences 
strongly. Where they are called into question, where the modality is low, it's often 
expressed in criticisms of the special effects. In Ben's case, where he does distance 
himself from the diegesis, it's to attribute to the special effects the credibility of the 
scene for him: 
I didn't know how the makers of the film would cope with the 
transformation scenes but I think they did it very well indeed. 
There is evidence in my study that comments on special effects should never be 
taken at face value: they're often quite contradictory, or contradict other evidence in 
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the study, as when students (especially boys) react positively to the special effects, 
then claim afterwards that they old-fashioned or unbelievable. It seems much 
more likely that such a claim is provoked by an unwillingness to appear affected by 
the spectacular horror scenes, an unwillingness more associated with boys than 
girls, though some girls in the study show it. (Martin Barker [1995] suggests that 
young audiences use a discourse of special effects for films they like, and 
distinguishes this from the kinds of language they might learn in school in Media 
Studies). In Ben's case, we seem to get both types of response: the initial reaction 
suggesting low modality; the written piece suggesting high modality. Clover gives us 
a clue to such shifting responses in her claim that the viewing position demanded by 
horror is a feminine position: identifying with the victim position, which is, Clover 
argues, structured as feminine, if not actually represented by a female character. 
Such a position, while producing an affective response as real for a boy as for a girl, 
is bound to also create discomfort, especially in the social setting of boys viewing 
together, and the demands this places on them. 
In terms of Kress and van Leeuwen's scheme, this image and sequence are notable 
for a concentration of modality markers, for a particular reason - that this kind of 
fantasy image in horror films carries its own modality problem. Its effectiveness, that 
is, the affective response without which it is meaningless, depends on convincing the 
viewer to suspend their disbelief in its self-evidently fictional nature, or metaphorical 
nature. The wolf may signify adult sexuality in the wider symbolic frame of the film, 
just as, in Franco Moretti's influential reading (1988), Frankenstein's creature 
represents the unruly proletariat, or Dracula the parasitic behaviour of monopoly 
capital. But in the short term, the affective response needed to make the sign 
function requires that we read the fantasy image literally. The kind of modality 
markers referred to by Kress and van Leeuwen are all there then. There is the 
representation of closeup detail of the transformation - the hair, the teeth, the blood 
and slime, the bursting skin. There is the dramatic and naturalistic lighting, the 
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chiaroscuro effect of the candle in the image. And there is more, beyond the still 
image, that we might begin to describe as modality markers in the moving sequence: 
the straining physicality of the werewolf's movements, and the articulation of them 
with the soundtrack, and its hyperreal composition of splitting, tearing and squelching 
noises, along with the groaning of the wolf, the screaming of the woman, and the 
music. 
My main question here was about how young people read the still image. It looks 
from this analysis of Ben's work as if, as we might expect, the grammar of the still 
image is everywhere informed by that of the moving sequence; though the text is not 
read as it presumably is at the moment of watching. This is a rereading, a 
transformation of the text. The freezing of the image allows for an anatomy of the 
elements of the frame, an uncovering of what Eisenstein called the polyphonic 
structure of elements. There's a sense in which Barthes' account looks quite wrong: 
there's no evidence in Ben's work of a refusal of filmic time; in fact, we could even 
say that he is quite unable to escape the temporal echoes in the image. In another 
sense, though, Barthes' disobedient attitude to narrative time provokes productive 
reflections. Certainly, the time of the film is disrupted here, the 'realtime' of the film is 
suspended, the diachronic sequence is undone. The strict temporality of the viewing 
is replaced by a different temporality, that of the interpretive performance, recasting 
the film narrative in the dominant present tense of exegesis, freezing the image for 
anatomical investigation. 
I am struck here by the similarity to drama work in school, and the use of still image 
and slow motion conventions to slow down and freeze real time, for very similar 
purposes: the transformation through a kind of performative analysis of events, 
images, situations. There is an important point to be made here about pedagogy, of 
course. These drama conventions - the living grammar of diegetic movement - are 
controlled by students, used by them as a language of movement and the body. 
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They derive some of their power, as argued by Jonothan Neelands (1990), from their 
cultural referents - statues, photographs, video freeze-frames - which students 
understand from their own cultural experience. But their use in this instance derives 
immediately from explicit instruction by the teacher, who has taught them as a set of 
dramatic conventions. In the same way, though Ben's commentary depends in many 
ways on social and cultural factors from outside the classroom, other features of it -
the freezing of the image, the explicit nature of the task, and his attention to some 
aspects of the image and the film - come from the classroom as a site of cultural 
encounter, and from explicit instruction by the teacher. 
There seems to be no sign, however, of Barthes' "indescribable third meaning", no 
reason to suppose that all the meanings Ben finds can't be encompassed within the 
realm of the semiotic. This could lead us to dispute Barthes' notion of an 
indescribable meaning altogether, substituting a notion of meanings which for some 
reason resist explication (indeed, Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1992, argue something 
like this, and their argument will be examined in Chapter 8). For instance, it is clear 
that his explicit commentary only goes so far in pulling the meanings he finds in the 
image and sequence into fully conscious exposition. He doesn't offer any kind of 
reading of the werewolf's possible symbolic meanings; or, indeed, why he chose this 
sequence. The meanings tied up in his choice, the pleasure presumably contained in 
the scene - these unspoken meanings will be those described by Hodge and Kress 
as the aspects of the synchronic syntagm peculiarly resistant to decoding (page 
175); those closest to Barthes' ineffable meanings. We need to look, then, at the 
significance of his choice - why these images, those closest to the semiotics of 
popular horror, rather than others which signal more clearly the elite aesthetic of art-
house cinema? What structures of pleasure, of taste, are involved here? And how 
might all this, this classroom study of a film, be in any way remotely similar to the 
way children watch films at home, or in the cinema? What meanings are specifically 
linked to the classroom itself as a social site of cultural engagement? 
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Part for whole: synchronic syntagms 2 
My second question was about the still image as a condensation of the film, a 
metonymic substitution for whole sequences, important themes, even the whole film. 
Eisenstein is revealing here. Interestingly, his first example of how the montage 
principle works does not come from film at all. He describes how he builds up, in his 
memory, an image of a New York Street. Because the streets aren't evoked as a 
visual image by their names, since the names are numbers, he says we build up an 
aggregation of what he calls 'representations', which are unified by the montage 
principle into our image of the street. 
There is an ambiguity here between the synchronic and diachronic nature of these 
images: do we recall our images of the New York street in the sequence, the chain in 
which we first saw them - or do we recall them as a composite image? It seems quite 
likely that the two forms - sequential and superimposed - could co-exist in the 
memory of the individual - even that she could move between them at will. 
The ambiguity is even clearer in Eisenstein's second example, which is a passage 
from Maupassant's Bel Ami, in which the image of midnight is evoked by a series of 
clocks striking at different distances around the city, producing a reinforcement of the 
sensation of midnight; a sensation that is at once sequential and unitary. 
But there is another ambiguity - that Eisenstein is, ostensibly at least, taking about 
montage as a process of composition. His analogies, however, work equally well as 
images of composition and viewing, production and reception. If we produce a 
composite image of a New York street, are we making a mental film of it, composing 
our representation of it; or are we making our own reading of somebody else's 
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composition? In our apprehension of midnight, are we adapting Maupassant for our 
own film version; or reading his text? The idea that writing and reading are two sides 
of the same coin, with analogous processes of meaning-making, is, in fact, 
Eisenstein's precise point, as he extends his theory of montage to include the 
viewer's reception of the text in a radical view of textual relations. It seems not 
unreasonable, then, to take from his account a view of montage, not only as the 
compositional process of juxtaposing and superimposing images; but also as the 
process by which a reader makes their own reading of the text by appropriating key 
images, reordering and restructuring them to produce their own remembered version 
of the film. Where we might dissent from Eisenstein, as mentioned above, is in 
questioning his belief that such acts of reading will inevitably be harmonious with 
authorial intentions. 
Barthes approaches the problem the other way round, describing the still as "... the 
fragment of a second text whose existence never exceeds the fragment" suggesting 
that film and still are in a palimpsest relationship, "... without it being possible to say 
that one is on top of the other or that one is extracted from the other." (page 332) 
He seems to be suggesting that each still, and the process of selecting it, provides 
the reader in question with one of an infinite number of texts, dependent in some 
ways on the whole, in other ways independent, each time a new text, condensed into 
the still, able, presumably, to be released into conscious thought by explication. 
Hodge and Tripp's account of the synchronic syntagm gives some new insights, 
which complement Eisenstein's view of the agglomerate image. They describe, as 
we've already seen, a second type of synchronic syntagm, this time not a single 
image, but an agglomeration of repeated images, greatly reinforcing the power of the 
syntagm. They suggest, in relation to Fangface, that an important repeated 
synchronic syntagm is the image of the central character. This is easy enough to 
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imagine - if we asked a child to draw the central character of a film, she'd be likely to 
produce an image which would be a composite of ideal characteristics drawn from 
many of the versions she's seen. 
They go on, however, to describe another interesting feature of this kind of 
synchronic syntagm - how readers interpret them, and link them together, can be 
quite unpredictable. They describe two extremes of reading, those who prefer 
paratactic, or chaining structures, and those who prefer hypotactic, or subordinating 
structures. Any kind of film narrative is likely to be hypotactic in nature, with complex 
hierarchies of subordination. Those who choose paratactic readings, therefore, are 
likely to produce subversive, unpredictable meanings. In other words, the reader has 
almost limitless possibilities for chaining together powerful images from the text to 
produce readings that suit his or her purposes: 
For the viewer oriented to paratactic structures the story will not exist as a 
unity. If there is a single meaning that is seen as the meaning of Fangface 
for the paratactic viewer, it is likely to be a repeated syntagm, or a repeated 
paradigmatic structure: especially a densely-coded meaning carried by a 
repeated synchronic syntagm. Of these, the most pervasive is the central 
character: in this case Fangface/Fangs. The meanings carried by this 
complex syntagm are, we have seen, ambiguous, contradictory and 
ambivalent. The non-hypotactic meanings, then, are the site of 
contradiction, subversion and contestation. We cannot even postulate an 
either-or, because paratactic meanings are primitive and powerful, 
accessible as an alternative even for someone who can interpret hypotactic 
structures. What we have, with Fangface and with children's programmes 
generally, is a double set of possibilities of different meanings. Different 
types of show could rely on different proportions of the two types of 
structure, or children of different ages might give different weighting to the 
two types of structure. (page 39) 
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So, if we could make some equivalence between Eisenstein's New York Street 
analogy and Hodge and Tripp's synchronic syntagm, we might get various versions. 
We might get a hypotactic reading of the street, say in a detailed tourist account of 
Times Square, like the Rough Guide to New York, which superimposes different 
historical versions of the square on each other. We might get a paratactic reading 
from a theatre-goer, who articulates only the images of the ticket-booths; or from a 
police officer or drug dealer, selecting elements of the street and square most 
relevant to their opposed purposes. 
The questions that emerge from all this for me are: do young people, as they choose 
the frames they want to digitize, select images of this kind, powerful synchronic 
syntagms? What causes them to choose the images they do? How do they deal with 
them? What transformations of the film do they produce? Are they controlling the 
film, the genre; or is it controlling them? 
Lemma and Ellie have chosen three images for their piece of work. The first shows 
the heroine of the film, Rosaleen, asleep in her bedroom at the start of the film 
(illustration 2). A relevant point, noted in Chapter 1, is that she's a contemporary 
Illustration 3.2: Rosaleen 
sleeping 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Illustration 3.4: the wolf-Rosaleen 
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heroine, inserted like an envelope around Angela Carter's original story, providing a 
new narrative frame, as it's her dream that contains the story of the company of 
Wolves. 
Their second image is of the werewolf-hunter, as he meets her in the wood on the 
way to her grandmother's (illustration 3). 
  
Illustration 3.3: the Hunter 
Their third is of the wolf that once was Rosaleen, after a transformation that she has 
invited, even controlled, in order to gain access to the world of adult sexuality that the 
werewolves appear to represent (illustration 4). 
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What does their selection reveal? It it is their own condensation of the entire film. 
Significantly, they have selected images that all come from the main narrative, or its 
envelope; what they have omitted is any images from the subordinate narratives that 
are told by Rosaleen and her grandmother. Perhaps, for them, the overarching 
narrative structure is important; or perhaps it is important to them that this structure is 
bound up with the consciousness of the character they are interested in. They have 
chosen images that concentrate on the girl - the first positions her, as it were, in the 
first person, dreaming the story; the second, in the second person, addressed by the 
hunter, imagined as the reverse of the shot; the third, in the third person, as the 
object of the action, object of the werewolf transformation, object of the attack with a 
gun from her father who doesn't recognise her, saved by her mother who does, 
alerted by the cross around her neck. 
The reading of the film represented by such a selection privileges the fairytale 
element - the hunter/wolf on the path; the point-of-view of the contemporary teenage 
girl, and the concomitant complexity of the narrative structure and its attendant 
modalities; and the deeply ambiguous role of the girl in relation to the monster/victim 
axis of modern horror movies. Several commentators, including Stephen King 
himself (1982) have noted how, in films from the late seventies onwards (with Brian 
de Palma's Carrie as a landmark, perhaps) female characters have occupied victim 
roles much more ambiguously, with such roles blurring into traditionally male hero 
functions, or into the role of the monster, or sometimes (again, Carrie is the classic 
example), all three. 
So their condensed image of the film reads it as a film about a girl growing up, 
predominantly; the spectacular horror of the werewolf transformation scenes is 
marginalised. Ben's reading, on the other hand, places the film closer to 
contemporary body horror, selecting the most replete image of horror, foregrounding 
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the images closest to popular horror, furthest from the art-house style of much of the 
fantasy. 
All of this, it seems to me, is a detailed and explicit reading of features of the visual 
text that would be noted, in the act of viewing, in a much more condensed way, 
perhaps unconsciously, or more accurately preconsciously, to use Freud's distinction 
(1915) between the repressed unconscious and that which is waiting to become 
conscious. So we might envisage this reading of the film which uses a still image 
supported by a written commentary, as a kind of triple movement: first, the reader 
recollects the image mentally; then she finds it, and fixes it (though this process, 
involving the often long and complex business of fast forward, rewind and 
freezeframe before the digitiser is even brought into play, has its own narrative of 
textual engagement), thereby condensing an understanding of an aspect of the film 
into one synchronic syntagm which metonymically represents, in this case, the 
protagonist/narrator. Thirdly, the condensation effect is reversed, as they unpack the 
meanings of the image, resituating it in their own version of the narrative syntagm, 
and elaborating the elements of the image and their significance in both synchronic 
and diachronic terms. 
The lesson we can learn from Eisenstein in particular, I suggest, lies in the analogy 
between commonplace, unconscious montage - the ordinary person's habit of 
retaining composite after-images, selected to form that person's ideal version of the 
text, whether it be street, book or film - between this everyday process, and the much 
more formalized analysis of the relationship between single images and the whole 
visual text. I am suggesting, then, that the freezing of the image and a detailed 
commentary on it, is not dissimilar from what viewers do in any case - retain key 
images, reorder them mentally, discuss them with friends ("What about the bit where 
he ..."). So the classroom operates as an amplification, a rehearsal, an explication, a 
bringing into consciousness, of processes that happen into the social context outside 
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the classroom anyway. Consciousness is a tricky question here; but provisionally, I 
mean the kind of consciousness Vygotsky (1962) describes as self-aware 
conceptualization: 
We use consciousness to denote awareness of the activity of the mind -
the consciousness of being conscious.' (page 91) 
What is in question here is a difficult issue about the nature of explicit instruction in 
language, made doubly difficult by its application to popular texts. The classroom and 
the teacher are open to charges of cultural appropriation, of subjecting popular 
meanings and pleasures to forms of investigation that are, as Barthes once 
remarked, anything but popular themselves. This is an area where teachers need to 
tread delicately; and there is no room in this article to develop the argument; but 
Eisenstein's analogy suggests that there are some connections between the way we 
make sense of and retain after-images of films in their more usual recreational 
setting, and the more formal, explicit ways in which we do this in the classroom. So it 
is not necessarily a denial of popular uses, nor an appropriation of them. It is, 
however, clearly a transformation of the social uses of the film, transferring, in part at 
least, the motivations for making meanings from the domain of family, friendship and 
recreation to the domain of education and the academy. 
Social uses, social pleasures: stills as quotation 
My third area of investigation took its cue from Barthes' recognition that the still was 
a kind of quotation: 
Moreover, the still is not a sample ... but a quotation (we know how much 
importance presently accrues to this concept in the theory of the text): at 
once parodic and disseminatory. (page 332) 
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To this extent, pupils use it as a quotation, in what is often a self-consciously 
expository text in quasi-academic mode. Gemma and Ellie's commentary, though far 
from a traditional expository essay, makes the nature of textuality its explicit theme. 
Writing, as Halliday asserts, emphasises its theme as the first item in the clause. 
Gemma and Ellie's sentences consistently display that their theme is the textuality of 
the image and the film, and the audience's interpretation of it: 
Our first image ... 
We chose this ... 
In this image ... 
Then the camera pans ... 
You can tell ... 
We could tell ... 
The atmosphere ... 
The camera angle ... 
Only the last sentence places the character and the diegesis as the theme: 
Her face is very distressed ... 
Elsewhere in their piece, there are the vocabularies and structures of quasi- 
academic discourse: 
... it is symbolic of her ... 
... panning around her face ... 
... closeup of each of her toys ... 
... it gives the indication that ... 
But there are other voices in their piece, voices of popular, informal comment and 
judgement: 
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... she was new at putting makeup on ... 
... the hunky hunter which has now turned into a wolf. 
... Her granny told her to stay away from men whose eyebrows join but she didn't 
pay any attention to what she said but is totally blown over by him and his charms.... 
You can tell from the beginning that he is a slimy prat who just wants to eat her, the 
silly thing is that she totally falls head over heals [sic] about him. 
Such a hybrid discourse signals a corresponding mixture of social intentions, what 
Hodge and Kress call motivation, what Mikhail Bakhtin calls the speech will, or 
speech plan, determining the "compositional and stylistic features" of the utterance 
(1952). They are simultaneously addressing a peer, as in an informal discussion of 
the film, peppered with indignation and concrete social detail, and a teacher, or 
academic system, and its expectations of formality. 
It is tempting to want to clean up this discourse, make it either one thing or the other 
- and such a move often characterises educational debates, promoting either the 
supposed objective rigour of a supposed monolithic expository form - the essay; or 
the supposed artless authenticity of a 'personal response'. Both of these are 
unrealistic. Speakers/writers are much more likely to have a mixture of motives, and 
their speech and writing will polyphonically suggest this. Our job as teachers should 
be to help them clarify their intentions, and find the representational resources to 
carry them out. If that makes for hybrid and contradictory discourses, we need to live 
with these, at least provisionally, without becoming censorious. Such a move would 
probably only result in driving the contradictions underground, never losing them. 
Bakhtin's view of language (1981) is much more tolerant of contradiction than 
Barthess: 
Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a 
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genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed 
analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-
ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of 
language. (page 272) 
Pleasures of the image 
There are several types of pleasure implicit in the model I have offered of the 
reader's use of the still image. Let me move chronologically through the experience 
of film viewing as I have described it. 
Barthes' notes on the still begin with some speculations about its fascination, rooted, 
as so often with Barthes, in his own behaviour. He confesses to a fascination with 
stills, photos from films in Cahiers du Cinema, or in magazines, or outside cinemas. 
He uses this to mount an attack on the common view of the still as a sample of the 
whole, thus necessarily a 'remote byproduct': 
I thought of myself as like those children who prefer the pictures to the text, 
or like those clients who, unable to attain the adult possession of objects 
(because too expensive), are content to derive pleasure from looking at a 
choice of samples or a department store catalogue. Such an explanation 
does no more than reproduce the common opinion with regard to stills 
which sees them as a remote subproduct of the film, a sample, a means of 
drawing in custom, a pornographic extract, and, technically, a reduction of 
the work by the immobilization of what is taken to be the sacred essence of 
cinema - the movement of the images. (page 331) 
Barthes evokes, though it is not really part of his argument, the part that stills play in 
the small social history that is the individual's experience of a film. All parts of this 
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social history are important, as is recognised by later cultural theory, especially in the 
cultural studies tradition - so the fact that Barthes describes himself looking at stills in 
the pages of Cahiers du Cinema, or outside a cinema, immediately affects the kinds 
of meanings that might be made from such images; as opposed to, say, posters of 
Sigourney Weaver in Aliens in a local video shop, or of Madonna in the pages of Just 
17, or Paul McGann as Dr Who on the cover of the Radio Times. 
The pleasures evoked here are the pleasures of particular individual tastes, socially 
formed, acceded to, contested or transformed. As Bourdieu (1984) describes, they 
may have their roots in formations of social class, in traditions of elite or popular 
taste; but they're at least modifiable. In any case, the immediate or gradual 
recognition that "this will be a film I'll enjoy" begins here. The question of pleasure 
and taste, and of the particular pleasures involved in the viewing of horror, will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Finally, I would want to say that oppositions between the pleasure of productive work 
- making film - and the unpleasure of analytical work are false in principle - they offer 
different axes of pleasure, that may be oriented towards different social experiences 
and intentions; but they need to be recognised as legitimate, nonetheless. So one 
child might find it intensely pleasurable to learn analytical terminology and perform 
this kind of transformation; another might find it much more pleasurable to work with 
image, film and editing equipment. 
Conclusion 
I have argued, then, a number of points about young people's viewing of film, and 
horror film in particular, relating these to their use of digital stills in the classroom. 
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They read a grammar of film both synchronically and diachronically, I suggest. They 
make such readings explicit more clearly with the help of their own digital stills; 
though their transformations of the text are different because of the use of stills, 
allowing them to superimpose a temporality derived from their own meanings over 
the original diachrony of the film. I have also argued that young people can use 
digital stills to construct their own abbreviated preferred version of the film, choosing 
images that represent themes important to them, pleasurable to them. 
This rather reductive account suggests an optimistic and unproblematic view of the 
use of film in the classroom, and the possibilities for new understandings using 
new(-ish) technology. In fact, I am, on the whole, optimistic about all of this, but 
wouldn't want to suggest that it is unproblematic - and I will conclude by considering 
some of the problems. 
It might be argued that such transformations of film betray the pleasures and social 
meanings experienced in 'real' viewings of them in cinemas and living-rooms, 
obliterating these authentic experiences for the sake of understandings imposed by, 
derived from, the academy. I will argue in Chapter 9 that this is a false opposition, 
that the classroom is an authentic social site like any other, and that no social site is 
free from the coercive effects of ideology, dominant meanings, and forms of social 
regulation. Indeed, these may operate quite as strongly within the family as within the 
classroom, as Valerie Walkerdine suggests in her study (1986) of a family watching 
Rocky II. However, granted this, we are still left with some difficult questions about 
the use of popular culture in the classroom, and its potential uses and abuses. The 
evidence of this study suggests that there are a wide range of possibilities. Such 
uses can result in transformations of the text which appear to be a kind of 
enlightened discussion of cultural questions, or a pleasurable amplification of 
important meanings found in film. Elsewhere, I have found suspicion, or even a 
refusal to allow popular pleasures to be appropriated by the work of the classroom, 
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and subjected to its quasi-academic discourse. The overwhelming experience, 
however, has been of pleasure - pleasures brought in from outside; the thrill of 
horror, sometimes disturbing, sometimes comfortable; pleasures of identification, 
both challenging and affirmatory; and the pleasure of power over images, a small, 
material pleasure. 
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Chapter 4: Spiders, Werewolves and Bad Girls 
This chapter will look closely at the work of one student, Johanna, as she watches 
The Company of Wolves, and talks and writes about it. My questions in this chapter, 
about Johanna's act of viewing, or reading, are partly (as in the last chapter) about 
the nature of response (a problematic term in itself, of course): what counts as 
response, and what counts as text; about the social context in which such response 
occurs (both the classroom, and outside). Also, however, I want to develop questions 
about the subject-as-spectator. What can we know about each of these people who 
engage with a film text? What aspects of subjectivity can we make reasonable 
informed guesses about, and how might these be derived from the traces of 
discourse available to us, which range from tiny gestural interactions at the moment 
of viewing to extensive written transformations of the film? How are the represented 
subjectivities in the film text related to actual aspects of her own self, the social 
identities she lives out at school, beyond school? In what ways might these actual 
and represented identities, senses of self, be determined by gender? What pleasures 
and unpleasures are implicated in what kinds of understanding, what kinds of 
recruitment of the text to the enormous, unconscious, daily creativity of the building 
and transformation of subjectivity? 
While semiotic and social semiotic theory helps to give a convincing account of the 
semiotic field of the film and of the social meanings into which this is transformed by 
the reader, there is also a need to account for certain aspects of subjectivity, such as 
acts of identification, the nature of pleasure, and the interplay of conscious and 
unconscious engagements with the text. Here, psychoanalytic theory might be more 
productive. There are well-known difficulties in attempting to resolve cultural 
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materialist perspectives with the traditionally transhistorical character of 
psychoanalytic theory. However, I have argued in Chapter 1 that some kind of 
synthesis, albeit provisional, is better than none, referring to Volosinov's image of the 
constant semiotic exchange between the "inner psyche" and the "outer world of 
signs", the exchange which, he argues, constitutes all signs, and all ideology. Such a 
view proposes an idea of a self constituted through social exchange, through 
dialogue with textual utterance and the utterances of others in particular social 
contexts, at particular historical moments. 
Engaging with the film: brushing away the spiders 
My evidence covers various stages of Johanna's engagement, response, production. 
There are some observations of her in the journal I wrote as the class watched the 
film; an interview with her and two friends she is working with; and her finished 
assignment. The assignment, like that of Ben, Gemma and Ellie in Chapter 3, is to 
choose significant images from the film, 'grab' them with a video digitiser, and write 
about them, incorporating the digitised images into their desktop-published text. 
While they watched, then, I observed, and wrote a journal. Boys' and girls' reactions 
fall into distinct patterns. They sit separately to watch. Boys are more likely to crack 
jokes, comment aloud, follow startled reactions at shock or suspense by laughing 
aloud, debunk the horror, contest the modalities of the film, ridicule the special 
effects. They also check out the narrative (one boy asking questions throughout), 
mimic the voices of the actors, and share sweets. At certain key moments of horror 
during the werewolf transformation scenes, however, they are completely silent, 
wide-eyed, frowning with concentration. 
The girls comment much less, laugh much less, grimace at the horror, frown when 
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the narrative takes a complex turn, smile with appreciation. Some girls laugh when 
the boys laugh. One covers her face at the werewolf transformation. They whisper 
interpretations to each other - at the end, when the titles begin, they check 
interpretations and reactions, while the boys are silent. One girl, Laura, makes ironic 
'posh conductor' movements with her hand to accompany the Baroque music of the 
final title sequence. There are also some boys, and some girls, who fit less neatly 
into these rather stereotypical patterns. Johanna is one of them. 
Clearly, the engagement with the text begins here: but I want to avoid the idea of a 
'response' - a process - which leads into the students' own 'texts' - the finished 
products. Rather, I want to problematize the idea of both 'response' and 'text', partly 
to avoid the kind of reductive, partial account described by Richard Johnson (1980) 
as 'the literary reduction': 
Here the concern is primarily with cultural products of a particular kind, 
text-like products, nicely lying there, inertly awaiting analysis or 
appreciation. (248) 
- and partly because the insistence of social semiotic theory on the social and 
historical contingency of textual production and reception seems to me an urgent 
matter for the classroom. So, avoiding Johnson's neat, text-like products, and 
bearing in mind the variety of semiotic codes described by social semiotics, I want to 
look for Johanna's responsive 'text' in all corners of the material context in which it is 
built. 
Johanna and other students have approached The Company of Wolves through a 
group of related texts: Red Riding Hood, Angela Carter's story, 'The Company of 
Wolves' from The Bloody Chamber, and other werewolf movies, including the hybrid 
Illustration 4.1: The Company of 
Wolves - the spiders on Rosaleen's 
bible 
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horror movie/pop video that John Landis directed for Michael Jackson's Thriller, and 
Terence Fisher's The Curse of the Werewolf. So, already, the borders of the film text 
blur, and connect with these others, literary and film texts; as well as others Johanna 
has seen, and mentions later in interview and written work: The Hand that Rocks the 
Cradle; Alien; Dracula; Terminator 2. In certain senses, her particular work is as 
much about the metatext that is the genre, as about this specific film. And (not to 
render the teaching in the course too invisible!), the question of the representation of 
women in horror movies has already been raised and discussed in the classroom. 
So, already, discourses of the classroom - of textual study - have merged (or 
collided) with discourses of popular understandings from beyond the classroom. 
These appear, so far, to be spoken texts; Johanna's first engagement with the film, 
however, is unspoken. It employs a semiotic of gesture, facial expression; and 
perhaps a reading of the film more visual than verbal. 
My memory of Johanna is that she was one of the small number of girls who laughed 
with the boys, but 'appreciated' with the girls. In my journal, I've only noted her 
response by name once, during a sequence when a mass of spiders falls from the 
church ceiling onto the bible of the central character, Rosaleen, and she fearlessly 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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brushes them off (illustration 1). Several girls made 'Ugh!' exclamations. Johanna 
made brushing away movements with her hand, imitating Rosaleen; and smiled. 
What's happening here? Two things, it seems to me. She laughs with some of the 
boys at the sequences of spectacular horror; and the laughter seems to be an 
assertion of mastery - toughness for the boys - over the fear response, expressed 
through a laughter which seems to operate as a camouflage sign, disguising the 
more usual expressions of shock or fear (the 'ughs' and grimaces of some of the 
girls). It seems linked to the familiar disparaging remarks about the special effects, 
which appear to be a contestation of the modality of these sequences; but may 
actually be again a discourse of misinformation, concealing a reluctant assent to the 
modality of the episode. We have already seen this kind of response in Chapter 3, 
where Ben finds the transformation sequence laughable at one moment, and 
describes it as "distressing" later. For boys, this kind of joky response is well-
documented (Willis: 1990; Wood: 1993); for girls, less so; though Buckingham (1996) 
notes similarly dismissive remarks made by a 12 year old girl about Pet Sematary; 
and how they contradict her earlier claims that the film was "'quite scary' " (page 
101). 
The other thing is her brushing away movement. What kind of sign is this? It looked 
almost unconscious - she wasn't looking at anyone else, didn't seem to want to 
share this gestural echo of the screen movement; but rather was looking directly at 
the screen, smiling. It seemed to be a mirroring, a bodily expression of a kind of 
identification with the film text. With the character? Or with the brief shift in the 
paradigm of horror heroine which this brushing away of the spiders represents? It's a 
shift that works against the affective structures of the genre: the fearless sweeping 
away of phobic myths prefigures the refusal of the girl to be afraid of the werewolf 
later in the film. If the fear response to horror is an identification with the fear of the 
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victim, then this film invites, to some degree, a refusal of such fear. 
This gesture, the brushing away of imaginary spiders, the smile at the screen, raises 
some interesting questions. I take it to be part of a set of texts - here a bodily text of 
gesture and expression - that form Johanna's remaking of the film. It is a drama, a 
role-play of the film character, a semiotic replay. It raises the question, as it seems 
almost unconscious, of the nature of the unconscious in the viewing of film. 
Psychoanalytic film theory has spent a good deal of time on the puzzling two-way 
nature of the viewing of film - the viewer positioned by the camera's gaze, which 
creates the film; but also the gaze of the screen at the viewer. In some accounts, 
such as Laura Mulvey's well-known article (1975), this results in a profoundly 
pessimistic view of the helplessness of spectators, pinned to a point-of-view always 
structured as male. The deterministic effect this has on the representation of women 
and on women as spectators is refused by later feminist critiques, such as that of 
Teresa de Lauretis (1980), who associates it with effects of cultural domination 
intrinsic to the figures of Freudian/Lacanian thought. Christian Metz (1982) is 
criticized by de Lauretis for the same reasons; though his account is less negative. 
He explores the Lacanian image of the mirror in relation to the act of viewing, finding 
that the screen in some ways resembles the mirror which forces the first division of 
the self in Lacan's account; but is in other ways very different: 
A strange mirror, then, very like that of childhood, and very different. Very 
like ... because during the showing we are, like the child, ... prey to the 
imaginary, the double, and are so paradoxically through a real perception. 
Very different, because this mirror returns us everything but ourselves, 
because we are wholly outside it, whereas the child is both in it and in front 
of it. (page 49) 
What light does this throw on Johanna's small act of identification? She mirrors the 
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character: a recognition of the likeness of self to the represented other, perhaps. We 
can only speculate on what's going on inside her head, on the basis of this bodily 
engagement with the text. Is it worth speculating on the conscious or unconscious 
nature of such a response? Such speculation makes a social semiotic reading 
difficult - we're no longer dealing with the relatively transparent signs of the fully 
conscious sign-maker; the Freudian unconscious raises the difficulty of a dimension 
apparently beyond the semiotic. Such a domain preoccupies Metz, in his comparison 
of film with dream. It's also a recurrent feature of critical commentary on horror 
literature and film, whose images and narratives, along with fantasy fiction in general, 
self-evidently connect with dreams and the repressed fears and desires of the 
unconscious. A dimension beyond the semiotic is also a feature of Paris school 
semiotics, in the form, for instance, of Barthes' 'third meaning' of the cinematic still 
(1978); and his punctum (1993) - moves to establish an ineffable form of 
apprehension beyond mundane signification. 
Metz, on the other hand, attempts to bring the semiotic and the unconscious closer 
together. A main thrust of The Imaginary Signifier is to weaken the boundary 
between them (imagining Freud's 'censorship' as a leaky, fluid process rather than a 
solid barrier, for instance), to recognise the actions of the unconscious in conscious 
thought, and, with Lacan, to recognise the discursive nature of the unconscious, 
thereby pulling it into the realm of language, of the semiotic. 
Similarly, Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, in an article on Barthes' punctum 
(1996), reject the ineffable nature of this image, its attempt to move beyond the 
semiotic, arguing that such a move is mystificatory and elitist. Their proposal 
(examined more fully in Chapter 8) is to extend the realm of the semiotic ever further, 
bringing more material within its reach, in a move of demystification. Their argument 
is entirely consonant with that of Volosinov, who insists on the materiality of the sign, 
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but recognises the transformative power of the psyche, which consumes the signs of 
the outer world, and produces new signs which it returns to the external flow of 
semiosis, and of ideology. 
This small sign of Johanna's, the brushing away of the spiders, accompanied by the 
smile, is worth considering in the light of these perspectives. Volosinov recognises 
the importance of the social context of sign-making, situating his "utterance" within 
the play of other semiotic systems: 
Social psychology exists primarily in a wide variety of forms of the 
"utterance", of little speech genres of internal and external kinds - things 
left completely unstudied to the present day. All these speech 
performances are, of course, joined with other types of semiotic 
manifestation and interchange - with miming, gesturing, acting out, and the 
like. (page 20) 
The only issue I would take here would be with the primacy of speech: Volosinov's 
theory of the speech genre becomes even more helpful if all the kinds of "semiotic 
manifestation" he mentions can be regarded as "utterances" in their own right, rather 
than semiotic cladding for the word. In this classroom, then, Johanna's gesture 
becomes an utterance, with an extensive social semiotic weight. How might we 
interpret it? 
In the context of Volosinov's idelogical sign rather than Barthess ineffable one, 
Johanna's gestural utterance is clearly ideological: it is a recognition of the strength 
of the female heroine, an emancipatory transformation of the Red Riding Hood 
paradigm and that of the horror heroine, as Carol Clover argues in her image of the 
female survivor figure, the Final Girl (1993). The growing strength of female 
characters has been often noted as a progressive element in the modern horror film 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 
	 104 
(Clover, 1990; Willis, 1992; King, 1982; Jancovich, 1992). This small gesture, then, 
recognises the power of this contestation of traditional representations of gender 
relations. 
But it does more than just "recognise": it is a sign simultaneously of reception and 
production. In the one gesture, the ideological sign has been absorbed, evaluated, 
transformed into a personal expression of female strength, and returned to the outer 
world. The sign is made on the borderline between inner and outer worlds that 
Volosinov identifies as the locus of the production of subjectivity: 
By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be located 
somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline 
separating these two spheres of reality. It is here that an encounter 
between the organism and the outside world takes place, but the encounter 
is not a physical one: the organism and the outside world meet here in the 
sign. Psychic experience is the semiotic expression of the contact between 
the organism and the outside environment. That is why the inner psyche is 
not analyzable as a thing but can only be understood as a sign. (page 26; 
original emphasis) 
As well as being irreducibly ideological and social, this brushing away of spiders is, 
as should be clear from the above, a sign with a history - or more accurately, with a 
number of histories. The history of Johanna's own battles to construct social 
identities which will fulfil conflicting social needs, as her other work on the film will 
show; the histories of the filmic sign in folktale and cinema, which Johanna's gesture 
imitates. 
To return to Barthes' ideal of disobedient reading, a theme which runs throughout 
the textual politics of post-structuralism and cultural studies, this is a sign which, 
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arguably, is both obedient and disobedient. To begin with, it seems absolutely in 
accord with the explicit intentions of the text to represent a girl who inverts social and 
textual stereotypes: an obedient reading of a feminist sign. Clearly, to read a 
progressive meaning obediently seems defiant (of dominant structures of power). It's 
not, however, a passive reading. She has the option to ignore this emphasis of the 
text, but chooses to markedly endorse, reflect, enact it. And it is still a transformation, 
a semiotic act: it is her sign, image of her decision, her pleasure, her self. As we look 
at other work - her talk, her writing - it will become clear, I think, that her reading of 
Rosaleen, and her own subjective alignments with the represented subjectivities of 
the film, produce a powerful image of what it is to be a strong girl, a semiotic 
construct woven from text and self. 
Finally, Johanna's movement, from the gesture of immediate engagement to final 
written assignment, shows something of the way in which the discourses of the 
classroom move from unconscious to conscious modes of understanding and 
production. But Metz's argument reminds us that this movement, while it may shift 
from broadly unconscious to broadly conscious engagement, retains aspects of both 
throughout. So we can look, in our reading of the gesture, and other first responses 
to the film, for all the complexity of full engagement, and perhaps a particularly visual 
kind of literacy, accepting, perhaps, Freud's idea of 'visual thinking' (1984), and his 
association of it with the preconscious. And we can look, in final product writing, such 
as Johanna's written piece on The Company of Wolves, not just for unambiguous 
conscious structures, but for slips, gaps, silences, the polysemy which, Metz argues, 
is the repressed, unconscious field of meaning that lies behind the conscious sign. 
This interplay of conscious and unconscious needs to be synthesised with the social 
nature of semiosis examined above, and stressed by Volosinov and others - it's this 
which Metz, in particular, might miss in Johanna's brushing away of the spiders. In 
fact, critiques of Metz in the early eighties, such as those of Stephen Heath and 
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Teresa de Lauretis (1980), point out the need to restore the social dimension of 
cinema, and a historical materialist perspective, missing from Metz's account. So 
Johanna's gesture needs to be read alongside her choosing to sit with the two girls 
who later become her partners in the task of interpreting the film; and against her 
later choices to focus on Rosaleen's role as rebel, bad girl; and against what 
Bourdieu (1984) would call her 'cultural capital' in this encounter - her knowledge of 
film, of the genre, and the structures of taste, choice and pleasure in which this is 
bound up. And it fits the model of a social engagement with texts (especially those 
which deal in imagery of the grotesque) which can be derived from Bakhtin's 
carnival, which will be explored in detail in the next chapter. Bakhtin opposes his 
model of a social, carnivalesque engagement with the grotesque, in which all are 
part of the immortal social carnival body, to the alienated individualism of German 
Idealism and the Romantic version of the grotesque. All of this has certain 
implications, clearly, for which texts we choose to work on in school, how we deal 
with them, and how we recognise, make room for, films young people have watched 
outside school, and the manner in which they watch and enjoy them. 
Talking about the film: 'she's the villain, yeah!' 
Later, I interview Johanna with Clare and Laura. They have decided, as a group, to 
do the question on the worksheet about the representation of women, each choosing 
one image from the film as a point of departure. Johanna has chosen an image from 
one of the subordinate narratives of the film, a story in which Rosaleen becomes 
narrator of the folk-tales for the first time, taking over the role from her grandmother. 
She tells her mother the story of a witch from the village who takes revenge on an 
aristocrat who has made her pregnant, as he's about to marry another woman from 
his own class. Johanna's first real contribution to the interview is to explain 
connections she has made between the Company of Wolves and other films: 
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AB Can you tell us the other ones you've written about? 
J 	 Urn - Aliens - where Sigourney Weaver is a - she's the - sort of - 
heroine - and she has to - get rid of all the aliens. 
The emergence of a paradigm of strong heroine is clear here; and, it seems to me, 
the connection with Johanna's brushing away of the spiders, sign of fearless 
heroine, is equally clear. Carol Clover describes this class of horror heroines in Men, 
Women and Chainsaws (1993), explaining how the price paid by the girl survivor, in 
appropriating the traditionally male hero role, is to become sexually ambiguous 
herself. Clover lists, as evidence, the androgynous names of several of these 'Final 
Girls', of whom Sigourney Weaver's character - Ripley - is one (illustration 2). 
Illustration 4.2: Aliens - Ripley 
attacks the aliens) 
The three girls go on to describe The Hand that Rocks the Cradle (Curtis Hanson, 
1991), in which the main character assumes the role of a nanny to exact revenge on 
the woman who has indirectly caused her husband's death: 
J 	 And then she goes back to get revenge. Against the woman. And she 
plays a character - that she's sort of acting - 
C 	 - the (character she's acting - 
J 	 (its her fault that her husband died. And - she went back - she 
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went back to - take revenge - so she went and babysitted for - (for 




like an imposter, and you don't know - 
J 	 - treated it like her own child, 'cos she's lost hers 
C 	 She's like an imposter, and at the beginning she's like a stereotype - 
sort of - mother, kind of - and she's actually the person who's - evil, 
person [laughs] 
AB So she's the villain as well, is she? 
J 	 She's the villain, yeah. 
Johanna's preoccupation with the imposter nanny is interesting. In fact, the film 
demonises her, and our sympathies are apparently invited throughout with the 
innocent mother whose motherhood is usurped and life threatened by the revenge-
obsessed Peyton Flanders (Rebecca de Mornay). It looks, from this interview, as 
though Johanna is reversing the sympathies the film invites, unsettling the allocation 
of blame ('it's her fault [the innocent mother's] that her husband died'), and 
emphasising the reason for her act of maternal usurpation ('- treated it like her own 
child, 'cos she's lost hers'). 
These brief responses seem to produce a particular variant of the horror-heroine 
paradigm. The new elements of Johanna's version seem to be: a transformation of 
the heroine-as-victim into the heroine-as-hero (Clover's 'Final Girl'); the revenge 
motif; and, related to revenge, the heroine-as-villain. Johanna, in fact, also seems to 
attribute a victim-function to the villain of The Hand that Rocks the Cradle, 
emphasising her lost husband and child. This complexity of female role in horror - the 
woman who can combine functions of hero, villain and monster, is perhaps most fully 
realised in Stephen King's Carrie, in Brian de Palma's film (1976). King himself 
(1993) remarks of her: 
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For me, Carrie White is a sadly misused teenager, an example of the sort 
of person whose spirit is so often broken for good in that pit of man- and 
woman- eaters that is your normal suburban high school. But she's also 
Woman, feeling her powers for the first time, and, like Samson, pulling 
down the temple on everyone in sight at the end of the book. (page 198) 
Writing about the film: "women as the baddies" 
These themes appear again in Johanna's final written assignment. The visual design 
of the page (illustration 3) consists of five frames: four textframes and one picture 
frame; inside one large frame with a double border. Clearly, the picture frame, at the 
top left-hand of the page, is the element placed first in the syntagm of the page 
design. Johanna has chosen an image that foregrounds the witch, as the 
transformed guests destroy the wedding table in a carnivalesque inversion of the 
former social order: as gleeful disorder ensues, to the accompaniment of fairground 
music (previously it was Bach), and the servants stop playing and serving, and toast 
each other with their masters' wine, the witch looks on from Johanna's chosen 
frame, and laughs. 
The page design then becomes ambiguous: do we read from the left (the box below 
the picture); or from the top right (the box on the right of the picture)? The one on the 
right echoes the theme of the avenging heroine: 
This is the scene where the witch is at the wedding party and she is 
pregnant from the groom.She has come back to seek revenge because he 
left her and what she does is disrupt the party. She then goes on to turn 
them all into wolves. 
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[Illustration 4.3: Johanna's page] WEDDING SCENE.  
This film is very different from. for example 
'Dracula' where the women are the victims and the 
man is the threat. Nowadays. women are begging 
to take more of a main role in films as the threat 
themselves,to make men and women more equal. 
Two of these kind of films are 'Alien' and 
'Terminator 2.' I have chosen this image because i 
think it's very important that women are treated as 
equals. 
My image is taken from about 
three quarters of the way 
through the video. This is the 
scene where the witch is at the 
wedding party and she is 
pregnant from the groom.She 
has come back to seek 
revenge because he left her 
and what she does is disrupt 
the party. She then goes on to 
turn them all into wolves.The 
wedding is very old 
fashionedand the costumes 
are great. I think this scene is 
showing women as the 
'baddies' which you don't 
normally see in films because 
you usually see them as the 
weak one's and the scared 
one's because they are 
exploited so much. But it also 
shows Rosaleen as the 
heroine in the end, as she isn't 
scared and she tames the wolf 
and becomes a wolf herself. 
I think the director has included this scene in the film because it just adds to all the 
madness of the film and another reason is because again,it is showing women as the 
more evil type and the threat, because she is getting revenge against her ex-
husband,which I think makes the film more exciting. I think probably the audience 
would not of expected a women to be the threat, so maybe that sort of evens out the 
stereotypical view of the threat because both women and men are playing the roles of 
baddies, the wolf being a man and the women being the witch. Also, Rosaline is sort of 
a baddie because she is sort of friendly with the wolf which gives her a bad side I think. 
This film is very unrealistic and it makes me laugh more than being frightened. For me I 
think this film should come under a comedy genre. When you watch the film you can't 
really get scared because you can't imagine something like this happening because it's 
so incredibly unrealistic. The film was quite exciting at times because it had funny little 
stories within the main story, such as the wedding scene and Rosaline's gran telling her 
stories of the past which gave you a sense of what was really going on and it added into 
the story quite nicely.The film was quite weird at times because I couldn't understand 
what was going on, such as the scene where a man pulled up in a posh car and gave 
the boy a potion, the car drove off and the boy put this potion on his chest and a lot of 
hair sprouted out from it, which was really weird. But even more weird was the fact that 
Rosaline was driving the car. I also didn't understand the bit where Rosaline climbs up 
the tree into the nest and finds the baby in an egg which I found was really stupid. The 
overall film wasn't bad and because it was weird it was interesting, and really kept me 
thinking and awake! 	 By Johanna. 9A 
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What she seems to be doing with the image is to use it to reconstruct, in brief and 
condensed terms, the narrative syntagm of this sequence: beginning with the present 
tense moment of the image (the witch Is at the wedding party); moving to the past 
tense of the understood prior events, her motivation (She has come back to seek 
revenge because he left her); and moving to a present/future telling of the 
consequences (She then goes on to turn them all into wolves). It is necessary to 
remark, though, that in the course of this three-part narrative syntagm, the paradigm 
of the avenging heroine is signalled clearly in the assigning of motivation to the witch: 
'to seek revenge', linking this narrative strategy with the expository passages that 
follow. 
The next sentence appears to be a complete non-sequitur: 
The wedding is very old fashioned and the costumes are great. 
I will return to it later, however. 
The remaining text in this frame, signalled by the introductory 'I think...' as a 
discourse of explicit commentary or interpretation, develops the theme of the heroine 
who, like those mentioned by others in the group, is a transformation of the victim 
type; but who, as Johanna alone observes, is also a 'baddie': 
I think this scene is showing women as the 'baddies' which you don't 
normally see in films because you usually see them as the weak one's and 
the scared one's because they are exploited so much. 
Here, weakness and fear are opposed to being a baddie rather than to strength; 
though strength seems to be assumed; and is implied in the linking of this heroine 
with the protagonist of the film (and the narrator of this episode) - Rosaleen: 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 112 
But it also shows Rosaleen as the heroine in the end, as she isn't scared 
and she tames the wolf and becomes a wolf herself. 
Here, just as strength is implicit in the baddie-weakness opposition in the previous 
sentence, 'baddie' seems to be implied in the cluster of qualities implicitly opposed 
to 'scared'. 
What does she mean by baddie? Johanna seems to be operating a kind of concept 
of 'admirable wickedness' - we sense that she considers both the witch and 
Rosaleen to be justified in their behaviour. She is constructing a heroine paradigm 
whose narrative function is to combine the role of heroine and villain in an exciting 
transgression of the conventional character types. The connection with the villain of 
The Hand that Rocks the Cradle is clear; and the revenge motif links the witch and 
the imposter nanny. 
Her second box has a different expository intention: to take an overview of a number 
of related films; but in relation to the same explicit theme, in which the political 
principle of the equality of women is realised through narrative structures in which 
heroines are transformed not just into heroes, but into that particular narrative 
function of horror movies which is the threat on which the fears and pleasures of the 
narrative turn: 
This film is very different from, for example 'Dracula' where the women are 
the victims and the man is the threat. Nowadays, women are begging [sic] 
to take more of a main role in films as the threat themselves,to make men 
and women more equal. Two of these kind of films are 'Alien' and 
'Terminator 2.' I have chosen this image because i think it's very important 
that women are treated as equals. 
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Threat is Johanna's word - an interesting word, because, like the admirable baddie 
figure she constructs, it is ambiguous in terms of the moral themes of the films. 
Unlike the word monster, or villain , which suggest intrinsic wickedness, threat derives 
its moral loading from its trajectory - who it is aimed at. So in Alien, its a benign 
threat (Ripley's destruction of the monster); or is Johanna referring to the female 
monster of the sequel, which has attracted extensive commentary from feminist 
critics (see, for instance, Creed: 1986; Clover: 1993)? In Terminator 2, it is the more 
ambiguous threat of the guerrilla heroine, Sarah Connor - benign in the sense that 
she's attacking the interests of global capital in constructing the computers which will 
threaten humanity; malign in that her action is against the innocent inventor of the 
machines, and is presented as excessively violent (illustration 4). 
Illustration 4.4: Terminator 2 - 
Sarah Connor, guerrilla heroine 
The next frame continues both the expository mode - "I think..." - and the 'female 
baddie' theme. It deals explicitly with the link between this scene and the whole film, 
in terms of her preoccupation with this paradigm, repeating the link she's already 
made in the first frame between the witch and Rosaleen: 
... it is showing women as the more evil type and the threat. because she is 
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getting revenge against her ex-husband,which I think makes the film more 
exciting. I think probably the audience would not of expected a woman to 
be the threat, so maybe that sort of evens out the stereotypical view of the 
threat because both women and men are playing the roles of baddies, the 
wolf being a man and the woman being the witch. Also, Rosaline is sort of 
a baddie because she is sort of friendly with the wolf which gives her a bad 
side I think. 
We can see even more clearly here how Johanna articulates two sets of oppositions: 
one of good and evil, driven by the suspense dynamic of horror movies; the other of 
weak/good women against strong/wicked women, driven by an emancipatory 
inversion of gender stereotypes. Audience reactions might conceivably be thrown 
into confusion by this - simultaneously booing the villain for her wickedness and 
cheering her for her strength! Needless to say, it is more complex than that, and 
Johanna at least suffers from no confusion, holding together structures which, 
though apparently contradictory, depend on different orders of audience desire. 
So far, Johanna emerges as a skilled, competent and experienced reader of film in 
general, and this film in particular. So far, I have only really asked the question -
'How does she read this film?' There are features of her responses, however, that 
do not fit the surface logic of her expository piece, which relate more to the question -
'Why does she read it like this?' 
To backtrack a little - the first response that gave me pause for thought was that, 
while she gave signs, like the other girls (stronger, if anything) of identification with 
the strong female protagonist, she joined in, unlike most of the girls, with the 
dismissive and joky reactions of the boys. This seemed to be related to a reluctance 
to be taken in by the horror scenes; and in the interview, she asserts that 'people like 
being sort of scared ... like being frightened ... just the thrill of being scared' - but 
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also, about horror films: 'they're so - unrealistic!'; and, about The Company of 
Wolves: 'It was funny (laughs]'. This oscillation between thrilled engagement and 
dismissive laughter is more typical of boys than girls in this study. 
In her written assignment, I would identify two features that don't fit the rather neat 
account of her readings and uses of the film I've given so far. The first is what 
appears to be an irrelevant sentence in the first text frame: 
The wedding is very old fashioned and the costumes are great. 
This is a brief moment of delight in the beautiful fabrics which construct the world of 
aristocratic privilege in the scene: marquee and guests' and servants' clothing are all 
of pastel silks, contrasting with the ragged homespun of the witch. But this is not, in 
fact, an irrelevant aside at all. If the social meanings of these costumes can be read 
as a signification of outrageous social and sexual inequity on one level, they are 
read, by Johanna, in relation to a different pattern of female pleasures and social 
roles on another. The structure that holds together her pleasure in the costumes and 
her pleasure in the emancipated heroine is an unconscious one - it is not signalled 
by any conscious structure of rational discourse in her text - reminding us of Metz's 
emphasis on the action of the unconscious within conscious thought, and language. 
Johanna's choices between the social roles available to girls in school are complex. 
She likes to do well in lessons; but draws back from excessive academic eagerness. 
She shares other girls' enthusiasm for work, but doesn't like to show it. She dresses 
in practical clothing with little decoration, little jewellery, no makeup. But she loves 
dance - and in musical productions, revels in tights, lyotard, tutu and ballet shoes. 
So it comes, perhaps, as no surprise that she should inscribe this careful balancing 
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of social roles - good, but not goody-goody; appropriating 'boyish' toughness and 
'girlish' sensitivity in well-judged proportions - into the narratives and images of 
femininity that she encounters. These structures of subjectivity extend even to the 
pleasures and unpleasures she experiences in the text, and to the actual cognitive 
processes of reading/spectating itself. 
That she finds pleasure in the female roles of the film is clear from her language, 
producing the least ambiguous terminology of evaluation and pleasure: 'exciting', 
'great'. But there is also resistance. The film is commonly experienced by pupils as 
puzzling, because of its complex narrative structure, shifting modalities and use of 
opaque visual tropes, which Metz (1982) describes as the kind of pure metaphor rare 
even in avant-garde film. There is no doubt that Johanna can unravel these 
complexities: in the interview she demonstrates a clear understanding of the final 
sequence: 
J 	 Yeah, the dream comes into real life - dream sort of comes true - and 
it jumps through her window. 
But in her written commentary, she adopts a different strategy to deal with the 
hypotactic narrative of the film, a strategy much more typical of boys in the study 
than girls - she uses much more ambiguous evaluative terms ('mad', 'weird'); 
refuses the fear/thrill response of horror ( 'it makes me laugh more than being 
frightened'); and contests the modality of the film ('This film is very unrealistic'; 
'stupid'). At the same time, she admits to the kind of textual pleasure of 
interpretation that is more characteristic of the girls in the sample - 'The overall film 
wasn't bad and because it was weird it was interesting, and really kept me thinking 
and awake!' 
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There are other ways in which Joanna's dealings with the film are marked by these 
tensions, balances, mediations: the kind of open, fluid condition of Mikhail Bakhtin's 
dialogism. There is the mixing of genres she seems to me to employ: formal 
categories of film analysis alongside a colloquial refusal of the sort of abstract 
terminology she might associate with the English classroom ('weird'; 'mad'; stupid'). 
There is the link (but also opposition) between school viewing and home (she 
watched The Hand that Rocks the Cradle at home on telly). There is the social 
nature of classroom viewing - with a group of friends; but close enough to groups of 
boys to hear their reactions to the film. There's the girl-group work: choosing the 
images from the film together; digitizing them; working and talking together as they 
write; sharing their (separate) pages on adjacent computer screens; putting together 
the printouts into a satisfying booklet. 
Response, Reading, Production 
The evidence of this study complicates the whole question of what counts as 
"response". The word itself carries a freight of controversy that is central to debates 
about the nature of culture, reading, and the production of meaning. I am certain that 
Johanna's 'response' is an active making of meaning; but I am not sure where we 
might place the boundaries of her engagement with the text, bearing in mind, for 
instance, that she arrives at the film text already conversant with Angela Carter's 
story, with Red Riding Hood, with a complex set of references from horror movies, 
and with her own version of the horror heroine well-articulated. My preferred image 
of what she does with the text is Bakhtin's image of open dialogism (1952/1981), and 
the active contributions to continuing discourse made by both reader and by author 
anticipating response: 
Responsive understanding is a fundamental force, one that participates in 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 118 
the formulation of discourse, and it is moreover an active understanding, 
one that discourse senses as resistance or support enriching the 
discourse. (page 281) 
Bakhtin's metaphor of centrifugal and centripetal forces in language, pulling between 
centre and margin, echoed in this opposition between 'resistance' and 'support', 
prefigures the hegemony theory in which were rooted the accounts of textual 
engagement given by cultural studies in the late seventies and early eighties, and 
later accounts of ways in which engagement with texts always involves ideological 
contestation of one kind or another (eg, Hodge and Kress, 1988, pp 7/8). The 
question of resistance to the ideologies surrounding the text seems clearly there in 
her specifically political work on images of women in these films; but also in her 
distancing from a film whose narrative structures signal the art-house movie, and its 
attendant structures of taste. 
What about her 'response'? It's begun, as I have noted, well before she even begins 
to watch the film, in the sense that she arrives in the classroom already engaged with 
the discourse of which this particular film is one part, a dynamic process memorably 
described by Bakhtin: 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up 
against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological 
consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to 
become an active participant in social dialogue. (page 276) 
In the case of Johanna, what corresponds to Bakhtin's 'utterance'? Not only the film 
text, but also Johanna's 'response' - not just a response, then, but a remaking, a 
new text in its own right. Bakhtin's image of dialogue blurs the distinction between 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 119 
text and response (the text, in any case, being a response to other texts). Gunther 
Kress (1993a) has described, similarly, the undoing of 'the settled distinctions of 
reading and writing, of consumption and production generally; of speech and writing; 
of reference and signification; ...'. This undoing, unsettling, is characteristic of 
Johanna's engagement with the film. 
Final thoughts: pleasures, visual literacies and English 
Much of this chapter has been about subjectivity, gender, and the ways in which 
these determine readings and writings of film in the classroom. Johanna seems, 
then, to be transforming the film into a text, or series of texts, of her own, structured 
around the images and narratives of femininity which intersect with her own 
experiences, desires, social roles. She embraces certain pleasures, readings, 
understandings; and refuses others. She positions herself as a reader/viewer in ways 
analogous to her positioning of herself as a girl among girls, a girl among boys, a 
student, a dancer, a daughter watching TV. In all this, the material conditions of 
viewing, reading, writing, producing, play an important determining role, so we need 
to recognise the significance of classroom rather than home or cinema; the social 
groups and gendered viewing patterns of the class; my role as teacher, choosing the 
film; the representational resources and technologies available to her. 
The question of textual pleasure will be developed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 
6. I will only suggest here that these pleasures are not, as we often imagine, simply 
the sugar on the pill that makes the curricular medicine go down. Rather, they are 
indissoluble aspects of the processes of cognition and affect that allow meaning to 
be made at all. The next two chapters will look to different theoretical perspectives 
for a convincing account of these pleasures: to Bourdieu's theory of aesthetic tastes; 
to Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle; to Bakhtin's carnival; and to accounts of 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 
	 120 
textual pleasure in recent cultural theory. In spite of the many contradictions between 
these theories, they might all have a part to play in constructing a theory of textual 
pleasure that could inform the pedagogy and classroom practice. 
Meanwhile, Joanna goes off to her next lesson, or to the next year, or to post-16 
education, the processes of dialogue and the transformation of self continuing. 
Curiously, she has found in the film almost the opposite of the empty mirror 
described in Metz's Lacanian image of the film screen, the mirror which 'returns us 
everything but ourselves'. She's found herself - or some of herself - for the time 
being. 
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Chapter 5: Pleasures of the Text: 
pleasure, value, horror in the classroom 
The problem of pleasure 
Pleasure is an elusive idea: always complex, always shifting, but perhaps especially 
tricky when we think of young people watching horror films, and particularly in the 
context of perennial public panics about the effects of horror on children. Martin 
Barker (1984), shows, in relation to the video nasties panic of the early 1980s, how 
such concerns are never what they seem to be: how the "public" concern is in fact 
orchestrated by lobbyists and politicians with specific vested interests; how the 
conception of the child around which the concern is built is an idealised, sentimental 
construct; and how the attempts to define the culpable films collapse under scrutiny, 
based as they are on assumptions about their cultural or moral worth and the 
inevitability of their effects, rather than on real analysis of text or audience. 
David Buckingham (1996), employing similar arguments in relation to the James 
Bulger affair of 1993 and its connection to the film Child's Play 3, develops the notion 
of pleasure, relating it firstly to the way in which such moral panics construct their 
own version of the horror audience to fit their argument. This supposed audience, 
argues Buckingham, is constructed as delinquent and largely male; and any forms of 
pleasure involved in the viewing of horror are, therefore, perceived as deviant and 
corrupting of 'normal' processes of socialisation. In fact, however, as he goes on to 
show, the horror audience is wide, there is no evidence that it is deviant, and it 
consists of girls as well as boys. It becomes possible, in the light of Buckingham's 
argument, to talk of pleasures found by young people in the viewing of horror which 
are both normal, and a normal part of growing up - a view of pleasure consonant with 
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the experiences of the young people discussed earlier in this study. Buckingham and 
Barker do not extend their discussion, however, to the question of how such 
pleasures can be viewed in the context of the classroom, where they collide with all 
the officially sanctioned (but equally hard to define) forms of pleasure, as well as the 
related discourses that work to ignore, marginalise, reify, even suppress pleasure. 
These contradictions are repeated, extended, problematised by the pedagogies 
teachers operate: practices based on theories that rarely, if ever, acknowledge the 
power of pleasure, official or otherwise; but which often operate around teachers' 
implicit understanding that students learn more effectively when they enjoy what they 
are doing. Where such enjoyment is made an explicit part of the pedagogic rationale, 
the danger is that it is seen merely as sugar on the educational pill, and so again 
reified, postponing both the attempt to theorise it, and also the attempt to see it as 
integral to cultural experience. 
This chapter will argue the centrality of pleasure to the way young people read texts, 
especially horror films. It will review theories of cultural pleasure available to us in our 
attempts to understand the place of such affective structures in their readings; and 
especially, to theorise the peculiar pleasures of the horror movie. It will examine the 
case for a curriculum that recognises popular culture; and that moves towards 
strategies to shift beyond the sterile oppositions between cultural value and cultural 
pleasure which often emerge strongly from influential cultural and pedagogic 
discourses in 20th century Europe, and especially Britain. 
Bourdieu and Kant: the pure and the vulgar 
Pierre Bourdieu, in Distinction (1984), his wideranging sociological study of cultural 
tastes in France, grounds his analysis of structures of taste, pleasure and aesthetic 
judgment in a critique of Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory in its final definitive form, 
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in The Critique of Judgement. Bourdieu's position, implicit throughout his exhaustive 
quantitative survey, is made explicit in the postscript of the book, "Towards a 'vulgar' 
critique of 'pure' critiques" (p 486 ff). It may be summarised as follows. 
Kant's aesthetic theory proposes a 'pure' gaze, which appreciates the aesthetic 
object (in particular, the 'beautiful') in a way that is free from all interest, even the 
interest of Reason. This 'pure' gaze is opposed to a 'barbarous' taste, which is 
represented by Kant as 'subject to every desire, every servitude'. Kant's "pure 
judgement of taste" (Kant, 1970) is an ideological project in the service of an elite 
social group to represent their own aesthetic preferences as disinterested, divorced 
from the realm of the social, the sensory, the affective. Bourdieu builds on the 
contrastive oppositions Kant suggests - that is, what pure judgment of taste is not -
to describe his own ideal of the popular, in effect inverting Kant's hierarchy of 
aesthetic judgement. He derives his notion of 'barbarous' taste from Kant's 
contemptuous dismissal of those who fail to match up to his stringent requirements: 
Taste that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, 
not to speak of adopting this as the measure of its approval, has not yet 
emerged from barbarism. (Kant, 1970, page 65) 
Rather than simply an inversion of Kant's aesthetic argument, however, Bourdieu 
finds Kant's reasoning contradictory and self-defeating. He argues that Kant's ideal 
is more ascetic than aesthetic in the original sense of Aristotle's acnceats and 
caokats, and concerned with a promotion of difficulty of apprehension of the cultural 
object, and a concomitant refusal of the facile (the translator notes that facile also 
means easy in French), in the interests of a closed social group. He also argues that 
this ideal is self-evidently historical, associated as it is with a sacralizing of the 
process of artistic production and the artistic object evident from the Romantic period 
onwards; and that therefore Kant's insistence on the transcendental nature of the 
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pure judgement of taste is actually part of this very ideological project and its 
attempts to conceal its own historical nature. Bourdieu appropriates the notion of 
ataesals for his own view of popular taste, and its emphasis on affect and on 
sensory experience. 
He argues that Kant admits, in spite of himself, the social nature of taste: he quotes 
Kant's image of physical appetite as a primitive instinct of the senses, imagined as a 
property of an earlier species of human; while " 'those who, occupied with thoughts 
as well as with the senses, are to a degree turned away from the sensuous.' " 
(Bourdieu,1984, page 490) 
Kant, suggests Bourdieu, is attempting to set up a specious genealogy which 
privileges culture over nature, and by implication, the 'cultured' class over the 
masses: 
We recognize here the ideological mechanism which works by describing 
the terms of the opposition one establishes between the social classes as 
stages in an evolution (here, the progress from nature to culture)." 
(Bourdieu, page 490) 
So, although Kant refuses the social, grounding his claims for pure taste in a 
transcendental appeal, in fact his distinctions are grounded "in an empirical social 
relation" (page 490), and rest on an opposition between "the cultivated bourgeoisie 
and the people", a relation exposed in his allusions to the culltivating effect of pure 
taste, and to teaching and the educability of taste. 
Kant refuses the social, as his project, says Bourdieu, is to naturalize the privileged 
class - so he presents their culture, their taste, as given, and universal. Pure taste, 
by this operation, is set up by Kant both as an opposition to the barbarism of nature 
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and as an imitation of, improvement upon, nature, therefore naturalizing the aesthetic 
prerogative of the dominant class, associating them with the defining characteristic of 
humanity, pure taste and the artistic creation, an imitation of the divine creation, that 
goes with it: 
Pure pleasure - ascetic, empty pleasure which implies the renunciation of 
pleasure, pleasure purified of pleasure - is predisposed to become a 
symbol of moral excellence, and the work of art a test of ethical superiority, 
an indisputable measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the 
truly human man. (Bourdieu, page 491) 
This artistic taste of sublimation negates enjoyment (natural pleasures), asserting the 
superiority of sublimated 'free' pleasures. Bourdieu remarks, invoking Bakhtin's 
vision of carnival, that, in the face of such dominance, the popular imagination can 
only invert it: 
... responding to sublimation by a strategy of reduction or degradation, as 
in slang, parody, burlesque or caricature, using obscenity or scatology to 
turn arsy-versy, head over heels, all the 'values' in which the dominant 
groups project and recognize their sublimity, it rides roughshod over 
difference, flouts distinctions, and, like the Carnival games, reduces the 
distinctive pleasures of the soul to the common satisfactions of food and 
sex. 
(Bourdieu, page 491) 
Bourdieu asserts that Kant opposes to pure pleasure a twofold term: not only 
barbarous enjoyment; but also civilised enjoyment. The latter is represented as 
potentially unnatural (as culture is not); with the potential for luxurious inclinations 
caused by a degeneration of Reason through the operation of imagination: 
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The 'counter-nature' proves ambiguous: civilization is bad, culture good.... 
This pure pleasure is indeed the rationalization of an ethos: pure pleasure, 
pleasure totally purified of all sensuous or sensible interest, as remote from 
concupiscence as it is from conspicuous consumption, is opposed as much 
to the refined, altruistic enjoyment of the courtier as it is to the crude, 
animal enjoyment of the people. 
(page 493) 
On this critique of Kant, Bourdieu builds the theory of taste which has become so 
widely-referred to since its publication in 1979, in which he asserts the absolute 
social basis of taste, and its determination by 'cultural capital', the cultural 
competences of the individual conferred by their family and education, by a complex 
dialectic between their social class and the dynamic social trajectories on which they 
may embark through a variety of circumstances: marriage, job, further education, 
place of residence, and so on. 
The influence of this theory has been profound on cultural theory through the eighties 
and nineties, both understandably and justifiably. It provided a materialist theory of 
cultural consumption sympathetic to cultural studies, and easily reconciled with 
Gramscian theories of cultural hegemony. It provided a rigorous base on which a 
championship of the popular might be mounted, in tandem with an assault on a 
range of anti-popular stances, from Leavisism to Adorno and Horkheimer's mass 
culture critique. 
Its influence has, however, been tempered by some criticisms. Henry Jenkins (1995), 
while endorsing the value of Bourdieu's theory for the understanding of the poetics of 
popular film, argues that he "never succeeds in writing about the popular aesthetic in 
anything other than vaguely patronizing terms" (page 110-111). Further, in the same 
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article, he makes the point that Bourdieu, while perceiving the problem of the 
bourgeois academic in legitimating 'pure' taste, exacerbates the problem by 
assuming that adherents of elite culture possess specialized knowledge, while those 
of popular culture have none: 
Bourdieu himself speaks as if the appreciation of high art involves 
specialized knowledge while the appreciation of popular art can be taken 
for granted. In practice, an avid viewer of Japanese animation or reader of 
popular romances or fan of television soap opera must master a complex 
array of aesthetic and generic conventions and interpretative skills 
necessary for a full appreciation of these forms. (page 113) 
Steven Connor (1992) associates Bourdieu with other theorists of pleasure and 
popular culture, in particular Barthes, Lyotard and Bakhtin. Their work, he argues, 
has the common aim of 'desublimating' pleasure: "... that is to say, it resists the 
attempt to raise up, educate or otherwise transform pleasure upwards into value ..." 
(page 48). This opposition between a sublimated, ascetic pleasure and an 
unsublimated popular aesthetic, which we have seen in Kant, and in Bourdieu's 
critique, is usefully traced by Connor through successive theories of pleasure of the 
twentieth century, in which he finds this opposition repeatedly inscribed. He criticizes 
the attempt to take either side, arguing that pleasure itself refuses to lie easily on 
either side of the distinction: 
A politics of pleasure must accordingly resist both the hedonist and the 
moralist temptations insofar as they rely on or tend towards notions of 
'pure' (unsublimated) pleasure and 'pure (sublimated) value. (p 54) 
To do this, he suggests, we must pay close attention to the instabilities of pleasure 
and value; and participate in the dynamic process whereby they endlessly reproduce 
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each other. His final suggestions, though highly nuanced and sophisticated, do not 
suggest any clear route for a politics of pleasure; though it may be that his refusal of 
simple answers problematizes the question as productively as anyone so far has 
managed to do: 
If the aesthetic has hitherto been constituted as a conceptual mechanism 
for separating pleasure and value out from each other, and for fixing their 
differential values, then it is conceivable that the aesthetic, in the enlarged 
form of a politics of culture, may yet become a realm in which the 
pleasurable renegotiation of the political value of pleasure may take place. 
(page 54) 
How might Bourdieu's theory help with an account of the nature of pleasure in the 
very specific instance with which this study is concerned - a group of 14-year-olds 
studying horror films in an English secondary school? 
To begin with, it is important not to underestimate the value of Distinction. The 
assertion of the value of popular cultural pleasures, and the exposure of the 
ideological motivation of an elite aesthetic, clears the ground profitably for an 
exploration of the horror genre, not least in the context of young people's aesthetic 
preferences. In this broad respect, this study will follow the example of other 
commentators in the cultural studies tradition. 
There remain, however, some reservations. To begin with, there are, as I have 
argued, good reasons to problematize the simple popular/elite opposition Bourdieu 
makes; and its unreserved inversion of values, as Connor points out. It is possible in 
the vast quantitative survey Bourdieu makes to lose the complexity and nuances of 
the pleasures and tastes of individuals and small groups (though at the other end of 
the spectrum gains in detail are made by the range of data, as, for instance, the 
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charting of French social tastes in film, music and food in Distinction demonstrate). 
The experience of this study is that any individual displays such a complex of 
pleasures and tastes, even in the engagement with a single text, that it becomes 
very difficult to easily slot them into the kind of categories Bourdieu describes. Case 
studies such as that examined in the next chapter of this thesis may be able, then, to 
complement the charting of tastes presented by Bourdieu, focusing on detailed 
expressions of pleasure and evalation at key moments in the viewing of a film where 
his study observes larger patterns of preference across a vast sample. 
Another reservation that might be expressed, however, about Bourdieu's 
conclusions is that the distinctions he draws between the practices of elite and 
popular culture are no longer as easy to maintain - if they ever were. Clearly, there 
are extremes, for instance in cinema, between the popular commercial film and the 
self-proclaiming art-house movie - and Bourdieu constitutes these extremes, in 
tabulating audience's preferences related to their jobs (pages 270-272). He does not 
take into account, however, the ability of films to shift their percieved value, adopted 
and sacralized by the cultural elite, promoted from popular to art-house status in 
spite of any original intentions of director or studio, the classic example being 
Casablanca. Nor is he able to consider the kind of intricate exchanges, reflections, 
mutual embraces between the two categories which some commentators have 
described as characteristic of a postmodern aesthetic, and its collapse of popular 
and elite cultures into each other (Featherstone, 1993; Jancovich, 1992; 
Connor,1990). This kind of effect can be seen in the production of movies -
especially horror films - which merge the narratives, structures and traditions of the 
popular with stylistic signifiers of the art-house movie: Don't Look Now; Silence of 
the Lambs; Schindler's List. 
The politics of pleasure which emerge from Distinction, in spite of its popularity within 
cultural studies, is similarly hard to maintain in any simple way. It is relatively easy to 
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demonise a faceless, collective bourgeois enemy, as Bourdieu effectively does in the 
critique of Kant at the end of his book. But when we find that this 'enemy' is, say, a 
child of a professional family in a secondary classroom, like many of the young 
people in this study, it becomes much less easy to rail against her preferences, even 
if they do appear to fit Bourdieu's description of the 'pure gaze'. We need a much 
more complex account of the popular-elite dialectic, and the complex of uses, 
pleasures and practices of reading and interpretation associated with them, if we are 
to propose any set of principles to guide the classroom use of film, or literary text, in 
such a way that the rights of all young people are maintained. 
Further, we might agree with Jenkins about Bourdieu's failure to recognise the 
expertise involved in the reading of popular texts. A key argument of this study is that 
young people's readings of horror films is a complex process of semiosis, articulated 
with an equally complex set of social conditions - and that these processes, these 
conditions, are profoundly implicated with the conditions in which elite texts (often 
hard to distinguish in any case) are read and interpreted. I will argue that these 
processes, amplified, ideally, by pedagogic practices, can be productive for all 
children and all texts. 
Another reservation about Bourdieu's critique of Kant is his omission of an important 
dimension of the Critique of Judgement: Kant's theory of the sublime, his final 
version of this aspect of his aesthetic theory. Bourdieu makes no mention of the 
sublime, which is curious for a number of reasons. Firstly, Kant makes claims for the 
sublime which are considerable, in some ways greater than those he makes for the 
aesthetic judgement of the beautiful - that the apprehension of the sublime is a 
supreme confirmation of human reason, in that reason can comprehend the sublime 
though imagination cannot - so that huge expanses of space beggar our imagination, 
but we can find ways of calculating them mathematically. In spite of being dwarfed by 
the vastnesses of nature - rocks, hurricanes, storms - we can match them through 
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the power of reason: 
... provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all the more 
attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, 
because they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar 
commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite 
another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves 
against the seeming omnipotence of nature. (page 111) 
Bourdieu's critique helps us to see that this exaltation of the human spirit is, in fact, a 
congratulation of the aesthetic sensibilities of a cultural elite, distinguished by Kant 
from those whose souls are, presumably, unable to rise "above the height of vulgar 
commonplace". Kant attempts to get round this in a later passage, where he argues 
that there is a pre-disposition to the sublime in everyone, thus there is no conflict with 
his account of the judgement of taste as an a priori principle; but he claims that 
education is necessary for an awareness of the sublime: 
In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which, thanks to 
preparatory culture, we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as 
terrifying. (page 116) 
So we see the same kind of fault-line that Bourdieu exposes elsewhere: an attempt 
to argue a transcendental case for the 'pure gaze, undermined by a simultaneous 
claim for the civilizing effect of education and culture. 
However, though Kant preserves the social distinctions he implies throughout The 
Critique of Judgement, the fact remains that he is constituting a category of aesthetic 
perception which is quite distinct from the apprehension of the beautiful, as a 
semiotic process: an apprehension, through a combination of reason and 
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imagination, of that which is limitless. Furthermore, the affect which Kant associates 
with the sublime is also quite distinctive: a mixture of fear and pleasure, a dynamic 
play of pleasure (at the capacity of reason) and unpleasure (at the failure of the 
imagination). This kind of affective dimension is quite different from the chilly 
pleasure of the apprehension of the beautiful, on which Bourdieu rests his case that 
the pleasure of the pure gaze is no real pleasure at all, unless a purely ascetic one. 
He does not engage with the dynamic thrill, pleasure and fear combined, that Kant 
constitutes as the affect of the sublime. 
A further compelling reason why he might have done so is that Kant's account of the 
sublime fits much better with the domain of popular pleasures concerned with 
excess, the grotesque, the grossly material, which Bourdieu describes approvingly 
as a popular inversion of the values of the pure gaze, in the passage invoking 
Bakhtin's carnival (page 491). 
Finally, it is worth looking beyond The Critique of Judgement. Although this work 
contains the definitive version of Kant's aesthetic theory, his earlier treatise, 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (Kant, 1960), gives an 
account of the sublime that reveals the opposition between the tradition of cultural 
refinement he endorses, and the popular traditions he condemns, which reveals a 
good deal more of his ideological project. There is no room in this chapter to explore 
this further; chapter 7 will provide a full account. It is enough to say, here, that this 
treatise sets up an opposition between a version of the sublime in accord with the 
pure gaze - sublimated, refined, committed to the contemplation of vast empty 
spaces - and a version aligned with the popular, a vulgar sublime which Kant 
represents as a clutter of superstitious bric-a-brac. Chapters 7 and 8 will argue that it 
is this opposition, and the semiotic forms associated with it, an account more fraught, 
more engaged with the historical sublime of Romantic aesthetics, that better 
prefigures the popular-elite dialectic in the modern horror film than the account in 
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The Critique of Judgement. 
Bakhtin, carnival, and the excess of horror 
It is Bakhtin's image of a carnival inversion of the usual social power structures that 
Bourdieu invokes to endorse his championship of the popular. Though Bakhtin, like 
Bourdieu, can be accused of simply championing the underdog in his often idealistic 
imagining of the reversal of values (and Connor, as I've already mentioned, makes 
this point), his account, again like Bourdieu's, offers a powerful theory of the popular. 
It is particularly powerful, I think, because it is so rooted in a semiotic of the popular 
imagination - Bakhtin is fascinated by the imagery of carnival, which offends, 
repudiates and inverts 'official' culture, which he sees as a kind of upstart latecomer, 
asserting an intolerant arriviste dominance over the ancient popular-festive 
ceremonies of mediaeval Europe. This fascination makes him unlike Bourdieu, who 
is less interested in the semiotic of the popular than in the social preferences that 
surround it. But it makes him very like Kant (at least, the Kant of the Observations), 
not in the tenor of his theory, of course, which is diametrically opposed to Kant's 
aesthetic - but in his preoccupation with the semiotic stuff of culture. 
Briefly, Bakhtin's well-known image of carnival is elaborated in Rabelais and his 
World (1965). He associates it with a persistent popular aesthetic, that of grotesque 
realism: 
... the images of the material bodily principle in the work of Rabelais ... are 
the heritage of that peculiar type of imagery and, more broadly speaking, of 
that peculiar aesthetic concept which is characteristic of this folk culture 
and which differs sharply from the aesthetic concept of the following ages. 
We shall call it conditionally the concept of grotesque realism. (page 18) 
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The nature of this aesthetic is, as it were, a direct repudiation of Kant's pure, refined 
ideal. Where Kant idealizes the human form, Bakhtin revels in the principle of bodily 
degradation, reversing, as Connor points out, the values of Kant's sublimated taste: 
The essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the 
lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the 
material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity. 
(page 19) 
Bakhtin continues to develop, in colourful detail, the kinds of excessive imagery of 
the body which this aesthetic produces, in a way that suggests clear that he is not 
only describing a set of structural oppositions to the sublimated pure taste, but he's 
actually enacting the kind of glee in the images of grotesque materiality which he is 
endorsing. 
This kind of imagery, in all its glorious messiness, coincides pretty well with the kind 
of vulgar sublime which Kant contemptously dismisses in the Observations: 
In human nature, praiseworthy qualities are never found without concurrent 
variations that must run through endless shadings to the utmost 
imperfection. The quality of the terrifying sublime, if it is quite unnatural, is 
adventurous. Unnatural things, so far as the sublime is supposed in them, 
though little or none may be actually found, are grotesque. Whoever loves 
and believes the fantastic, is a visionary. ... Monasteries and such tombs , 
to confine the living saints, are grotesque. ... Castigation, vows, and other 
such monks' virtues are grotesque. Holy bones, holy wood, and all similar 
rubbish, the high Llama of Tibet not excluded, are grotesque. (pages 56/7) 
The coincidence is marked by Kant's and Bakhtin's use of the same word to 
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describe this semiotic field: "grotesque". That they exactly reverse each other's 
valencies could not be clearer. In fact, Bakhtin considers the way in which imagery of 
the grotesque changes in the Romantic period, subjected to the ideology of 
individualism which alienates the grotesque from its true social nature, rendering it 
an object of terror rather than laughter. It is this Romantic grotesque which derives, 
in part, from the Kantian sublime, its disquiet with the popular-festive, and its 
individualist ideology. Meanwhile, Kant, in his urge to refine the sublime of its 
grotesque excesses, misses its social value, like the nineteenth century German 
scholar Schneegans, whom Bakhtin accuses of missing the point of the grotesque 
repertoires of the commedia dell'arte: 
Because Schneegans relied on the idealised aesthetics of the second part 
of the nineteenth century and on the narrow artistic and ideological norms 
of his time, he could not find the right path to the grotesque. (page 308) 
Bakhtin's imagery has provided a powerful argument for the value of popular culture 
within the tradition of cultural studies over recent years. John Fiske (1989), for 
example, uses the theory of carnival to explain the appeal of the grotesque in 
popular culture, embodying as it does the antithesis of the bourgeois ideal, and, for 
children, a heroic enlargement of the unformed adolescent body, plagued by growth 
and transformation: 
Bakhtin (1968) suggests that the grotesque is linked to a sense of earthy 
realism; indeed, he talks about "grotesque realism." The realism of the 
grotesque is opposed to the "aesthetics of the beautiful" (p.29) represented 
in sport's vision of the perfect body. The grotesque body is "contrary to the 
classic images of the finished, completed man" (p.25); cleansed of, or 
liberated from, the social construction and evaluation of the body, it exists 
only in its own materiality. If the body beautiful is the complete, formed 
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social body, then the body grotesque is the incomplete, the unformed. Its 
appeal to children (whose heroes, such as the Incredible Hulk or Mr. T, 
often have grotesque bodies) may well lie in the relevances they see 
between the grotesque body and their own childishly incomplete, unformed 
ones. The grotesque allies their incompleteness with adult strength. There 
is a sense, too, in which the principles of growth and change are embodied 
in the grotesque, for it is in direct opposition to the stasis of the beautiful. 
The grotesque is properly part of the vernacular of the oppressed." (pages 
88-9) 
The value of this reading of Bakhtin for an account of the pleasures of horror films is 
clear - although Fiske's examples here are drawn from comicstrip fantasy, the 
imagery of modern body horror, such as the grotesque transformation of Seth 
Brundle into the Fly in David Cronenberg's The Fly (1986) make even better 
examples. The opposition between the idealised male form and the grotesque, abject 
form of the fly is an explicit theme of the film, as its central semiotic strategy is a 
gradual transformation from Brundle's athletic body, emphasised by semi-nude 
gymnastics, into the lumpy, hairy, misshapen form of the human fly. 
There is a problem, though, with Fiske's account. As with Bourdieu, there is a 
temptation with Bakhtin's theory to apply it too critically, especially in the context of a 
populist, celebratory account of popular culture. Fiske's place in a recent tradition of 
cultural populism has been noted by Jim McGuigan (1992), who points out that the 
drift to populism in the cultural studies of the eighties and nineties risks a politics of 
inertia, since too simple a trust in the oppositional nature of all popular readings 
removes the need to actually do anything about cultural power and domination. 
In this particular instance, a little probing exposes the difficulties of Fiske's position. 
He cites the grotesque bodies of comicstrip anti-heroes like the Incredible Hulk 
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approvingly, rightly identifying their popular appeal, especially to the young; and 
reasonably aligning this with Bakhtin's account of grotesque realism, and its defiant 
rejection of the idealised forms, bodies and tastes of modern European bourgeois 
culture. What he conveniently overlooks, however, is that the imaginative appeal of 
the Hulk is rooted in one of the key strategies of the semiotics of subjectivity in the 
superhero pantheon: the dual identity. The sympathy invited by the character is 
derived from his identity as an ordinary man, Bruce Banner, or David Banner in the 
TV series (in fact, represented in ideal terms, both physically and intellectually), as 
well as a misshapen, latter-day Caliban. The affective peaks of the narratives are 
located at the moments of transformation, characterised by physical pain, the agony 
of involuntary transformation, and the extreme contrast between the slight, intelligent 
hero and the grotesque, barely conscious anti-hero - a popular representation of ego 
and id if ever there was one. Similarly, the narratives are often built around Banner's 
attempts to rid himself of his alter ego, in a tussle between warring fragments of the 
self clearly derived from Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde. 
So, in giving a full account of the appeal of these images and narratives to young 
people, I could certainly agree with Fiske in his account of the use of a semiotics of 
excess to represent the changes of the adolescent body; and in his use of Bakhtin to 
defend this kind of cultural form against conventional charges of triviality or 
debasement, and to postulate a kind of popular revelling in its flamboyant popular 
aesthetic, and the pleasures associated with it. I would also note, however, that the 
the superhero is as ill at ease with his body as many teenagers are; and that an in-
your-face celebration of its awkward power goes hand-in-hand with an altogether 
conventional acquiescence in idealised images of the bodies of adulthood - just as 
Bakhtin's carnival inversions of the rituals of church and state dissolve on the 
following morning, and the usual hierarchies are restored. 
The other problem of Fiske's analysis is its failure to recognise the phenomenon of 
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the postmodern, in the kind of qualified way I have suggested earlier in relation to 
Bourdieu. Though in many ways the old distinctions are still perceivable, between 
popular and elite, there are a good many instances where such distinctions are hard 
to maintain. Where it might have been easy to distinguish between the difficult, elite 
aesthetic of Conrad's Heart of Darkness and the 'easy' popular aesthetic of Rice 
Burroughs' Tarzan of the Apes, two roughly contemporary texts on roughly similar 
thematic and semiotic ground, what are we to make now of a transformation such as 
Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now? Its references, images, style and 
marketing seem spread equally along the elite/popular continuum. (I am grateful to 
Anthony Easthope for a remark at a HETE conference in 1989 about the productive 
possibilities of a comparison of Conrad and Rice Burroughs). 
It is arguable, of course, that the theory of the postmodern is not adequate to 
account for the ways in which the popular and elite aesthetic forms of modern 
European culture collide, merge, cross-fertilize, invert. The difficulties of the Brontës 
and Dickens, pulled on the one hand towards a novel form attempting to justify itself 
as the representative, through a particular mode of realism, of the unified subject of 
bourgeois ideology; and, on the other, towards the popular semiotic landscape of the 
Gothic - these difficulties are well-known. Though the Victorian novel had its feet, so 
to speak, in the stuff of popular entertainment, its moral and aesthetic aspirations 
were lofty. It is possible to see here the antecedents of modern slippages between 
popular and elite, revised and reconstituted by each generation in a shuffling of 
aesthetic preferences to accommodate their own nostalgias, their own treasured 
images and repressed fears, their renewal of the cultural distinctions particular to 
them. And if these in some senses reproduce the old distinctions, the distinctions of 
social class and aesthetic judgement which seem so rigid in Bourdieu's account, 
there are other senses in which there is a perceptible loosening of the divisions, a 
loosening that's greater in degree, at least than the slippages of Victorian fiction. And 
it is a loosening of the distinctions, not only between the social groups, but between 
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generational groups, which might justify the postmodernist hypothesis. What Connor 
(1992) calls the "pick'n'mix aesthetic" allows for choices between today and 
yesteryear, as well as between the cultural territories of different social groups. 
So my argument will be to employ Bakhtin's image of carnival, and of grotesque 
realism in particular, to explain the gleeful, insubordinate appeal of the popular, and 
of horror in particular. I will try to synthesise this account with the vulgar sublime that 
Kant notes and rejects, to work towards a social semiotics of horror, and the affective 
complex observable in the small audience in this study. It will be necessary to avoid 
an uncritical populism, but instead problematize the elite/popular dialectic, arguing 
for the profitability of deliberately choosing texts on the borderline to work on in 
schools, in the interests both of recognizing the cultural allegiances of young people, 
and of extending the range of resources with which they can transform these texts, 
and their understandings of how they represent, and what they represent. 
It is important, before moving on, to bring the question of pleasure into the 
foreground. Bakhtin's text is odd, for a book so often used in defence of the 
pleasures of the popular, in that it rarely mentions 'pleasure' expicitly. It is, however, 
clearly a thesis of cultural pleasure in a number of important ways. 
Firstly, it offers an account of laughter as a central manifestation of carnival, its 
characteristic mode of engagement: 
Laughter and its forms represent, as we have said, the least scrutinized 
sphere of the people's creation. (page 4) 
An interesting feature of this laughter is the complete lack of distance between the 
spectator and the cultural object (a distance Bourdieu notes as typical of the pure 
gaze). In fact, it is impossible, in Bakhtin's account, to distinguish between the 
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laughter of the spectator and the laughter of the event itself - of the text, so to speak 
- just as it is impossible to distinguish spectator from participant in the carnival. This 
blurring of distinctions between actor and audience is extended later into an 
assertion of the ability of carnival to abolish distinctions between art and reality: 
It belongs to the borderline between art and life. In reality, it is life itself, but 
shaped according to a certain pattern of play. 
In fact, carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not 
acknowledge any distinction between actors and spectators.... Carnival is 
not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone 
participates because its very idea embraces all the people. (page 7) 
It might seem that, while this vision of the carnival audience represents the life of 
popular culture well, it is restricted to comic forms: Bakhtin emphasises laughter as 
its characteristic expression, as we have seen, and he describes carnival as a comic 
form throughout his treatise. 
However, he also makes it clear that there is a darker side to the laughter: 
... this laughter is ambivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time 
mocking, deriding. It asserts and denies, it buries and revives. Such is the 
laughter of carnival. (pages 11-12) 
The laughter is a response to the cycles of birth and death, and carries the affective 
loading of both. Elsewhere, he describes carnival in terms of appetite, again 
asserting the unashamed materiality of this popular aesthetic (Kant is quick to 
condemn tastes which seek the gratification of the senses), repeatedly representing 
a culture of intensely pleasurable consumption whose ultimate image is that of the 
gaping, swallowing mouth: 
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Eating and drinking are one of the most significant manifestations of the 
grotesque body. The distinctive character of this body is its open unfinished 
nature, its interaction with the world. These traits are most fully and 
concretely revealed in the act of eating; the body transgresses here its own 
limits: it swallows, devours, rends the world apart, is enriched and grows at 
the world's expense. The encounter of man with the world, which takes 
place inside the open, biting, rending, chewing mouth, is one of the most 
ancient, and most important objects of human thought and imagery. Here 
man tastes the world, introduces it into his body, makes it part of himself. 
(page 281) 
So, far from trivial comedy, this is a terrifying kind of comedy, an image of the huge 
enterprise of the popular, which is no less, in Bakhtin's account, than an attempt at 
mastery over death itself, a vast, cyclical feast which swallows up the world. The acts 
of transgression involved here, the abolition of limits and boundaries, provide fruitful 
comparisons with the history of the sublime. Here, it's enough to note that this is an 
account of a serious kind of pleasure: a festive assault against death; a laughter 
whose purpose is to master fear: 
It was the victory of laughter over fear that most impressed mediaeval man. 
It was not only a victory over mystic terror of God, but also a victory over 
the awe inspired by forces of nature, and most of all over the oppression 
and guilt related to all that was consecrated and forbidden ('mana' and 
'taboo'). It was the defeat of divine and human power, of authoritarian 
commandments and prohibitions, of death and punishment after death, hell 
and all that is more terrifying than the earth itself. (page 90) 
So the intense unpleasure occasioned by the dreadful warnings of official culture is 
transformed by carnival laughter into pleasures of insubordination and a mastery 
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over supernatural fears. This, clearly, offers ways of viewing, not only the pleasures 
of the popular in general, but those of horror in particular. As noted above, however, 
Bakhtin observes a degradation, a "loss of laughter", with the arrival of the Romantic 
grotesque: 
The world of Romantic grotesque is to a certain extent a terrifying world, 
alien to man. (page 30) 
This view should warn us against to easy a transposition of the productive image of 
carnival to a modern horror genre which derives from exactly this Romantic 
grotesque as much as from earlier poular-festive forms. However, Bakhtin also 
emphasises that the energy of folk culture persists in opposition to official culture, 
proposing Its own conception of the world, its own form and imagery" (page 473). 
We might regard modern horror, then, as a divided and contradictory form, permitting 
terrifying representations of the alienated individual, but simultaneously energised by 
the productive, gleeful irreverance of the popular grotesque, the "chorus of laughing 
people" (page 474). 
Freud: pleasure, unpleasure and the uncanny 
Bourdieu and Bakhtin, then, provide valuable ways of explaining how pleasure is 
socially situated, articulated with the lines of tension between dominated and 
subordinate groups at different historical points. Freud, as is well known, contributes 
to the theory of pleasure an economic and topographical account of the function of 
pleasure in the human psyche. This might be expected to shed some light on the 
vexed question of subjectivity, and how it relates to pleasure, and how we can 
constitute a theory of pleasure which takes account of social conditions and semiotic 
processes on the one hand, but also of the complexities of identity and individual 
subjectivity on the other. 
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Stuart Hall (1992) usefully summarises the history of how we view subjectivity, from 
the rational, conscious Cartesian subject to what he describes as "the post-modern 
subject", fragmented, contradictory, incomplete: 
If we feel we have a unified identity from birth to death, it is only because 
we construct a comforting story or 'narrative of the self' about ourselves 
(see Hall, 1990). The fully unified, completed, secure and coheent identity 
is a fantasy. Instead, as the systems of meaning and cultural 
representation multiply, we are confronted by a bewildering, fleeting 
multiplicity of possible identities, ant one of which we could identify with - at 
least temporarily." (page 277) 
Hall describes the great shift which Freudian theory, and subsequently, Lacanian 
theory permitted in the conceptualization of subjectivity: 
Identity arises, not so much from the fullness of identity which is already 
inside us as individuals, but from a lack of wholeness which is 'filled' from 
outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves to be seen by others. 
Psychoanalytically, the reason why we continually search for 'identity', 
constructing biographies which together the different parts of our divided 
selves into a unity, is to recapture this fantasized pleasure of fullness 
(plenitude). (pages 287/8) 
This gives a clear picture of one particular kind of pleasure we might expect to find in 
film: a series of fictions that provide this fantasy, fill the lack, provide the images we 
can use to fabricate our sense of our imagined identities. It is a notoriously bleak 
view, however, presenting an image of humans as blind, helpless creatures 
stumbling after a phantasmatic comfort which eternally eludes them, and which is 
worthless in any case. Later commentators have provided more optimistic versions 
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of the post-Freudian subject, notably Ernesto Laclau, whom Hall cites: 
We should add that, far from being dismayed by all this, Laclau argues that 
dislocation has positive features. It unhinges the stable identities of the 
past, but it also opens up the possibility of new articulations - the forging of 
new identities, the production of new subjects ... (page 279). 
It is precisely this view of the positive possibilities of the postmodern subject that is 
grasped by Mark Jancovich in his history of horror films (1992), in which he argues 
that the body-horror of the eighties and nineties, which he describes as a 
postmodern form of the horror movie, depicts images of literally dissolving identity 
(he uses Cronenberg's The Fly, discussed above) which are troubling and 
disturbing, but liberating at the same time, offering possibilities of escape from the 
bodies and identities so long imprisoned by dominant ideologies, and increasingly 
regulated by the state. 
So we have the possibilities here of a kind of pleasure occasioned by the search for 
identity, and the liberating experience of making and remaking identities; though an 
experience, as the horror film reminds us, that can be as troubling as it is 
exhilarating. 
If we return to Freud, however, we find that his preoccupation with pleasure is much 
more an end in itself, an end which Freud ultimately associates with death itself. In 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), he begins by rehearsing his thesis of the 
pleasure principle, which describes pleasure as the lowering of tension, the attempt 
to reduce all forms of unpleasurable excitation until stasis is achieved. This economy 
of pleasure is articulated with its companion structure, the reality principle, which 
prevents the unhindered search for pleasure in the interests of survival, thus 
producing a deferral of pleasure until the external obstacle has disappeared. 
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The object of his piece, however, is to move beyond the pleasure principle - to briefly 
account for those forms of pleasure which don't fit the hypothesis of the pleasure 
principle; but particularly to find a hypothesis for a kind of pleasure which seems 
independent of the pleasure principle altogether. 
He mentions a number of phenomena, all of which are intriguing in relation to film, 
especially horror; but I will look here at three. 
The first is his relation of pleasure and unpleasure to the phenomenon of repression, 
and to the struggle between different parts of the psyche. He argues that a complex 
of pleasure/unpleasure is occasioned by the efforts of one part of the psyche to 
obtain satisfaction while another part experiences the same stimulus as unpleasure. 
An experience which is found pleasurable by the id (Freud doesn't use the term till 
later, in The Ego and the Id, but clearly already has it mind here, as well as the 
superego), but disapproved of by the superego, and so is either repressed, or, if it 
manages to break through into consciousness, is experienced as unpleasure. This 
idea is taken up by the French film theorist Christian Metz (1982), in an explanation 
of the conflicting pleasures of film, and the appearance of "filmic unpleasure", which, 
he says, can arise from insufficient "nourishment" of the id; or by an aggressive 
censorious reaction to the film by the superego (this idea will be explored further in 
Chapter 6). 
The application to horror films is clear; indeed, this theory, enlarged to apply to the 
society as well as the individual, can help account for the perennial moral and 
aesthetic public arguments over horror, taste, and the corruption of the young. 
Secondly, a repressed unpleasurable experience can be brought into the realm of 
the conscious in order to convert it into something pleasurable by gaining mastery 
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over it. Freud's example is the celebrated fort/da game, in which a young child 
symbolically re-enacts the loss of his mother, and institutes an imaginary finding of 
her, by repeating the throwing away and pulling back of a ball on a string. 
That this model of pleasure is useful for a theory of the pleasure of film, especially 
films which are apparently distressing, such as horror, is reinforced by Freud's 
explicit linking of this hypothesis with the adult artistic imitation of distressing 
experiences for pleasurable purposes (eg, tragedy), which he sees as reconcilable 
wth the pleasure principle, presumably because the motivation for the mind is to 
increase the yield of pleasure by reworking the distressing event in such a way that it 
affords a lowering of tension. Freud is, however, tantalizingly vague on this point, 
dismissing it in his search for what truly lies beyond the pleasure principle, and 
consigning it to "some system of aesthetics with an economic approach to its 
subject-matter" (page 287). 
The third hypothesis is the one which Freud employs in his attempt to move beyond 
the pleasure principle, a hypothesis which he admits is highly speculative. He looks 
at the effect of traumatic experiences on the psyche, asking why there should be a 
compulsion to repeat them psychically, in dreams, for instance. He suggests that the 
powerful stimulus of the original trauma breaks through the crust of the conscious, 
flooding the psyche, and temporarily displacing the pleasure principle by draining all 
other parts of the psyche in order to bind the excess energy. The accompanying 
feeling is of fright, which Freud associates with unpreparedness for the trauma. The 
pleasure principle cannot restore its dominance until the trauma has been re-
enacted, in dreams for instance, the difference being that, unlike the original 
experience, the repetition is accompanied by anxiety instead of fright; anxiety being 
characterised by preparedness for the trauma. So, the dreams/repetitions are 
different from the original trauma in that they restore the anxiety that was missing, 
thus allowing a retrospective mastery of the stimulus. 
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There is a good deal in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that is, as Freud himself 
admits, highly tentative and speculative; and it's far from clear that the pleasure 
principle couldn't have been elaborated to account for all the phenomena he 
describes. The question for this study is, what can be usefully employed in a theory 
of the pleasure of the horror movie; and how can it be reconciled with the theoretical 
perspectives derived from Bourdieu, Bakhtin and others? 
The parts of Freud's account that might prove helpful, as I indicated while reviewing 
them, are the following three. 
i. The idea that different parts of the psyche might be differently affected by a text, 
the idea that Metz picks up in The Imaginary Signifier, when he considers film as a 
kind of nutrition for one part of the psyche at the expense of another, leading to the 
kind of contradictory feelings and ideas about a film that can be observed in this 
study. 
ii. The idea that film, like dreams, allows for what Freud calls (in 'The Uncanny', 
1919), the return of the repressed: primitive fears, of the dark, of the unknown, of 
imaginary monsters. 
iii. The idea that film, again like dreams, can allow a retrospective mastery of 
troubling ideas, feelings and images, by changing the nature of the fear into a fear 
mediated by fore-knowledge (in this case, knowledge of the structures of the genre), 
which allows a transformation of fear into pleasure. In the case of the particular fears 
and pleasures of horror films, this needs to be considered against a more detailed 
account of Freud's paper on the uncanny, and against theories of the sublime. 
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Connor: cultural pleasure; cultural value 
Before making some tentative proposals about a model that could afford some 
insight into what happens in the very specific situation of a group of 13 and 14 year-
olds sitting down in a classroom in the late 1990s to watch a kind of horror film, it is 
necessary to make some brief further observations, about how these theories of 
pleasure have been developed and transformed in recent years. 
Chiefly, I shall draw on the valuable review of theories of pleasure offered by Steven 
Connor (1992), since he has room to develop an account in much more detail than I 
can do here. His main points can be summarised as follows. 
i. Cultural pleasure and cultural value have been constituted as binary opposites 
since the Enlightenment. The Kantian aesthetic tradition has privileged value over 
pleasure, associating it with a sublimated, disinterested aesthetic sense, opposed to 
all forms of sensual gratification. 
ii. This tradition of ascetic cultural pleasure is continued into the twentieth century 
and the age of mass communication. Connor traces it through I A Richards, and his 
condemnation of "the cretinous gratifications of mass culture" (Connor, page 37), 
and Adorno and Horkheimer's mass culture critique, in both of which the 'ease' of 
popular pleasure is imaged by the inertia of Freud's pleasure principle. He traces the 
ascetic strain to some aspects of feminist theory, in particular Laura Mulvey's essay 
calling for the destruction of narrative pleasure in film (Mulvey, 1975) , which always 
positions women as objects of a voyeuristic male gaze. Connor sees the asceticism 
of Richards and Mulvey as concealing another form of pleasure, however, so that the 
postponements and deferrals of the reality principle work in the end in the service of 
the pleasure principle by increasing the yield of pleasure qualitatively if not 
quantitatively: he finds in both authors a transfer of affective language from the 
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negative terms of inertia, the 'ease' and 'plenitude' of the forms they condemn to the 
positive dynamism of 'thrill' and 'daring' of the rejection of pleasure in the interests 
of value or ethics. 
iii. He opposes against these ascetics a theoretical tradition at the centre of which he 
finds Lacan's jouissance. He identifies Barthes, whom he sees as 'desublimating', in 
that he refuses to associate value with pleasure, with Bourdieu, Lyotard, and 
Bakhtin, whose carnival Connor sees as "a populist, democratic version of the textual 
erotics evoked by Barthes." (page 49) 
iv. He considers the different pleasures of the sublime, the aspect of Kant's Critique 
of Judgement ignored by Bourdieu. He sees the sublime as offering the potential for 
a more transgressive kind of pleasure, which he associates with the transcendence 
of Barthes. He goes on to find other championships of unsublimated pleasures in 
strands of feminist theory at odds with Mulvey's asceticism, such as Cora Kaplan's, 
which sees pleasure in fantasy (romantic fiction) as affirmatory of female 
subjectivities and difference: 
... Kaplan argues that the pleasure of fantasy involves not a fixing of the 
subject in identification, but rather a mobile plurality of identifications, an 
identification with the syntax of the fantasy rather than with the central 
protagonist. (page 50) 
Connor sees this account as valuable, attempting to find value in unsublimated 
pleasures, but with insecapable uncertainties - to what extent are such pleasures 
liberating, emancipatory; or do they simply offer imagined escape, while still being 
restrained by the reactionary frame of the generic forms which permit them (eg 
romantic fiction)? 
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v. He considers postmodernism, in particular Jameson, concluding that his acount of 
the sublime pleasures of the postmodern subject are yet another form of the 
desublimating strain of theory he has already noted: 
The fluxes of intensity, the skidding mobility of pleasures in postmodern 
subjectivity may therefore be seen as a form of the sublimity from below 
that I characterized earlier, which resists every traditional, Kantian 
sublimation of pleasure into higher pleasure, affirming the value of 
unsublimated pleasure against the sublimation ... of pleasure into higher 
values. (page 53) 
vi. Connor ends up by suggesting that the hedonist/moralist opposing camps are 
both doomed to failure, since the two positions imply, reflect, derive from, each other. 
He argues that Jameson's attempts to sublimate the desublimating energy of 
pleasure by deriving a political value from it is an "impossible and self-contradictory 
project": 
...for ... the hedonist and the moralist positions imply and inhabit each 
other. To assert the value of pleasure in itself, which is the only way in 
which it can be rescued from the false sublimation of bourgeois aesthetics, 
is always to moralize, to reduce to a principle its unprincipled refusal of 
sublimation. The hedonic position that pleasure is value always becomes a 
version of the moralist position that pleasure only conceals, implies or 
figures a value, which must, by some exterior or supplementary operation 
of theory, be spelled out of it." (pages 53/4) 
His own solution is satisfyingly balanced; though this study will need to consider how 
it measures up to the observations of empirical audience research: 
A politics of pleasure must accordingly resist both the hedonist and the 
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moralist temptations insofar as they rely on or tend towards notions of 
'pure' (unsublimated) pleasure and 'pure' (sublimated) value. (page 54) 
To do this, we must pay close attention to the instabilities of pleasure and value; and 
participate in the dynamic process whereby they endlessly reproduce each other. 
If the aesthetic has hitherto been constituted as a conceptual mechanism 
for separating pleasure and value out from each other, and for fixing their 
differential values, then it is conceivable that the aesthetic, in the enlarged 
form of a politics of culture, may yet become a realm in which the 
pleasurable renegotiation of the political value of pleasure may take place. 
(page 54) 
Towards a model of the pleasures of horror 
In the light of Connor's argument, it becomes very difficult to re-assert any kind of 
politics of pleasure along the lines of theorists in the populist tradition of cultural 
studies (Fiske, Willis), in which the twofold problem of a simple rejection of cultural 
value and sublimated pleasure, and a neglect of the possibilities of the sublime, 
render their position unbalanced and untenable. 
The model I want to suggest, then, needs a number of criterial properties. 
L A social theory in which the possibilities of the mobility and transformative capacity 
of social identities can be accommodated, so avoiding the limiting rigidity of 
Bourdieu's class groups, and allowing for the possibility of movement between the 
ease and difficulty of different forms of textual pleasure. 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 	 152 
ii. A theory of subjectivity and consciousness which allows for productive struggle 
between different parts of the psyche; for popular understandings and affects to meet 
the explicit discourses of the classroom. 
iii. A theory of the semiotics of horror which explains (historically and synchronically) 
the peculiar appropriateness of its images to represent the Freudian repressed; and 
how these representations cause pleasure and unpleasure, understood in terms of 
the Kantian sublime, Bakhtin's grotesque realism, and Freud's compulsion to repeat. 
iv. A theory of the social semiotic properties of elite and popular texts, especially film, 
which accounts for the ways in which textual ease and difficulty, and the pleasures 
associated with them, are constructed and read; and which accounts for the blurring, 
merging, and dialectic movement between these two poles apparently characteristic 
of the postmodern moment. 
v. An account of the collision and potential mutual benefit of pleasure and value in 
the context of public perceptions of horror, the English curriculum, and the classroom 
as a viewing space and a site of textual exploration. 
Rather than develop this in abstract, I want to look, in the next chapter, at a case 
study, and see how a model can be built along the way. The evidence is derived 
from a classroom journal which documents how a year 9 class watched The 
Company of Wolves. 
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Chapter 6: Spectatorial Pleasures: A Case Study 
This chapter takes a close look at an audience at the point of immediate contact with 
a film, as they view it. A good deal of the way we make sense of a film relies -
necessarily - on retrospective analysis: film reviews, classroom and academic 
studies of image, script, and so on. We rely heavily on memory - on remembered 
reconstructions and transformations of the film text - partly because it's materially 
difficult for academics, reviewers, school students, to have the text before them as 
they write, in the way that they can with a literary text. Chapter 3 has examined the 
effects of this distancing between the moment of viewing and the moment of 
reviewing, exemplified, for instance, in Roland Barthes' essay, 'The Third Meaning' 
(1978), in which his speculations about film derive from that versatile material 
instance of the processes of preview and review: the cinematic still. 
Another reason why it is easier, and therefore more common, to scrutinise audience 
uses, readings, responses, transformations of film at the points of preview and 
review is the nature of the forms of discourse under scrutiny. Preview and review are 
encoded in less ephemeral forms of discourse - image, writing, speech (controlled by 
investigation, as in taped interview). The moment of viewing is characterised by more 
ephemeral forms of discourse. Speech is certainly there, again (and much more of it 
than might be imagined); but also a discourse of physical movement, from elaborate 
mime to the closing and opening of eyes. There is, then, the double problem for 
academic investigation of the difficulty of recording the viewing moment, and the 
difficulty of finding a language with which to describe it. It needs to be recognised, 
however, that despite its trickiness in succumbing to empirical observation and 
recording, this moment of viewing is valuable in that it throws into relief the social 
nature of reading a film, indeed, of any semiotic activity whatsoever. As Volosinov 
(1929/1973) points out, signs are inseparable from their social context, and to 
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abstract them, as it is tempting to do with residual forms of language, especially 
writing, is likely to mislead. 
Students, classrooms and social roles 
The data examined in this chapter is provided by a journal of observations, written by 
me as I watched the group of Year 9 school students watching The Company of 
Wolves. My intention was to observe as much as possible, though concentrating on 
a small group at the back of the classroom. The initial reason for this was because it 
contained three boys regarded in the school as low achievers, though for very 
different reasons. Jamie is perceived as a 'naughty boy', his classroom behaviour 
characterised by poor concentration, frequent disruption, distraction of and by other 
students, and a hostile attitude to official modes of learning and to the usual forms of 
authority sanctioned by the school. He is also a working class boy in a school with a 
large middle class intake, and so is often isolated by the discourses, rituals and 
aspirations of many of his peers. Rather than changing his language and behaviour 
to 'fit in', he adopts the familiar strategy of the 'class clown', seeking peer approval 
by his own brand of witty repartee, by noises, jokes, fidgeting, stealing pencil cases, 
and so on. Francis, sitting next to him, is also perceived as 'naughty'; though in his 
case, again in the general perception of the school, his behaviour is related to his 
particular learning difficulties, described in the school's register of special needs as 
connected with literacy problems, difficulties with sequencing and conceptual 
ordering, and consequent problems with attention span. 
Nico, who appears in the second half of the journal (he was absent for the lesson in 
which the first half of the film was shown), also sits next to Jamie. He is an able, 
middle class boy - but also chooses subversive forms of behaviour, preferring the 
social styles, rituals and speech of Jamie's persona to the obedience to the school's 
official culture of some of his peers. If we adopted the evocative slang borrowed by 
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Paul Willis from the boys he studied in Learning to Labour (1977), Jamie would 
clearly be a 'lad', the boys at the front of the class, Richard, Jonathan and their 
group, would look like 'ear'oles'; while Nico might exemplify a class we could 
extrapolate from Willis's study - 'wannabe lads', middle class boys rejecting the 
style, image, language and aspirations of their peers and adopting those of their 
working class neighbours. 
These images now look so reductive, however, as to be damaging stereotypes. 
Though there is no room fully to develop this here, Nico's social identity in school 
needs, I feel, to be read against an account of how hierarchies of domination and 
subordination in two dimensions - class and generation - have been articulated in 
postwar Britain, and how in both these dimensions, the ostensibly dominant group 
have made cultural borrowings from the subordinate group (and vice versa). So, in 
the account given by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 
the 70's and 80's, the youth subcultures of the 1950's to 70's (teddy boys, mods, 
skinheads, punks) are working class cultural forms making semiotic raids on the 
clothing of the midde and upper classes, at first in relatively simple appropriations, as 
in the drape jackets of teddy boys, later in punk's assemblages from haute couture 
to trashcan, better described, as in Hebdige's account, as a kind of bricolage (Clarke 
et al, 1976; Hebdige, 1979). However, the CCCS classic account of youth 
subcultures, valuable and influential though it has been, is marred by certain 
inedequacies. For one thing, it is largely about boys, in spite of Angela McRobbie's 
early attempts to right the balance in her study of girls magazines (1979). For 
another, it avoids any sustained account of middle class youth culture, which is 
treated briefly if at all, and frequently reductively, defined against a cultural politics 
which championed working class style by demonising or ignoring middle class 
subcultural forms, notably hippies. Eric Hobsbawm, in his account of the 'cultural 
revolution' of the postwar period (1995) corrects this imbalance by pointing out the 
bottom-up movement of cultural forms, middle and upper class youth borrowing from 
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working-class style, taste and speech: 
The novelty of the 1950's was that the upper- and middle-class young ... 
began to accept the music, the clothes, even the language of the urban 
lower classes ... as their model. ... The fashion market for the plebeian 
young established its independence and began to set the tone for the 
patrician market. ... Young aristocrats began to shed the accents which, in 
Britain, had infallibly identified members of their class and began to talk in 
an approximation of London working-class speech. (page 331) 
This account helps, I think, to make some sense of Nico's social allegiances, and the 
collision between his preferences and the official cultures and requirements of 
school, as well as the traditional tastes and preferences of his class background. The 
most helpful kind of description of the cultural range which includes Jamie and Nico, 
but also middle class young people who remain closer to the preferences traditionally 
made by their families and peers (endorsed by forms of cultural hegemony and even 
coercion represented by, for instance, the National Curriculum), is, in my view, to 
avoid reductive kinds of demonisation and glamourisation. This makes cultural 
politics a much more complex affair; but there are, I believe, advantages in that. 
Janine, who is also sitting with this group, and appears frequently in the journal, is 
able and successful in school, though perceived as an underachiever. Her style is 
fashionable, flamboyant, sometimes noisy: a rejection of the 'good girl' classroom 
persona; but she manages, pretty successfully, to marry this with an interest in, and 
enthusiasm for, work in class - at least, as far as I've seen in my lessons. Like Nico, 
she seems to be somewhere in between affiliations to 'official' and 'popular' cultural 
forms - though her trajectory, rather than Nicoss migration from an inherited set of 
preferences to its opposite, seems to have found a relatively stable midway point, 
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allowing her to mix and match, and form her own hybrid transformations and uses. In 
some ways, then, she resembles Johanna, whose engagement with the film is 
described in Chapter 4; though her dialogue with the 'naughty' boys in the group 
makes her more of a dissenting presence in the context of the official project of the 
classroom. 
Questions of pleasure 
The data provided by this journal allows insights into many aspects of film viewing, I 
believe. However, I want here to concentrate on one central question: what is the 
nature of the pleasure of viewing a film? In the light of the theories of pleasure 
reviewed in the previous chapter, and in the light of the specific nature of this event, 
this film, this location, the central question breaks down into a number of subsidiary 
questions: 
- can we observe tastes, preferences, forms of enjoyment aligned with the sort of 
elite-popular axis described by Bourdieu? 
- can we observe pleasures specific to film and the visual; and to horror movies in 
particular? 
- how can the pleasures of viewing be seen to be affected by the semiotic strategies 
of this particular film? 
- are there any of the kinds of audience behaviour associated by Fiske with 
Bakhtinian carnival? and what might these mean in the classroom, the educational 
equivalent of the concert-hall of 'official' culture? 
- what kinds of subjectivity permit, inhibit or defer what kinds of pleasures? How do 
aspects of identity, elements of the psyche, social roles of young viewers become 
implicated with the representation of subjectivity and social roles in the metaphorical 
constructs of the film? 
- how does the classroom as a social site of cultural engagement affect the kinds of 
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pleasures that can be experienced by these young viewers? 
- what kinds of discourse express what kinds of pleasures at the point of viewing? 
- how might an understanding of these varieties of pleasure affect the pedagogical 
project of the classroom? 
My commentary on the journal, in the right hand column, is fairly informal, seeking to 
open up questions and speculate on the detail of the observations. I intend to 
address the above questions, using the evidence in the journal and developing these 




6.1:T le sequence: doll 
n 
CORRESPONDING 
MOMENTS IN THE 
FILM 
he grass_ 
CO I :NTARY 
The film starts: the room quite darL, 	 ass 
facing the TV/video on one side of the roorr 
 
a t the front writing these journal notes. I'm 
especially interested in two boys who have a 
reputation for naughtiness; but in fact I ca 
help noticing other remarks. movements, 
responses. 
arune -flaking wo -sca 
aces a Franc's._ 
David points magma 
at sister on scree 
Jam e g ves quiet o 
how 
Qnmne. 	 huck 
Sarah 




ru 	 through forest 
towar 	 use. 
Rosa een' 





ci o Rosa le 
ugh bedroc loo 
'a 	 e 
ore 
Dolls shov, 	 an around 
Rosa een's bed n 
Lifes ze do 	 forest 
attack Rosa 	 lister in 
the dre—. 
R)( doll tciHS ove 
6.2: Rosa een in bed 
dreamin 
anine's excited but knowing whisper catches 
my attention first, It's directed at Nicky; and he 
repeats it later, after Janine has said it again to 
Sarah. The dolls are used in this film for 
uncanny effects, Nickys "Chucky. exclamation 
is in response to life-size versions of the dolls 
attacking Rosaleen's sister, in her w s 
fulfilment revenge dream. The first image. to 
which Janine reacts, is signalled as uncanny, 
guess, by the music. the title of the filrri, and the 
genre-expectations which the course has set up. 
Their responses read the image as popular  
horror,relating it to Child's Play, and its evil 
animated doll; their anticipation of thrills, 
signalled by their tone of voice and demeanour 
of fascinated engagement, seems to expect a 
pleasure associated with this class of images a 
the uncanny. Nicky signals a mixture of pleasure 
and revulsion: "Ugh it's C ucky.. followed by 
a laug 
Meanwhile, Jamie s howling quietly at he 
screen; at the family Alsatian who does in fact 
prefigure the wolves that appear later in the 
story. Again, this seems to be an anticipation o 
the narrative, informed certainly by popular 
 
understandings of the werewolf subgen es 
though also by the explicit study of it in class. 
 
It's a different kind of engagement, though no 
the discourse of commentary that Janine and 
Nicky are displaying; but a kind of performative 
transformation of the screen image, or the 
anchor-text' that he's reading in it. He 
performing back at the screen. His reaction 
sure he knows, is quietly subversive of the 
expected classroom response: he knows he' 
not supposed to howl at the film. which is why 
hes doing it quietly! This performance seems to 
reduce the distance between text and spectator, 
 
a distance hat's clearly  there in Janine and 
Nicky's remarks. And, like his gum-chewing, 
whispering and restlessness,it's an assertion of 
 
his insistence on watching the film in his own 
way. in defiance of classroom expectation 
which, actually, ve explicitly requested!); but 
 
a subdued enough way for us all o get along 
upstaris to 
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60 
Jamie chewing gum 
him to Jose it He goes to 
bi 
thout loss of ace. 
David, pointing an imaginary gun at Rosaleen's 
sister, seems to be enacting a similarly 
performative engagement, entering an imagined 
relation with the represented participant, the 
detested sister. Why the gun? Is he sympathisin 
with Rosaleen's hatred of the loved older 
 
sibling? I thought at first he might be making ant 
girl gestures; but e shows no hostility to images 
of Rosaleen. 
6.3 - Burial of sister.  
Nicky aughs at village bo village boy 	 era 
Several girls: Aaah 
 
Janine: fAaah - he' I 
buried. 
Toad on sister 	 'o n - 
earth thr 	 i on it 
Jamie 'pounces' o 
Francis. 
Granny. describing wolves: 
hey pounce 
Sarah 1 laughs. po n 
Nicky. 
Nicky laugh 
ranny s warning to 
Rosaleen about  
werewolves: 
"Never trust a man whose 
eyebrows meet. 
Bride: "First hing I noticed 
about you is the way your 
 




And, alongside these signs of enjoyment,  
another kind: Sarah 2 smiles at the image of 
 
Rosaleen, asleep, dreaming the narratives of the 
film. Is this a quiet identification with the teenage 
girl, and with her powerful authorial role, dream 
architect of the Red Riding Hood and werewolf 
narratives that allow her to play with the fire of 
adult sexuality? 
Jamie carries on enacting the narrative - but still 
apparently emphasising the wolf-theme - as he 
pounces on Francis. Their customary naughty-
boy behaviour seems to be here a part of an 
engagement with the text, an engagement which 
insists on fun, on physical activity, subversive, 
again, of the imposed mode of classroom 
viewing - but not at all of the text. Another 
 
interesting feature is that the syntagm they've 
selected from the film - "they pounce" is a 
verbal one, with no accompanying visual sign, 
other than that of the Granny's face as she 
speaks it. Jamie and Francis, then, are 
transforming the verbal sign into their own. 
performed, visual one: a reversal of the more 
usual transcoding by film-viewers of image into 
word. 
I dont think N cky's eyebrows do actually meet - 
but Sarah seems to be casting him in that role. 
What about the laughter? Nicky laughs earlier at 
 
the nightmare life-size dolls, who are clearly 
intended to be disturbing rather than funny, as is 
this announcement of the sign of the werewolf. 
The laughter needs careful interpretation, it 
seems. Nicky laughs again as the bride remarks 
on he bridegroom's eyebrows meeting. 
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Bridegroom treads on 
hedgehog. 
Granny: "So she waited ..." 
... and she waited ..." 
... not too shy to piss in a 
pot" 
"... until one winter's night 
Werewolf enters cottage. 
6.4: Transformation 
sequence. 
Husband chops wolf's 
head off. 
6.5: Head lands in bucket 
of milk. 
Milk goes red with blood. 
Calm music. 
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Richard - grimace: "Oooh!" 
(gasp of mock pain). 
Nicky: "... and she waited" 
(anticipates next line. 
Looks pleased - looks at 
Sarah 1 for recognition. 
Quiet laughter. 
Shifting expectantly -
Robin and other boys at 
front. 
Jamie: "Hell0000!" (quiet, 
high voice). 
Francis makes twisty face 
(mimicking the facial 
contortions on screen). 
Jamie - completely 
absorbed. David too. 
Nicky - brief laugh - then 
serious. 
Josh - laughing: "It's sick!" 
David - laughing at beast. 
All serious again. 
Someone - "Ugh!"; and 
"Wicked!" 
Nicky starts imitating 
tearing skin off face. 
Laura Ormerod: "Ugh!" 
Hands over face. 
Some relaxation - Jamie 
stretching. 
Nicky, like Jamie elsewhere, picks up the spoken 
narrative in a literally dialogic engagement, 
maybe recalling the lines from the Angela Carter 
story, which are the same. His pleased 
expression seems to be a sign of pleasure in this 
textual connection, understanding - and part of 
the pleasure comes from a recognition by others 
of his perception. 
The response to the transformation sequence is 
always interesting. As I've observed in other 
classroom journals at this moment, there's rapid 
alternation between serious, absorbed 
expressions - frowning, wide eyes - and laughter. 
There's also Jamie's funny greeting of the 
werewolf as he enters the cottage of his former 
wife. I've heard him do this before - he makes 
the same quiet, high-pitched "Hell0000!" when 
we watched Michael Jackson's Thriller, a week 
earlier. On that occasion, he does it when the 
first zombie appears in the second half of the 
video. So it seems to be an ironic greeting of the 
monster -a simultaneous recognition of their 
status as key sign of horror, and a mocking 
debunking of their claim to terror; a complex, 
even contradictory modality judgement. 
Francis, again. is performing the text, this time 
mirroring the facial contortions of the 
transforming werewolf. Shortly afterwards, Nicky 
does the same thing, pretending to tear the skin 
off his face - while Laura hides hers. These two, 
opposed uses of their faces seem to be a 
structural parallel to the two semiotic options of 
horror - to reveal or conceal: as the text can 
choose where to locate itself on the continuum of 
revelation-concealment, so can the viewer, 
pupils expanded to a maximum to absorb every 
last detail; or completely covered by eyelids or 
hands, shutting out the 'assaultive gaze' (Clover, 
1992) of the screen. The search for pleasure, of 
a highly stimulating, excited kind, and the 
avoidance of pain (the identical excitation) seem 
here very close - two sides of the same coin, or 
the same piece of paper. 
There are clear signs of relaxation at the end of 
the sequence - a dissipation of tension: Jamie 
stretches elaborately, always larger than life. 
This relaxing responds to two signifiers in the 
text. One is a signifier of the end of a narrative 
sequence in this subgenre: the dead werewolf 
reverting to his human form. The other is the 
peaceful music which succeeds the agitated 
soundtrack of the transformation and killing. 
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Kate: "Is it the woman out 
of Bedknobs and 
Broomsticks?" 
Francis, to me: "Did they 
make this forest?" I nod. 
He nods. 
Laura 0: "Weird film", to 
Nicky. 
Jamie:"She still 
dreaming?" to me. I nod. 
Someone else: "She 
sleeps a lot!" 
Rory: quiet - fixed 
attention. 
Robin - fixed. 
Richard - laughs quietly to 
Martin. 
Francis and Jamie lose 
concentration; whisper; 
Francis fiddles with pen. 
Jamie grabs pen off 
Francis. 
David intent, though 
Francis and Jamie are 
between him and the 
screen. 
Liam too - trying to see 
past Francis and Jamie. 
Rory - intent; and Martin. 
Richard, Robin, David, 
Liam. Jamie and Francis 
also eventually drawn in. 
Nicky - expression of 
puzzlement. 
All intent. 
Jamie: quiet howl. 
Nicky imitates twisted face 
again. 
Granny takes off glasses. 
Shot of forest. 
Shot of village. 
6.6: Shot of Rosaleenss 
bedroom. 
Sound of parents' 
intercourse. 
Rosaleen and mother's 
conversation about sex -
"the beast in men... . 
Boy asks Rosaleen for a 
walk. 
Devil in the wood: Granny 
narrates story of the 
priest's illegitimate son 
who meets the Devil in the 
Wood (Devil 
anachronistically in vintage 
Rolls, with a blonde-
bewigged Rosaleen as 
chauffeur). 
Devil gives boy the potion. 
Plants twine round his 
legs; hair grows on his 
body. 
He screams. 
His twisted face appears in 
Rosaleen's bedroom 
mirror. 
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These are bridging scenes, reminding us of the 
narrative structure of the film (the granny 
narrating the subordinate narratives of the 
werewolf bridegroom and the Devil-in-the-Wood; 
Rosaleen in bed dreaming the whole film). Jamie 
clearly seems to be checking on this, consciously 
aware of the outer layer of the narrative structure 
- and feeling secure with me as the authority on 
this: so a response which this time defers to my 
social role, rather than establishing itself in more 
conflictual ways. Is this a pleasure in itself? or a 
precondition for other pleasures? 
Francis seems interested in the set - Anton 
Furst's self-proclaimedly artificial fairytale forest. 
This is obviously a modality judgement, with the 
artifice of the set at issue - but it's not clear 
whether Francis approves the artifice, as an 
impressive kind of special effect, or whether its 
unnaturalness lowers the affinity. I suspect the 
former - that he likes its fantastic exaggeration. 
Laura's dismissive remark to Nicky ("Weird film") 
is the kind of ambivalent response to the film's 
narrative complexity that I've noticed before - I 
guess she's intrigued and challenged by this, but 
feels a distance from it also, perhaps precisely to 
the degree that the film itself signals a distance 
from the more accessible structures of popular 
cinema. Again, how close pleasure and 
unpleasure seem here. 
Francis and Jamie get bored, and their physical 
restlessness now signals a lack of interest - in 
the "romantic" scene? 
The Devil-in-the-Wood episode is another of the 
film's peaks of popular horror, at least in the 
transformation sequence, where triffid-like vines 
snake rapidly round the boy's limbs, and rapidly-
growing hair, indispensable werewolf signifier, 
appears on his chest and face. Other elements 
of the narrative syntagm, however, signal art-
house inaccessibility: the puzzling anachronisms, 
the obscure representation of the Devil as a 
suave modern aristocrat; the migration of 
signifiers from elsewhere in the film (Rosaleen; 
the Rolls a transformation of one of the toys in 
Rosaleen's bedroom). So their reception of it is a 
mixture of puzzlement (Nicky's face) and the 
confident performative readings of the semiotics 
of popular horror we've seen in response to the 
earlier transformation scenes: Jamie's howl at 
the screen; Nicky's mirroring of the facial 
contortions of the transforming werewolf. 
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6.7: Spiders drop on 
Rosaleerf s bible. She 
brushes them off.  
sa t I 
• )res 
SS 
nd 	 bs a 	 inthe 
)rest, nding a stork's 
 
'est with eggs which crack 
reveal stone babies, a 
small hand-mirror. and a 





During these sequences, theres a kind of 
 
dialogue between Jamie and Janine -though in 
fact they're not looking at each other, or really 
addressing each other but rather addressing 
e screen, though th 	 remarks clearly  a ect 
each other 
 
L ugh e 
Janine: "U h s 
touch then  
Jamie and Fran P ying 
Janine mouthes: "Mirror 
Jamie: "Gonna make he 
lips go all hair 
N cky u 
Janine 	 me disgust a., ihe spiders sees 
 
close to he characteristic ambivalent pleasure  o 
he horror f 	 a simultaneous revulsion from 
and fascination at the explicit signifier of obscure 
phobias. But it's also, stereotypically, a gendered 
esponse, a girl's admission of fear of spiders, 
which, at the same time, allows sense to be 
made of Rosa een's inversion of the stereotype 
by her fearless brushing away of he spiders, 
anticipating her fearlessness in the face of he 
werewolf later in the film.  
Jamie bounces off Jan ne's response and the 
maged horror by parodically intensifying the 
signifiers of horror and fearlessness, as he 
mimes eating the spiders. He moves. then. in a 
matter of seconds, from bored fidgeting. to a 
participative engagement with the text and with 
another viewer's response, to a quite different 
explicit commentary of generic competence, 
linking the film with itself, with the story, and wit, 
he fairytale, as he sees Rosaleen "straying from 
he path", and echoes the grandmother's 
warning and Angela Carter's story. 
Janine mouthes a recognition of the signifier of 
 
emale adolescence, the mirror not discussed 
yet in class. not present in the Carter story, but a 
key sign in the film's semiotics of gender. Jamie 
moves, again, into a parodic inversion of this - 
he lipstick and mirror, signifiers of beauty, he 
reads as signifiers of sublime ugliness. Bu 
ough in one way this is a subversive reading, in 
another way it makes sense, linking with the 
Devil-in-wood episode, where the ointment does 
make the boy hairy. . For the girl, lipstick is a 
powerful signifier of adult female sexuality; for 
he boy , t's a magic ointment which he 
articulates with the mythic structures of the 
werewolf genre. I suspect this is a deliberate 
,hoice as much as an involuntary interpre a 
is reading of the popular horror strand runs 
side-by-side with his transformation. inversion, 
 
signifiers derived from popular omance, girls' 
 
magazines. For the pleasurable beauty offered 
by popular omance, he substitutes the 
) easurab e ugliness of popular hor o 
pen games again. s, p 
em click fingers. 
David listening care u I 
sermo 
Janhe: 'U h!" 
Jamie mimes eating 
spiders from hand. 
Jan 	 "S aying 
pa 1, 
All quite seriou 
b. The stork s ne 
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Janine - mimes father's 
action accurately. 
Laughter. 
Puzzlement - speculation 
They pack up... 
Richard: "Who 
understands? No one!" 
Jonathan, Robin - "I did - " 
Richard explains the 
dream structure to them. 
Some discussion of special 
effects (boys at front). 
Jamie puts his hand up -
"Questions after - yeah?" I 
nod and smile. He says: 
"OK." 
All intent. 
David watching; chewing 
cartridge. 
Jamie laughs and points. 
Delighted horror (Richard 
S). 
Laughter. 
David uncaps pen, starts 
drawing? writing? 
Looks up - 
Caps pen, looks at screen. 
Jamie: "Bet he's still alive." 
Nico: "He's gonna be a 
man..." 
Rosaleens father hits boy 
as he comes into village 
screaming "Wolf!" 
Boy's father hits him too. 
Rosaleen shows her 
mother the stone baby. 
STOP VIDEO (END OF 
LESSON) 
SECOND PART OF FILM: 
1.10.96 
The trapping of the wolf; 
Rosaleen in the bath. 
The duck in the pit - bait 
for the wolf. 
Rosaleen's story of the 
witch and the wedding 
party; the marquee. 
Old bewigged woman 
gnawing chicken bone. 
Old woman transforming; 
tears dress to reveal hairy 
body. 
Wolf wearing wig. 
End of scene. 
Music crescendoes; 
wolves howl round witch in 
tree-house. 
At the end of the 
subordinate narrative of 
the witch, the film returns 
to the duck in the pit. 
The wolf is trapped; they 
cut off its paws; 
Rosaleen's father returns 
to house with the paw, 
which has become a hand. 
The hand is thrown on the 
More performative involvement, this time from 
Janine. Is this a girl's imagined attack on the 
image of a boy, as David's pointing of an 
imaginary gun at Rosaleen's sister might have 
been the reverse? 
At the end of the lesson, the group of boys at the 
front (whose image, reputation, behaviour is 
constructed in school as the exact opposite of 
Jamie's - 'good' boys), display a contradictory 
reaction to the film - a pretence at not 
understanding coupled with clear evidence that 
they do, actually, understand: Richard, in 
particular - a simultaneous distancing from, and 
engagement with, the film's narrative device of 
the dream. Alternatively, perhaps he's simply 
signalling confusion about some features (the 
opaque symbolism of the stone babies in the 
stork's nest) and confidence about others (the 
dream-narrative). 
Jamie's first move seems to signal that part of 
his classroom identity that's always there, part of 
the 'naughty boy', moderating, conflicting with, 
alternating with, his restlessness and small 
subversions: the part that wants to be 'good', 
wants my approval, so much so that, 
uncharacteristically, he's prepared to defer a 
question voluntarily. 
The pleasure of watching this scene is always 
expressed in laughter, the kind of delighted 
horror I've noted in Richard. Much of this 
laughter isn't in any way mysterious - this 
transformation is signalled as comical by images 
such as the wolf in the wig, and by the fairground 
music which accompanies the carnivalesque 
inversion of power - the wronged witch's 
revenge, the transformation of the aristocrat who 
abandoned her, his bride and the entire wedding 
party into wolves. Only David seems unmoved 
by this; though it's hard to tell. 
In this lesson, Jamie's sitting next to Nico, who, 
while more successful in school, and from a 
middle class family, also has a 'naughty boy' 
reputation to live up to. Here, they're applying 
their knowledge of the genre and their reading of 
the clues in the film to guess, rightly, that it's no 
ordinary wolf - Nico with complete accuracy. A 
pleasure of prediction - a kind of narrative 
mastery? - enhanced by predicting aloud, a 
loudly whispered dialogue. 
6.9: The Hun 
Hunter says if she gets to 
e cottage before him:  
you can - give me - 
a kiss 
Granny s house. The 
Hunter arrives, enters. 
 
attack hp nn, 
Richard Uq and 
smiles at Lia 
Nico and Jamie laugh 
hers too‘ 
6.10: werewolf attacked 
by Granny - huge red 
ongue bus out. 
 
Cut to Rosaleen 




hink here, that Jam e's spotted one o 
om 	 Rosaleen's toys in the corner, and is maybe 
reading it as a centrally significant detail of he 
mage (its weighted by having been used, 
giant animated form. in the scene of the 
nightmare death of Rosaleen's siste 
His questions and observations seem to be 
pleasures of textual involvement, prediction. 
generic competence. He continues with thi 
predicting 	 a kiss!, remembering the Carte 




e rupt on for Persona 
Learning Plan interview: 
David CooL noes ou 
Nico: uF r  
N cky co 	 P P 
Cr 	 ger.  
Laura K. "No blood . 
puzzled).  
Cut to villag 
Forest scene - Rosaleen 
on her way to Grann 
house. 
 
Toad on path. 
Hunter appea 
Hunter: 'It goes w 
wherever I wear m 
trousers," 	 compass in 
.s pocke 
Why this commentary aloud? Is it just a 
ecognition of key signs, and a rendering of her 
aloud in speech thinking aloud? What happens 
in ihis transformation? The selection what to 
underline in this way - is important. The toad is 
part of a deliberate chain of signifiers of 
witchcraft and the supernatural through the film; 
maybe Nico recognises this partly with his 
og. 
Granny's head knocked 
becomes plaster, 
breaks against wall, white 
powders ow motion 
This is the beginning of he third transforniatior 
 
sequence. Again, indicators of the mingled 
disgust and enjoyment - Richard' s Ugh" and 
smiles: laughter from Nico and Jamie - all these 
responses to the lolling tongue of the werewo 
The decapitation of the granny resolves, like the 
decapitation of the werewolf bridegroom earlier 
 
n the film, in soothing music, slow motion, and s. 
airytale image of a doll's head breaking into 
white powder. Laura begins to make sense of 
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Nico - mock wide-eyed, 
leaning forward, hand 
outstretched (mock alarm). 
Nico: "That's her hair. isn't 
it?" 
Francis: "Dirty man!" (quite 
loud). I shush him. 
Richard: "Did she shoot 
him?" 
Jamie: "Shoot him in the 
head!" 
Jamie: gun mime; gun 
noise. 
Nico - laughs. 
Maisy - hand over mouth. 
Nico - imitating wolf 
emerging - legs waving. 
Laughter. 
"Ahhh - sweet" - Laura K. 
Nico joking, moving 
around. I shush him. He 
salutes. and settles. 
Jamie: "... and she ran and 
she ran ..." 
Closeup of hunter's eye as 
he rocks in rocking-chair. 
Rosaleen comes in. 
Shot of granny's hair on 
fi re-grate. 
Hunter: "Won't you take off 
your shawl?" 
6.11: Rosaleen shoots 
the werewolf with his 
own rifle. 
Hunter (replying to 
Rosaleen's question about 
whether he lives in the 
world above or the world 
below): "I come and go 
between them." 
He approaches her. 
Rosaleen: "Jesus - what 
big teeth you have!" 
She shoots him again. 
6.12: Transformation: 
wolf face emerging from 
man's face. 
End of transformation; 
calm; wolf like pet dog. 
Rosaleen: "I'm sorry." 
Rosaleen stroking wolf. 
Rosaleen tells wolf the 
she-wolf story. 
Rosaleen: "So she ran. 
and she ran ..." 
Nico's expert mockery reads the alarm signals 
made up of the ominous closeup of one eye, the 
rocking, the music, and a cut to the moon, 
bloodshot - he's enjoying a parody of how horror 
audiences behave. He quickly reverts to his 
former use of question and commentary to check 
the details of the narrative. 
Francis' "Dirty man!" looks just like a gratuitously 
sexual interpretation - and he may have meant 
no more than that - the volume of his comment is 
clearly meant to amuse or annoy. It's worth 
remembering, though, that the werewolf's 
intentions are sexual - and even more so in the 
Carter story. which they've read. 
Jamie seems here to be positioned with 
Rosaleen, accepting the affective alignments the 
film invites, and the female positioning that this 
implies, maybe - but, if this is so, subverting this 
position with a demand for a violence which the 
narrative doesn't suggest. Does he know this? Is 
he just being 'outrageous'? or is his acceptance 
of the female positioning required here modified 
by an excessive desire for revenge - a strategy 
linking the film to more violent horror films he's 
seen? He continues this enactment - the gun, the 
sound, a performative identification with the 
victim-turned-aggressor. 
Nico continues his performative parody, his 
pleasure in imitating the transformation, but in a 
way that recognises an important feature of it -
its birthlike nature, the wolf emerging from inside 
the man. Maisy's response, the straightforward 
thrill of fear, hand over mouth, is juxtaposed with 
Nico's elaborate, mocking mime. 
End of scene - the calm of the music and the 
dog-like wolf: their response seems to indicate 
reassurance, relief, a relaxation after the 
discharge of tension (so is part of the pleasure of 
horror in the discharge of tension and the 
subsequent relief?) 
Jamie picking up the dialogue again. echoing the 
fairytale repetitions. 
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The priest takes pity on the 
wounded wolf-girl. 
The girl stretches; naked: 
tousled: thick eyebrows. 
She approaches the well in 
the village, and climbs into 
it to return to the 
underworld. 
Back to cottage: villagers 
approach; Mother deflects 
father's gun as he's about 
to shoot wolf/Rosaleen 
closeup of cross around 
her neck. 
6.13: cross round the 
neck of Rosaleentwolf 
The wolves. including the 
wolf-Rosaleen, race 
through the forest. 
Cut to interior of 
Rosaleen's house; wolves 
coming up the stairs; 
through the walls, through 
her bedroom window. 
Cut to her, screaming. 
6.14: Rosaleen's scream 
Titles; music; cautionary 
rhyme voiceover. 
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Janine: "That's the dead 
one coming out of the 
grave! 	 She looks 
ancient! She looks like 
Patsy out of Ab Fab!" 
Francis: "Is she a wolf?" 
Nico - "If s got a necklace 
on!" 
All intent. 
Janine soundlessly mimes 
scream. 
Janine: "That was her 
dream - she'll wake up." 
Richard: taps head and 
makes 'loony' face. 
They start spontaneously 
to move back to places. 
Jonathan: "If s weird! - 
seen it before." I ask 
where - he says "Channel 
4". 
I don't really understand Janine's remark - she 
seems to be remaking the image of the girl and 
the well as a horror 'living-dead' image (maybe a 
link with the zombie scenes in 'Thriller'). There's 
a sense here, and certainly in her reference to 
Ab-Fab, that she's subverting the art-house 
seriousness and obscurity of the film by making 
irreverent popular associations and 
transformations. 
As the pace of the narrative speeds up, nearing 
the final sequence, Francis is checking on the 
story; Nico too. maybe, back in 'running 
commentary' mode. 
This final sequence usually provokes intent and 
serious responses, coupled with signs of 
puzzlement, presumably about how the wolf 
Rosaleen of the dream is meeting the girl-
Rosaleen of the waking world; and how the 
dream is erupting into the waking world. 
I haven't, though. seen a response like Janine's 
before: it looks like a physical identification with 
Rosaleen, especially with the affective burden of 
the sequence, carried by the scream image; and 
she follows it with a quite different kind of 
transformation: a reading of the narrative dream-
structure. 
In the moment of relaxation as the titles roll, 
Richard does something very similar to what he 
did at the end of the first part: signals the 
oddness and incomprehensibility of the film 
(though I know he understands it well); as does 
Jonathan, acceding to the group feeling of the 
strangeness of it - though he is more familiar with 
it than all of them, having seen it before. 
GAL ISSUES
L ISSUES
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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THRILLING TRANSFORMATIONS: TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE SUBLIME 
PLEASURES OF HORROR 
Rather than attempt to squeeze these journal observations into the theories of 
pleasure reviewed in the previous chapter, I will attempt a more informal taxonomy, 
suggested by the observations themselves. It seems to me that four distinct - but 
related and overlapping - kinds of behaviour that could be described loosely as forms 
of pleasure can be observed: 
• Thrills of the Spectacle 
There is a pleasure that seems to be related to spectacular images of popular 
horror, manifested in reactions to the film that effectively shift its frame of reference 
to that of popular horror; and in reactions to the sequences which derive from recent 
(the last twenty years or so) popular body-horror (the transformation sequences). I 
use the term spectacle to associate these kinds of text with the 'spectacle' of 
Bakhtin's carnival (discussed in Chapter 5), its aesthetic of excess (Bakhtin's 
"grotesque realism"), and its reduction of the distance between text and audience. 
I think it is the case that, in contrast to these pleasures derived from images of 
excess and revelation, there might be other pleasures to do with the semiotic 
counter-strategy of concealment, opacity, implication, mystery - though such 
responses might be harder to see, more likely to be encoded in the spectatorial 
counterpart to such a textual semiotic - that is, in a response such as an intent 
silence, maybe a slight frown. These are the pleasures that can be related, in terms 
of representational processes as well as affective uses, to the history of the sublime 
in literature and film, a history briefly discussed in earlier chapters, and more fully 
explored in chapter 7 and 8. 
• Narrative Pleasure 
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There is a pleasure of narrative mastery - pleasure at understanding a difficult story. 
Related to this is the unpleasure of struggling with a difficult, less accessible story; 
and, further, an increased yield of pleasure (for some) at the harder-won mastery. 
We might expect here to find this kind of pleasure associated with academic 
aspiration and success, and unpleasure with the reverse. It's not that simple, 
however, as I hope to show. Narrative operates in other ways: the narrative which 
allows the raising and lowering of levels of excitation in the ways Freud related to his 
economy of pleasure; or the ways in which horror narratives of transformation might 
involve related narratives of subjective transformation in the individual histories of 
spectators. 
• Pleasures of Identification 
There are pleasures of identification: pleasures of adopting particular subject-
positions, where aspects of the social identities of the young viewers interact with the 
represented subjectivities on the screen. These seem partly to do with the feminist 
structures and intentions of the text and their assertion of a strong female central 
character; partly to do with the representation of youth in the film; and partly to do 
with victim/monster relations characteristic of the genre. All of these, of course, 
represent a particular moment in the historical development of film, and horror film in 
particular; as well as more general historical constructions of social identities of 
gender and youth in, say, post-war Britain. 
• Pleasures of the Spectatorium 
There are other pleasures to do with subject-relations - but here I mean those that 
obtain between viewer and viewer, viewer and classroom-text, and between viewer-
as-pupil and the complex construction of regulation that involves teacher, institution 
and curriculum. These pleasures, then, involve the classroom as a viewing site, a 
spectatorial arena, and one which seeks to prohibit certain forms of pleasure and 
legitimise others - though I intend to argue that, especially where teacher and 
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curriculum have decided to legitimise forms of popular culture, the classroom is more 
characterised by complex forms of negotiation and a kind of permissible subversion, 
a constant shifting and resettling of cultural power and pleasure, than by simple 
binary structures of domination and subordination. This argument will be further 
developed in Chapter 9. 
The other general matter to clarify provisionally before looking in detail at the journal 
is the forms of discourse employed by these young viewers. Clearly, two major 
semiotic codes are used: that of speech and that of gesture. However, as in the case 
of Johanna's gesture in Chapter 4, both (all) codes will be treated as instances of 
utterance (in the sense Volosinov uses the term); and the interest for me will lie in 
distinguishing different types of utterance here: gestures or words which mime, which 
enact, which perform, which interrogate, which deny, accept, reveal, conceal; 
differences between those words and movements that seem oriented towards the 
screen, and those that seem more oriented towards other spectators in the 
classroom. 
Thrills of the spectacle: "It's a Chucky Doll!" 
Janine and Nicky's preoccupation with this idea fits, I think, the idea of the spectacle 
- though it also problematizes it. Three points spring to mind: 
• it is a reference to, and reading of, an image pregnant with obscure pleasures and 
fears of a particular class of images central to the genre; 
• it is an intertextual reference which relates this film to a tradition of popular horror, 
what Buckingham (1996) calls the "demonic doll" subgenre; 
• it is a transformation by the viewers, with certain narrative properties, therefore 
perhaps certain pleasures dependent upon certain types of narrative structure typical 
of the genre. 
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This reading of the image evokes a single image with an extensive complex of 
meanings: the "chucky doll" of the Child's Play series of films (1988/90/92 ). For 
viewers like Janine and Nicky, this would certainly carry associations of the 
frightening uncanniness of the animated doll that turns against its young owner; of 
the monster/victim structure this depends on; and of the narrative outline that allows 
these fears to be played out (the animation of the doll; the stalking sequences, 
characterised by low-angle subjective camera; the killing of a number of minor 
characters; the eventual overcoming of the evil doll; but also the possibility, even 
certainty, of its return). 
These concentrated images exist only in the mind of the viewer: by comparison, the 
single frame or shot in the film can only have a fraction of the burden of significance. 
In the viewer's mind, the single visual idea of "Chucky" (as of Frankenstein, Dracula, 
Superman, Wonderwoman) is the compressed result of many viewings of the image 
that produce the ideal version, densely packed with the narrative, affective and 
ideational structures that all the countless instances have played out. 
From a social semiotic perspective, such a densely-coded image has been described 
in Chapter 3 as a synchronic syntagm: a syntagmatic structure in two senses; firstly, 
in that it consists of a compositional syntagm that is perceived as if instantaneously 
by the viewer (conferring on it a particular ideological power); and secondly, that it is 
carries a syntagmatic relation to all the other near-repeats of itself, for which it 
stands, and which it evokes (see Hodge and Tripp, 1986; and Hodge and Kress, 
1988). 
These properties of the image produce contradictory effects from the point of view of 
narrative. In one sense, they are strongly bound up with narrative structures, in a 
powerful package with its own inbuilt narrative expectations. On the other hand, they 
allow the image, the synchronic syntagm, to become detached from the immediate 
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narrative of the specific text, dislocated from its specific structures. To the extent that 
the specific text conforms to the expectations of the genre, this dislocation will result, 
for the spectator, in readings close to the intentions of the text; to the extent that it 
does not conform, the readings of such syntagms are likely to contest the intentions 
of the text. 
What about pleasure, though? The Company of Wolves announces itself as a 
complex narrative, redolent of an art-house aesthetic, in ways which provoke 
resistance and reluctance to assent to its narrative meanings in some young people, 
as I have noted elsewhere. To read an image as narratively significant in the context 
of another film, and a different tradition of the genre, is likely to increase the 
spectator's readiness to accept the narrative, if her preferences are more orientated 
to the popular tradition she is enlisting. In plain terms, it might be that Janine derives 
more narrative pleasure by reading an image in this film through an image in Child's 
Play 3, even if she runs the risk of narrative expectations that might be disappointed. 
In fact, they aren't entirely disappointed, as the film does indeed develop the theme 
of the sinister dolls, animating them as giant figures that attack Rosaleen's sister in 
the first part of her dream, a sibling rivalry fantasy. Both spectator and director/writer, 
it seems, are enlisting the semiotic support of the popular. 
But the dialogic movement is not simply between screen and viewer, a kind of 
particular instance of the abstracted two-way relation of classic Screen theory. 
Janine's first observation is directed at Nicky, and her second at Sarah; and Nicky's 
grimace and laugh: "Ugh, it's Chucky!" as their narrative expectations of the 
animated dolls are realised, is, I guess, for the benefit of those around him as much 
as an observation to the screen. So they're checking out their references, sharing 
tastes and allegiances, evoking Chucky to intensify the thrill for themselves and each 
other. 
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What about the nature of the thrill? This kind of affective structure, so particular to 
the horror genre, is a mixture of fear and pleasure I have described as sublime, 
following a number of other commentators (Donald, 1992; Jancovich, 1992). This 
idea has been briefly expounded in Chapters 2 and 5, and will be developed in detail 
in chapters 7 and 8. This mixture of fear and pleasure is clearly signalled here by 
Nicky as he combines an exclamation of revulsion with a delighted laugh. Donald's 
genealogy of the sublime ends in his own view of how horror films encode structures 
of identity characteristic of the cultural landscape of the postmodern period. My 
suggestion has been to use the term to make possible an understanding of this 
particular affective complex in modem audiences which recognises two kinds of 
history. 
One is the history of the semiotics of the sublime, in which images of terror have 
been employed to represent and explore anxieties about social change and changing 
social identities. These images, while they are themselves continually remade as 
material signifiers, represent different anxieties and different imagined solutions in 
each historical period; but then also visit on the succeeding generation the memories 
of their older meanings (nostalgia; old insecurities and fears; and a return of those 
which have been repressed). In particular, as has been described in Chapter 2, the 
figure of the werewolf, so central to The Company of Wolves, has been used to 
represent social fears of those constituted as Other by the dominant group, as well 
as those aspects of selfhood most feared, least understood. 
The other is the history of the individual, in which such signifiers have been pressed 
into service in the construction of the individual subject: employed, perhaps, in the 
language and rituals of family, school and community to give material substance to 
those fragments of the self expected to play such a wide variety of roles in these 
social arenas; and simultaneously internalised in the formation of the individual 
psyche. Chapter 4 has explored something of how Volosinov (1929/73) suggests this 
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dialectic relationship between the interior and exterior life of the individual, between 
ideology and the psyche: 
Between the psyche and ideology there exists, then, a continuous 
dialectical interplay: the psyche effaces itself, or is obliterated, in the 
process of becoming ideology, and ideology effaces itself in the process of 
becoming the psyche. The inner sign must free itself from its absorption by 
the psychic context ... , must cease being a subjective experience, in order 
to become an ideological sign. The ideological sign must immerse itself in 
the element of inner, subjective signs; it must ring with subjective tones in 
order to remain a living sign and not be relegated to the honorary status of 
an incomprehensible museum piece. (page 39) 
Volosinov's vision of the interplay between the individual psyche and the ideological 
sign, both constantly remaking and renewing themselves, illuminates the connection 
between the two kinds of history I have suggested, in the context of which such 
affective structures as the sublime need to be understood. 
In the transformation scenes of the film, the most obvious responses of fear and 
pleasure are evident. There is the shutting out of the image, the hiding of eyes 
(Laura) and covering of mouth (Maisy); the gleeful mimicry of the spectacular detail 
of the transformation (Francis and Nicky imitating the facial contortions and tearing 
skin of the transforming werewolf). There are kinds of parodic behaviour: Jamie's 
comic "Hell0000!" at the appearance of the werewolf; Nico's waving of the legs in 
imitation of the wolf's emergence from the mouth of the man in the third 
transformation sequence. There are verbal signs of revulsion - "It's sick!" (Josh); 
and "Ugh!" - and of delight - "Wicked!". And there is the silence and seriousness of 
complete absorption. 
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What can we make of this? Obviously it is impossible to speculate on many of the 
meanings these signs may have for these individual spectators as they receive and 
transform them, and the pleasures bound up in those meanings. There are some 
clues, however. 
Firstly, it is clear that the images are horror are at least partly understood by 
reference to others previously seen, as we might expect. So Jamie reacts to the 
werewolf's appearance with the same ironic greeting he has previously used for the 
zombies in Thriller (Jackson and Landis, 1984), which we know he has seen at home 
as well as in the classroom. So his assured, humorous response, at once detached 
from the intense emotional impact experienced by others, and, simultaneously, 
intimately related to the text, bound up in knowledgeable (literal) dialogue with it - this 
response is part of a pattern of learnt gendered uses of horror. The expectations of 
and by male audiences to test themselves against images of horror as a male rite of 
passage are well-documented. They are clear in this review of the 1931 Universal 
Frankenstein: 
It is one of those weird and gruesome stories that brings shrieks and 
ejaculations from the feminine fans and sends a cold shiver up the spines 
of the sterner sex.... Arouse public curiosity by stating: "To have seen 
'Frankenstein' is to wear a badge of courage." (Reel Journal, 1931) 
At home, someone has bought Thriller for Jamie, seeing it as appropriate for him; or 
maybe he's asked for it. At any rate, it has become part of his cultural capital, part of 
what allows his confident use of this new film, a contradictory blend of experienced, 
joky detachment and intense, knowledgeable absorption. In fact, his response is well 
imaged by Michael Jackson in the video, as he is seen in the cinema, gazing 
delightedly at the werewolf on-screen (also himself), grinning broadly, devouring 
popcorn. So we can see at least some of the interplay between Jamie's individual 
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history and the historic development of popular images and narratives of the 
werewolf; and guess at some of the ways in which these signs are, as Volosinov puts 
it, immersed "in the element of inner, subjective signs", and made to "ring with 
subjective tones." Similarly, we can see how his transformation of those signs in the 
act of viewing allows the making of new ideological signs, in which part of the 
pleasure of the text - and his new text, his howlings, funny noises, and mimicry of 
horror's aesthetic of excess - is to contest the official culture of the English 
classroom, and its expected modes of viewing. 
So, for Jamie, Nico, Nicky and Janine, part of the pleasure of this text is achieved by 
reading it through popular horror: Child's Play and Thriller, in this case. This 
operates in two ways we have observed: it raises the intensity of the experience, 
conferring the excitement and thrill of the other related synchronic syntagms; but also 
offers a degree of control and power, through a generic narrative understanding. 
Narrative pleasure 
There are many indicators of different kinds of engagement with the film narrative in 
this journal: Francis and Nico checking with me on the story; a pleasure in prediction, 
in mastery of a complex narrative. These features, clearly, are not specific to the text 
as a horror film. There are, however, aspects of the narrative which are particular to 
the genre, and it is on these that I wish to focus. 
They involve a third kind of history, in addition to the history of the individual subject 
and the history of the semiotics of horror; a third history without which the effects of 
these images makes no sense. It is the diachronic structure of the narrative, the way 
in which the unpleasure and excitation of the appearance of the monster is related to 
learnt expectations of a narrative resolution, and to the actual dynamic of the 
sequence, in which the excitement and disturbance of the threat offered by the 
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monster are relieved by the end of the sequence. This aspect of the axis of pleasure 
and unpleasure characteristic of horror is the one best described by Freud's well-
known economy of pleasure, described in Beyond The Pleasure Principle (1920) and 
elsewhere. Chapter 5 has shown how the idea of a fearful response which is also 
pleasurable is explained by Freud's notion of anxiety, which knows something in 
advance of the outcome of the traumatic experience, since it is repeating it in dream-
form; and is thus to be distinguished from fright, the uncontrollable response to the 
original trauma. 
I propose to adopt a modified form of Freud's account, one which disputes his thesis 
that there is a "beyond" of the pleasure principle, but which assumes that his 
economy of pleasure, with the variations he rather impatiently reviews, is adequate 
as a basis to describe the thrill of watching horror films. Furthermore, I propose to 
align the axis of pleasure/unpleasure of his model with the fear/pleasure combination 
originally proposed by Burke and by Kant as the defining experience of the sublime. 
Because Freud dispenses so rapidly with the idea of an aesthetic theory to explain 
the rehearsal, in art, of distressing experiences, he leaves us to simply match up his 
economic model of the pleasure principle with this phenomenon. If we do this, it 
immediately becomes obvious that there is a feature which needs amendment: that 
the ego will tolerate unpleasure if a greater eventual yield of pleasure is the outcome. 
From what we can see of the pleasure of watching horror, it is not enough to 
describe it as 'tolerance': the actual raising of the levels of excitation itself seems to 
be pleasurable: an adrenaline rush. Here is an account by Harry, written immediately 
after watching the first transformation sequence in The Company of Wolves: 
I felt a good feeling a rush of excitment [sic] run through my body. 
It made me laugh because it was quiet [sic]gory and it made me excited it 
made me get into the film more. 
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Four possible explanations offer themselves from commentaries on pleasure and 
horror. 
The first is Freud's own insistence on the first principle of pleasure being a lowering 
of levels of excitation, which suggests the possibility that, if the subject knows that 
such a lowering will be the eventual outcome, the initial raising of excitation will not 
only increase the yield of pleasure afforded by the discharge of energy, but might 
allow the unpleasurable excitation to be experienced as pleasurable itself. In this 
explanation, the dynamic of pleasure is articulated with the diachronic syntagm which 
presents the distressing images in a sequence relating them to a narrative resolution 
of the distress. 
The second can be derived from Bakhtin's idea (1965/1968) of "grotesque realism", 
which reduces the distance between text and spectator (increasing its pleasure), 
unlike the sublimated aesthetic, which increases it (diminishing pleasure). So Harry's 
experience of the images of spectacular horror making him "get into the film more" 
could be read as an example of precisely that diminishing of distance. Similarly, the 
performative responses of Nico, Francis, Nicky and Jamie - howling, tearing skin off 
their faces, waving their legs - could be read as an engagement which blurs the 
boundary between text and reader, actor and audience, the boundary on which 
Bakhtin's carnival exists. 
The third explanation involves narrative, though it also helps explain the powerful 
appeal of the thrill of the spectacular image I have explored above. It is suggested, 
again, by Bourdieu: that pleasure in grotesque imagery consists of pleasure in an 
imaginary, symbolic victory over death: but nonetheless real, since it is a victory, not 
over death literally, but over the taboo of death: a coded, but relatively transparent 
way to speak that which we often can only represent by the opaque code of silence. 
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In Bakhtin's account, as Chapter 5 has shown, it is also a victory over the mystic 
terrors of religion used to oppress the people. 
So it is possible (though here I can only speculate) that the individual history and its 
culturally acquired awareness of death is in some way related to the images and 
narratives of horror. Certainly, there is a striking resemblance between the images of 
grotesque, birthlike transformation in this sequence and the swellings, protrusions 
and procreative potency of Bakhtin's imagery. Also, if Bakhtin is right, both about the 
original redemptive power of grotesque representations of death and rebirth which 
symbolise the deathlessness of the social, carnival body, and about the subsequent 
alienation of the self in the Romantic grotesque, it is only to be expected that similar 
images in modern horror, derived from these contradictory traditions, should evoke 
the contradictory responses observed in this and other studies: fear and laughter. 
Kant and Bakhtin both argue, however, that the act of representing that which is 
fearful offers a sense of control, and of pleasure; and in this sense, accord with 
Freud's explanation of the compulsion to repeat. 
However, there is, in this contradictory pleasure, a contradictory semiotic process 
also. The representation of limitlessness, itself a contradictory idea, involves a play 
between a semiotic of absence, silence, emptiness; and its opposite and counterpart, 
a semiotic of replete and excessive presence, noise, urgency, shocking detail. These 
are the two options open to the semiotics of the sublime: and though the history of 
their operations in the elite-popular aesthetic continuum show, as chapters 7 and 8 
suggest, a privileging by elite groups of emptiness over plenitude, both are inevitably 
present in any horror text, and it is the dialectic relationship between them which 
allows the experience of the sublime to be felt at all. 
In these responses to this short sequence of film, I suggest that we can see kinds of 
response by these young spectators which are a kind of spectatorial counterpart to 
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these textual semiotic options. That is, while the text has the choice of concealing or 
revealing the image of horror, the viewer simultaneously has the same choice: wide 
eyes or closed eyes, delighted screaming or hand over the mouth. Here's Adam: 
I felt quite scared when he started to rip his flesh off and I wanted to close 
my eyes but I didn't. I watched very intently as it happened and I said Wow 
because I didn't think it was going to be that growsome [sic/ 
It is equally clear, however, that this is not the classic Screen relation of spectator 
and screen, but that it is socially situated. Here's Clare: 
I thought that it was a bit grim in most parts. If I had been watching it by 
myself - not with the class I would probably have covered my eyes up or 
something. I normally watch gross things on TV even though I cover my 
eyes up. 
So here, I suggest, diachronic and synchronic representational structures become 
indistinguishable, in the relation between socially-situated viewer and textual 
syntagm. In a single moment, textual understanding and textual pleasure are 
contingent upon the concealment of images (by text or spectator), which itself only 
makes sense in terms of revealed images which precede or succeed, either within 
the syntagm of the text, or in the paradigm of the genre. 
Though we are moving, in some ways, well beyond the idea of narrative here, there 
is still a sense in which these options, this dialectic movement between concealment 
and revelation, closed and open eyes, is a defining syntagmatic structure of horror, is 
essentially a founding narrative, upon which the Freudian economy of pleasure 
depends, as I have suggested above. But it is important to reiterate that this 
apparently individual narrative, involving only spectator and screen, is socially 
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situated, so that this narrative structure, horizontal as it were, is vertically articulated 
with structures of taste: processes which find the text oddly poised between 
pleasures experienced by part of the self as liberating and by another part as 
repellant - those processes popularly described, especially in relation to horror, as 
'bad taste'. Christian Metz (1982) picks up on Freud's suggestion that what is 
experienced as pleasurable by one part of the psyche can be experienced as 
pleasurable by another. Metz describes two kinds of filmic unpleasure: 
It can arise on the side of the id when the id is insufficiently nourished by 
the diegesis of the film; instinctual satisfaction is stingily dealt out, and we 
have then a case of frustration ...; hence films that seem to us 'boring' or 
'ordinary', etc. But aggressivity against the film ... can equally result from 
an intervention of the super-ego and the defences of the ego, which are 
frightened and counter-attack when the satisfaction of the id has, on the 
contrary, been too intense, as sometimes happens with films 'in bad taste' 
(taste then becomes an excellent alibi), or films that go too far, or are 
childish, or sentimental, or sado-pornographic films, etc., in a word, films 
against which we defend ourselves (at least when we have been touched) 
by smiling or laughing, or by an allegation of stupidity, grotesqueness, or 
'lack of verisimilitude'. (page 111) 
Metz's account, though rooted in his preoccupation with the individual psyche and its 
two-way relation with the screen, is pregnant here with recognition of a social 
dimension which he does not develop. With the benefit of later theoretical 
developments, we can develop this recognition. 
The "taste" Metz refers to can clearly be related to Bourdieu's account of taste. This 
allows an axis of pleasure/unpleasure articulated with social roles, education, class 
and the aesthetic preferences of popular and elite groups. Metz's account is 
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valuable, I think, in that it recognises the way in which these contradictions are lived 
out in each individual, in distinction from the impression Bourdieu gives of people 
securely located in one social stratum or another, their preferences unambiguously 
made. Metz's implicit recognition of the social dimension of taste is coded in key 
words of his description. "Alibi", for instance, suggests the way in which the dominant 
aesthetic derived from the Kantian "pure gaze" obliges us to police and repress 
those desires associated with an aesthetic of excess, disowning them, rendering 
them illegitimate in our private discourse and our academic canons, and literally 
criminalising them in systems of regulation such as the video Recordings Bill and 
the debates that surrounded it, in which, as Martin Barker observes, apparently 
moral concerns concealed "a politically motivated rhetoric which systematically 
distorts the meaning and nature of the videos themselves" (Barker, 1984, page 7). 
"Films that go too far" suggests a topography of representation, and the metaphorical 
suggestions evident in the etymology of the word "sublime", with its associations of 
liminality (see Connor, 1992, page 48, for an etymology and history of the sublime). 
This topography is characterised by metaphors of a borderland, metaphors which 
appear, as Donald (1992) notes, in discussions of the sublime from Freud to 
Kristeva; and which Donald himself borrows for his image of a cultural politics of a 
postmodern popular sublime: 
The step I am trying to imagine ... indicates a cultural politics and a political 
culture that would take heterogeneity and fragmentation, those blunt and 
comic facts of life, seriously. In this alternative, will-o'-the'wisp identities 
would still be conjured up by the dynamics of fantasy and desire, by the 
operation of cultural technologies, governmental disciplines and systems of 
representation, and by the interaction between them ... But it would resist 
the temptation to found a politics on the expression or perfection of such 
identities. Instead, as Franz Faron insisted in a phrase that recalls the 
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uncertainties and hesitations of Todorov's fantastic, 'it is to the zone of 
occult instability where the people dwell that we must come.' What would a 
politics appropriate to such a shadowy borderland look like? ... This politics 
would be aware of the possibilities implicit in the critical manipulation and 
enjoyment of symbolic forms, the pleasures of the confusion of boundaries, 
and so also be sensitive to the need for responsibility in the aspiration 
towards community that always remains to be brought into being. (page 
121) 
So, the model of textual pleasure I want to propose will include a sense of the 
contradictory liminality of the semiotics of horror. Horror allows a representation of 
the unrepresentable, which reproduces the fear of the limitless, while in fact confining 
it within the semiotic, thus generating the thrill of the textual sublime. This begs the 
question of what the individual will experience as sublime. We need here to allow for 
two possibilities, both historically defined, and referred to above. The individual 
history of the individual, whose private fears will derive from her social experience in 
family, community, language, country, historical moment - in short, her culture. And 
the historical development of the semiotics of the sublime. These two histories of 
course interact - as I have suggested, it is Volosinov who proposes most helpfully the 
process whereby signs are exchanged between the individual psyche and the 
ideology, transformed in both directions in a dialectic remaking of the culture and the 
individual subject. So it might be the case, as Hutchings (1993) suggests, that the 
Hammer studio's Dracula cycle (Fisher, 1958, and others) represents for its 
contemporary viewers the anxieties of a crisis of masculinity in the bourgeois family 
of the 1950s; or that, simultaneously in America, the AIP studio's I Was A Teenage 
Werewolf (Fowler, 1957) represents the contradictory liberation and threat of the 
delinquent teenager (Jancovich, 1995). These accounts can only, however, describe 
one side of Volosinov's process (as Hutchings does, in his clear explanation of how 
the male executives and craftsmen of the Hammer studios encoded contemporary 
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anxieties about a crisis in patriarchy in the images of middle-aged professionals 
typified by Peter Cushing and Christopher Lee). The other side, how these powerful 
images are appropriated and internalised by viewers; and then transformed in new 
expressions, new ideological signs, as these viewers hide their eyes, gasp, howl, 
scream, gossip, debate, make their own films, write essays - all this can only be 
described by applying forms of discourse analysis to the behaviour of real audiences. 
Metz's use of the word "grotesqueness" reminds us of Bakhtin's "grotesque realism", 
an aesthetic of robust, material excess opposed to the idealised bodies of Kant's 
aesthetic of the Beautiful, and its descendants in the sacralized forms of modern 
official culture; and such "grotesqueness", for the "us" of Metz's account, is to be 
expelled rather than embraced: in another metaphor of legality, it is an "allegation" 
that we make. 
He also suggests that "childishness" is another charge we make against those films 
that disturb settled conventions of taste, suggesting, perhaps, the operations by 
which the dominant ideology of realism in 20th century cinema as in the 19th century 
novel drives narratives of fantasy and allegory underground, marginalising them as 
children's texts, or popular texts, or 'genre' texts. 
The final charge he suggests we make against the offending texts is that of "lack of 
verisimilitude". This suggests a component I want to propose for this model of textual 
pleasure. It is clearly related to the socially constructed ideologies of realism referred 
to above. It is also explicable in social semiotic theory as a function of the dialogic 
relation of text to reader: a representation of the world which the reader agrees to 
accept as credible or not, through the operation of systems of modality. Modality 
judgments are clearly an important determinant of (or symptom of) the complex of 
pleasure and unpleasure experienced by readers/viewers. I will return to this idea 
later, in the context of the pleasures of identification. 
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So, this founding narrative of horror, a narrative of an economy of pleasure, of 
warring parts of the psyche, of personal and fictional histories, of the cultural 
histories of paradigmatic images of horror, of the sublime syntagmatic alternation of 
open and shut eyes, of the spectacular and agonised transformation of the werewolf, 
can be observed as a pleasurable experience in the words and gestures of this 
classroom audience. 
Other possible explanations of the peculiar pleasures of the transformation 
sequences take us into the last two broad areas I am proposing as components of 
the textual pleasure of horror. 
Pleasures of identification 
Here, there are two broad possibilities suggested by previous commentators. The 
first is the question, raised in the Screen debates of the seventies (for instance, 
Mulvey, 1975; Heath, 1978; Metz, 1982), of the relationship between spectator and 
represented characters on screen (or the screen itself). Part of this debate, as Heath 
acutely observes, is about who exactly this spectator might be; and he usefully 
distinguishes between the spectator addressed by, constructed by the film; and the 
spectating individual, who may or may not assent to the text's expectations. Clearly, 
this is still an issue for the classroom; and the control young people might exercise 
over the extent to which they assent to the ideological meanings, pleasures, invited 
identifications of a film is a legitimate area for the work of the classroom. 
The other substantial area of the debate is about what it might be exactly that the 
spectator is entering into a relation with. Mulvey characterises the relationship as 
invariably voyeuristic, an inescapably patriarchal relation in which the viewing gaze is 
structured as male, its object the helpless figure of woman. Metz's view is that the 
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spectator identifies with himself, the screen acting as a version of Lacan's celebrated 
mirror. These positions are criticized by Heath and de Lauretis; Heath in a critique of 
the phallocentrism of the Lacanian position; de Lauretis (1980) in an objection to the 
determinism of the Lacanian view. She problematizes the spectatorial relation, 
insisting on a historical materialist perspective, and restoring some power to the 
spectating subject, so helpless in Mulvey's view: 
'A film working on a problem'. This must be, provisionally, the task of the 
critical discourse as well: to oppose the simply totalising closure of final 
statements (cinema is pornographic, cinema is voyeurist, cinema is the 
imaginary, the dream-machine in Plato's cave, and so on), to seek out 
contradictions, heterogeneity, ruptures in the fabric of representation so 
thinly stretched - if powerful - to contain excess, division, difference, 
resistance; to open up critical spaces in the seamless narrative space 
constructed by dominant cinema and by dominant discourses ...; finally, to 
displace those discourses from where they obliterate the claims of other 
social instances, erase the insistence of practice in history. (page 197) 
It is not clear whether de Lauretis is referring to the films or to the way they're read 
as 'dominant discourses' to be 'displaced' - or, indeed, to a combination of the two. 
The tradition of cultural studies would have much in common with her position, 
though the need to displace dominant discourses might be transferred from text to 
audience. 
A later critique of Mulvey, addressed specifically to the horror genre, is that of Carol 
Clover (1992), who switches the emphasis completely. She argues that the viewer of 
horror is structured as female, tending to identify with victim figures, and subject to 
the 'assaultive gaze' of the screen. She inverts Mulvey's argument in terms of the 
gendered spectator-screen relation; and in so doing, also inverts the pleasure felt by 
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the spectator. Rather than sadistic-voyeuristic, it becomes characteristically 
masochistic. 
The other broad possibility for a reading of the pleasures of identification looks less 
at the relational structure of viewing, and more at the motivations, interpretations, 
social meanings for viewers. The suggestions of Fiske (1989) and Jancovich (1992; 
1996) about the attractions for teenagers in grotesque images of transforming bodies 
have been discussed in Chapter 5. 
Is it possible, though, to discern forms of identification at the moment of viewing; and 
to make any judgements about the pleasures associated with them? 
What, for instance, is happening when a thirteen-year-old mimics a moment on the 
screen? When Janine makes 'wolf-scary' faces at Francis? Or Francis and Nicky 
imitate the facial contortions of the werewolf transformation? It seems very grand to 
describe this kind of thing as a postmodern unsettling of identity, and much more 
tempting to see it simply as kids mucking about. Of course there is more to it. All the 
evidence of this study is that all these young people watch this film in complex, 
sophisticated ways, and the pleasures and understandings they show run deep - are 
never superficial. Also, they display quite different patterns. Francis, Nicky, Nico 
mime the transformation scenes (twisty faces, pretending to rip off their skin, waving 
legs). Jamie never does. His performative work is much less a mimicry, much more a 
kind of dialogue with signs in the text - and much more anticipatory. When the actual 
transformations occur, he is fairly quiet, engrossed, undemonstrative. He howls, not 
when the werewolf appears, but when it is remotely signalled by an Alsatian dog. He 
greets the werewolf with his funny "hell000" before the werewolf transforms, when 
the only warning signs are his unkempt hair and starved appearance. His interest 
seems to be predominantly in the monsters of the film, rather than the victims - but 
he greets them as old, familiar friends rather than as enemies. Later, though, when 
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Rosaleen is facing the werewolf, threatening him with his own gun, Jamie speaks 
directly to her: "Shoot him in the head!" As I observe in the comments, this looks like 
a positioning with the victim, as Clover (1992) suggests. The violent injunction to 
shoot the werewolf isn't clear, though. It looks at first like a misreading of the film, or 
at least a misrecognition of how this text transforms the genre, tempering the 
violence of the traditional monster/victim relationship with a different set of generic 
qualities, suggesting whimsical fantasy rather than modern body-horror. 
At this point, it becomes difficult to describe his response, his identifications, his 
pleasure, without addressing the ways in which the question of pleasure is implicated 
with the question of value, both aesthetic and moral, in the ways described by 
Connor (1992). So Jamie, reading this moment in the film through the structures of 
popular body-horror, seems to reject the ways in which the film modifies the popular 
aesthetic, lightening the brutality of the werewolf by resolving the conflict in the 
image of a pet Alsatian; rejecting, in fact, the way the film subordinates its moments 
of popular imagery to an art-house aesthetic. Immediately, Jamie's response invites 
the traditional questions of value: is he replacing the complex moral patterns of the 
text with cruder and less responsible patterns? Is he missing a refined aesthetic, 
preferring a more primitive, visceral set of pleasures? The latter question can clearly 
be referred to the popular/elite debate conducted in the cultural studies tradition. It is 
exactly the refined aesthetic, Kant's "pure gaze", Connor's "sublimated pleasure", 
that Jamie is refusing here - to a degree, at least, just as the text itself refuses it to a 
degree, or as Angela Carter's work, as Chapter 2 suggests, refuses it up to a point. 
However, I believe it is arguable that Jamie's response, which would be easy 
enough to caricaturise as popular in the kind of polarised terms that often emerge 
from the cultural politics of Fiske and others (eg Willis, 1992), is in fact harder to pin 
down. The observable forms of identification shift between monster and victim, male 
and female: he displays a performative fascination with the monsters, echoing and 
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greeting them; but positions himself with the girl-victim as she, like Clover's "Final 
Girls", turns on the monster, appropriating his phallic weapon; or warning her, in the 
words of the Grandmother, about "straying from the path". This is a reading neither 
simply sadistic or masochistic, in the terms set up by Mulvey and Clover; but with 
overtones of both. Another example of ways in which it is easy to misread his 
understandings and identifications is his comment on the pot of lipstick which 
Rosaleen finds in the stork's nest: "Gonna make her lips go all hairy!" Again, 
superficially, this looks like a misreading: and it does do a kind of violence to the 
intended aesthetic of the film, as well as forming a dramatic counterpoint to the girls' 
frequent identification with these signs of female adolescence and the physical 
changes they signify. Jamie's reading is subversive, as I have noted in my 
commentary: but entirely consistent with both the refusal by "grotesque realism" 
(noted by Fiske) of the Kantian ideal body; and with the earlier sequence in the film 
where a boy rubs ointment (given by the Devil) on his chest, and immediately grows 
the hair of the werewolf. The symbolism of the film makes a radical, but in some 
ways reactionary, gender divide: a boy rubs on magic ointment to become an 
agonised, ugly, fearful monster (sexually threatening man); a girl rubs on magic 
ointment to become sexually fertile, beautiful woman. Jamie's reading recognises 
the connection, but refuses, perhaps, the stereotypical gender polarity, making an 
obstinately male identification, reading the female images through the earlier male 
ones, inverting the aesthetic of feminine beauty which they invoke. 
Clearly, these profound and complex (though apparently simple and crude) forms of 
gendered reading and positioning take us into the areas of subjectivity described by 
Fiske and Jancovich. As the film sets up a dialogue with the mythic stereotypes of 
gender in fairytale and horror, living in a contradictory world where at one moment 
the stereotypes are revived, at another moment inverted, so these young spectators 
negotiate these imagined identities like clothes and masks in a Drama wardrobe, 
trying them on, feeling at home or uncomfortable, looking in the mirror, speaking the 
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lines, throwing them off, storing them in memory for future use. 
From what kinds of regulation, if Jancovich's argument about the liberating effects of 
representations of divided identity in horror (1992), does this offer some liberation? 
This is difficult territory. It is arguable, I think, that there are forms of shifting, 
provisional, multiple identity at stake here, and we have seen evidence for some of 
this. I think it is also arguable that represented identities in the film offer opportunities 
for the exploration of social identities of young people, which can at least be 
described in the context of the school's systems of regulation. Horror films take us 
into areas of illicitness in the school curriculum, circumscribed by film and video 
censorship, statutory judgements of aesthetic value imposed by the National 
Curriculum, and wider forms of social approval and disapproval expressed by the 
community involved in the school (religious groups, for instance). So, to the extent 
that this film employs the imagery and aesthetic of popular horror, it can create 
unease in teacher and pupil - or a sense of subversive liberation - or, more likely, a 
contradictory mix of both. 
Similarly, the elements of the film most dissonant from the elite aesthetic and the 
moral sensibilities associated with it appear to offer opportunities for joyful resistance 
to the school's usual imposition of quiet and obedient aesthetic work. Again, 
however, it may be more complicated than that. The imagery which seems most 
consonant with the sublimated aesthetic - the feminist revision of the Red Riding 
Hood character, the 'good girl' with guts - offers forms of illicit liberation to the 
teenage female audience that are altogether more confusing. The 'good girl' of the 
Red Riding Hood story is the rebellious victim of intense sibling rivalry in the outer 
layer of the narrative, and it is this image, replete with its apparatus of adolescent 
experiment and risk-taking, that appeals to the 'good girls' in the audience, as in 
Sarah 2's quiet smile as she watches Rosaleen's fevered sleep. 
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Meanwhile, the boys' apparently simple identification with the monsters and images 
of spectacular excess is counterpoised by more complex shifts of spectatorial 
positioning. It is also counterpoised by some surprising willingness to embrace the 
complex narrative, as in Jamie's questions about the story, its hypotactic structure 
("Is she still dreaming?") and the connections he makes with the Angela Carter story. 
Also, the noisy, physically active engagement of some of the boys, an apparent 
rejection of the sacralized viewing of the refined aesthetic, is actually circumscribed 
in contradictory ways also, as the next section will describe. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the extent of these kinds of engagement with the 
text - identifications, performances, willing unravellings - is marked by rapid shifts in 
the modality judgements made by various individuals, and socially negotiated with 
their peers. Intent absorption, wide eyes, hands over mouth alternate with dismissive 
remarks ("Weird film!"). Claims of incomprehension ("Who understood? Nobody!") 
are rapidly succeeded by competent explanations of the film. Mingled pleasure and 
discomfort at the transformation sequence gives way to claims of weak modality, as 
in this report written immediately after watching the sequence: 
It was funny but a bit sick I thought it was original. I laughed when he was 
tearing his face off because he looked so funny. It was very fake like when 
his nose got longer and his neck. 
Pleasures of the spectatorium 
Bourdieu (1984) describes clearly the kinds of auditoria that fit his polarised model of 
the refined aesthetic and popular pleasure: 
In one case it is constant, manifest (boos, whistles), sometimes direct 
(pitch or playing-field invasions); in the other it is intermittent, distant, highly 
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ritualized, with obligatory applause, and even shouts of enthusiasm, at the 
end, or even perfectly silent (concerts in churches). (487-8) 
These are clearly valid material instances of the aesthetic hierarchy at work in 
contemporary culture, and we recognise them easily. They are marked by the 
extremes of audience distance from the text, the kinds of engagement described by 
Bakhtin, whose carnival is distinguished by such closeness of audience to spectacle 
that the boundary between actor and spectator dissolves. 
In this instance under scrutiny in this study, however, the auditorium - the classroom 
- is harder to categorise, a much more hybrid affair. It has something of the concert 
hall, with its expectations of obedient and quiet reverence, enforced by explicit 
instruction from the teacher (and I'm no exception here). It also has something of the 
commercial cinema, though, erupting disobediently as the teenage audience in semi-
darkness express some of their pleasure aloud. Also something of the living-room, 
with a small-screen text, subject to video controls, pausing at times, stopping halfway 
through the film. And the text itself imports certain expectations, certain 
contradictions. School video carries expectations of 'educational' programmes, 
scheduled school programmes, films-of-books in English, children's documentaries, 
and so on. Horror films are less common, often scrupulously avoided and 
controversial - so they carry some of the expectations of popular, even illicit, 
pleasures with them. 
There is a lot of work to be done, I think, on the physical space in which young 
people watch film in the classroom. Where are the boundaries so important to the 
accounts of Bourdieu and Bakhtin? What's the significance of closeness to the 
screen? of who has control over the video remote? of the degrees of darkness 
achievable with inadequate blackout? of chairs and desks, their usual groupings 
dislocated by the shuffle to get a better view? of the teacher, perched somewhere to 
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the side, the usual point of focus in the classroom shifting to the screen? 
Chapter 9 will explore these questions further. However, the evidence of the 
classroom journal does allow some tentative beginnings. There is clear evidence, to 
begin with, that the kinds of noisy, demonstrative involvement characteristic of 
popular cinema, which recall Bakhtin's carnival, are both present in this classroom 
and that they are modified considerably. Jamie howls at the screen - but quietly. His 
"Hell000!" to the werewolf is in "quiet, high voice". Most of the miming - the twisty 
faces, waving legs, pointing of guns - is silent. Most of the laughter and comments 
are quiet, whispered. 
What's going on here? Is it simply a kind of compromise between the desired 
behaviour of popular auditoria and the enforced reverential hush of official school 
culture? There might be something of that, though even this structure is a bit more 
complex than that. For instance, the fact that there is negotiation at all - that the 
official culture - me! - can accept a degree of demonstrative engagement seems to 
suggest a certain blurring of boundaries. Also, even those with the most marked 
reputations for dissent from the school's 'official' culture behave in unexpectedly 
varied ways. Jamie switches frequently between imaginative, potentially disruptive 
engagements with the film and the kind of engagement more usually associated with 
the expectations of the English classroom: an attentiveness to the plot, to the 
connection with the Angela Carter story, and a willing engagement with the regulated 
dialogue of the classroom: "Questions later, yeah?" 
It is more complicated than even this, however. This is a room full of many 
audiences, not the kind of homogeneous popular audience of, say, Fiske's account. 
The social relations between them are marked by kinds of solidarity - the exchanges 
of horrid faces, echoed exclamations, whispered comments between Nicky, Sarah, 
Janine, Laura, for instance. Or, on the other hand, the much quieter communities of 
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both girls and boys, exchanging less visible signs: puzzled expressions, proximity 
and positioning, silent assurance that it's OK to cover your eyes. There's also the 
possibility for kinds of coercion here: the pressure on boys to laugh at the images of 
horror, and the freedom for girls to look scared, for instance. 
Finally, another sign of a historical shift, the emphasis on verbal text implied by the 
spaces of audience activity on which classrooms have traditionally been modelled -
the scriptorium and auditorium - has been replaced by an emphasis on the visual, for 
which I have used the term spectatorium. These distinctions will be explored further 
in the final chapter. 
Here, then, is one small instance of pleasures of the cinematic sublime. Because it is 
a film which addresses the aesthetic both of art-house and popular cinema; because 
it is a horror film, at least in part; because it's a classroom in late 20th century 
England - it is an auditorium more remarkable for its contradictions than its 
homogeneity. This, maybe, exemplifies something of Connor's refusal of the 
polarised view of the sublimated and unsublimated aesthetic, of cultural pleasure and 
cultural value; and something of the postmodern shadowlands of James Donald's 
account of horror. In any case, troubled and contradictory though they may be, the 
pleasures are real, and worth mining for their value as we construct the pedagogies 
of the future. Textual pleasure in the classroom may be a risky and volatile mix of 
loyalties, power and jostling subjectivities - but no more than is the case in living-
room, cinema and street. 
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Chapter 7: Spectating the Sublime: the Thrill of 
Horror 
Thrills in the Dark 
It is night-time in a house in a small village.Two twelve-year-old girls are watchinga 
video of The Silence of the Lambs (Demme, 1991). They watch in the dark; and, 
since the girl whose house it is has only just moved in, there are temporary curtains 
at the windows. One curtain is loose, and the fabric flaps eerily. As the girls thrill to 
the terror imaged on the screen, their fears are compounded by knocking on the 
windows - the boys of the village are outside, adding their mock-threats to the 
threatening mimicry of Buffalo Bill and Hannibal Lector in the movie. 
Next evening, in the house of the other girl, they develop a reciprocal sleepover into 
an extension of the film's thrill. They sleep in a tent in the garden, frightening 
themselves deliciously with the evil spirits outside the tent, quarrelling over whether 
to close the opening in the canvas to keep out the spirits, or open it to let out the 
insects. 
This instance of spectatorship, of the viewing of horror, exemplifies the classic 
questions perennially raised about the genre and its social uses. In particular - the 
question I want to explore in this chapter - it highlights the perplexing emotion central 
to the genre: the thrill of horror, the fear which is also pleasure, "the insistent 
operations of terror and desire" (Donald, 1992), the "distress and delight" 
(Buckingham, 1996) of watching horror films. Why do these two girls (why should 
anyone?) deliberately set out to terrify themselves? What is the nature of the fear 
and pleasure they experience? 
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Theories of terror 
Academic commentaries on the genre invariably address this contradictory affect. 
Carroll (1990) points out that the genre is unusual in being defined by its emotional 
consequences, rather than, as is more usual, by its content: "horror" is derived from 
the Latin "horrere", to bristle, or shudder, an etymology that at once emphasises the 
emotion and the physicality of its expression. 
Analyses of this aspect of the genre take a number of different points of departure 
and theoretical frameworks. One influential strand develops the philosophical notion 
of the sublime, which was popular in the 18th century, following the widespread 
availability of Boileau's 1674 translation of the treatise on the sublime by the 
classical scholar Longinus. The English philosopher Edmund Burke developed an 
account of the sublime (Burke, 1757/1960) which provided a theory of the 
conjunction of fear and wonder provoked by objects of terror and awe, both in nature 
and in art. Immanuel Kant wrote both an early thesis on the sublime (1763/1960) and 
a more fully developed (and more often-quoted) account in The Critique of 
Judgement (1790/1952), examined briefly in Chapters 2 and 5. Kant develops a 
theory of how both fear and terror can be stimulated by the sublime object; but 
argues that, while the sublime beggars our imagination in its immensity, it confirms 
the superiority of our reason in our ability to conceptualise it. As I will argue later, 
Kant's developing theory in particular can be seen as an instance of the 
contradictions and tensions characteristic of the disjunction between the 
Enlightenment ideal of the rational self and the explosive forces of revolution and 
narratives of transgression and irrationality so typical of the Romantic movement. As 
Noel Carroll points out (1990), though he is rightly cautious about easy explanations, 
it is no coincidence that the modem horror genre, in the form of the gothic novel, 
emerges in this particular set of historical circumstances. 
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James Donald (1992) tracks the sublime and its influence on horror through the 
Gothic, into the popular forms of Victorian melodrama which succeeded it (often 
offering direct adaptations of the texts of the Gothic novel); and thence into the early 
cinema which produced further transformations of the texts of Gothic horror, first in 
German Expressionism, then in the Universal studios' films of the 1930s. At the 
same time, he parallels this development of a popular sublime with the sequence of 
philosophical accounts of the sublime, from Kant through Schiller and Nietzsche to 
the postmodernist sublime of Jean-Francois Lyotard. He also, in a productive move, 
allies the sublime to Freud's "uncanny" (Freud, 1919/1990), and to Julia Kristeva's 
notion of the "abject" (Kristeva, 1982), which she herself describes as a condition of 
debasement "edged with the sublime". Donald's project in this complex historical 
account is to find his own postmodern sublime, providing a general account of the 
shadowy and unstable politics and aesthetics of the postmodern condition, as well as 
a suggestion of why these uncertainties should be figured, precisely, by the monsters 
of the horror movie. 
Gilles Deleuze (1992) also invokes the Kantian sublime in an account of the horror 
films of German Expressionism. In The Critique of Judgement, Kant outlines two 
forms of the sublime: the mathematical sublime, which involves awesome immensity, 
which, though unable to imagine, we can mathematically conceive of; and the 
dynamic sublime, which is an "infinite outstripping of form by content", as Connor 
(1992) puts it. Deleuze associates Kant's mathematical sublime with French cinema, 
and with Abel Gance in particular, arguing that the montage employed by Gance 
suggests limitless time and space. He associates the dynamic sublime with German 
Expressionist cinema, and with FW Murnau especially, suggesting that the 
limitlessness of the dynamic sublime is evoked by the intensity of characteristic 
images of the genre: the distorted perspective of the sets (indicating a terrifying non-
organic life); the intensification of evil represented by monsters such as the vampire; 
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and the play of light, the chiaroscuro which emphasises - intensifies - these qualities 
within the structure of the image and the montage. 
A second perspective frequently adopted in accounts of the thrill of horror is that of 
psychoanalytic theory. So, for instance, Robin Wood (1978), adopts Freud's theory 
of repression to argue that the monsters of horror represent the repressed features 
of the culture, and thus the films serve a progressive purpose in permitting the 
expression of these meanings, transgressing the censorial impulses of the dominant 
culture. Similarly, Franco Moretti (1988) argues that the Frankenstein monster and 
Dracula represent, respectively, the the return of an oppressed proletariat and the 
repressed object of Oedipal desire. And Freud himself, of course (1919/1990), 
argued the case for the mechanism of repression as an explanation of the force of 
the uncanny. His essay On The Uncanny does not directly consider the pleasurable 
fear of horror; but he does mention the puzzling compulsion to repeat apparently 
unpleasant experiences, a phenomenon he explores at length in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, which he had already begun in 1919, and which is discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Carol Clover, in her wide-ranging study of the genre, Men, Women and Chainsaws 
(1992), also adopts a psychoanalytic stance to investigate how horror texts invite 
gendered forms of response and identification. Broadly, her thesis inverts Laura 
Mulvey's well-known Lacanian proposal (1975) that film narrative structures its 
audience as male and voyeuristic/scopophilic. Clover argues that horror audiences, 
rather, are invited to identify with the victim, and thus are structured as female and 
masochistic. 
A third perspective is to approach horror from the tradition of cultural studies, which 
might encompass cultural theory, film theory, sociological analysis. Mark Jancovich 
(1992), for instance, considers modern body-horror, characterised by sequences of 
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grotesque transformation such as those in The Fly (Cronenberg, 1986) against a 
view of the contemporary moment informed by a Foucauldian sense of the 
increasing regulation of the individual, and a postmodernist view of the disintegration 
of the unitary subject. His picture proposes a weakening of the boundaries between 
the individual subject and the systems of regulation increasingly controlling it; an 
increasingly unstable global capitalism and consequent disorder in labour markets, 
families and communities; and social anxiety and paranoia, often focused (in horror 
texts) at the level of the family (both victim of and producer of threats to individual 
security) and the military (supreme example of institutional, coercive regulation). This 
formulation allows Jancovich to see the fragmenting of identity imaged by the 
transforming monsters of body-horror as a phenomenon at once threatening and 
liberating - and thus, though he doesn't present it in these terms, we have a possible 
explanation for the simultaneous fear and pleasure of the experience of horror. 
David Buckingham (1996) presents a study unusual in the literature in that it 
concentrates on real audiences rather than text or ideal reader. His research into the 
television viewing of 72 children from four schools provides a series of very specific 
insights into the pleasure of horror. His suggestions about the nature of the 
fear/pleasure of horror are complex. He partly agrees with Clover's view of victim-
identification, but demonstrates that in fact the pleasure derives from shifting 
identifications, in which the viewer slips rapidly from one point-of-view to another. But 
he also finds a pleasure in the critical distance young viewers can achieve, and their 
awareness of artifice; in an expert knowledge of the genre and its history; in forms of 
aesthetic judgement evident in their responses; and in the social play of viewing and 
of subsequent discussion. He finds a kind of subversive pleasure in the monsters 
and the havoc they cause, and observes that the children dwell on the "gory bits", 
seeming much more interested in this than in the "just ending" sometimes used by 
moral apologists for horror. He identifies this kind of viewing with the "paratactic" 
reading strategies observed by Hodge and Tripp (1986), in which young people stitch 
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together chains of images to provide subversive narratives often at odds with the 
ostensible structure or meaning of the text. 
Finally, he also suggests that watching horror is a kind of rite of passage - that it's 
about learning to cope with fear, the pleasure afforded in part by the newly found 
power over the fear; and that these skills are socially modelled by friends and family, 
as well as being "taught" by the text, which contains coded instructions on how to 
deal with the affective charge it emits. 
What concerns can we derive from these quite disparate commentaries, and how 
might they apply to the questions of this study? 
One important question, with which this chapter began, and which is emphasised in 
all commentaries, is that of the affect of horror - the fear/pleasure response. This is 
valuable, especially from a pedagogical point of view, because of the stubborn 
refusal of this genre to be reduced to a cognitive view of how it is read: the genre is 
labelled after the affect it produces, and seems to insist on the inseparability of affect 
and cognition, the importance of which Vygotsky (1962) stressed: 
We have in mind the relation between intellect and affect. Their separation 
as subjects of study is a major weakness of traditional psychology since it 
makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of "thoughts 
thinking themselves," segregated from the fullness of life, from the 
personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker. 
(page 8) 
A second, related, question is that of identity. Who is the subject who experiences 
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this thrill? How the identity of the viewer might be addressed by, affected by, 
submitted to by the text is a question invited by a consideration of the sublime (how 
does the phenomenon of the sublime permit both affirmation of and challenge to the 
ideal rational integrity of the Enlightenment subject, and successive constructions of 
subjectivity up to the present day?); by psychoanalysis (what elements of the psyche 
are addressed by what elements of the film text?); by cultural studies and social 
semiotics (how are social identities involved in the reading and social uses of 
horror?). 
A third question (again, related) is the aesthetic question. The sublime, for instance, 
was originally formulated as a paradigm of aesthetic quality - for Longinus, it's a 
matter of how to produce great writing; Burke's examples of the sublime in art are 
drawn from Milton's depiction of Satan in Paradise Lost. But if our modern equivalent 
of the sublime is to be found in the horror film, beset, as Buckingham shows, by 
assumptions of aesthetic worthlessness, how can we read the aesthetic preferences 
made by its viewers - preferences dependent on the stimulation of fear? And how is 
pleasure related to aesthetic judgement, in a tradition whose dominant group, as 
Bourdieu and others have shown (cf. Connor, 1992), privileges sublimated forms of 
aesthetic experience which deny or repress textual pleasure? 
A fourth question is that of the politics of horror. How do its monsters and fantasies 
encode the real? How might they be instances of the kind of realism described by 
Brecht (1977), in a plea for a less superficial approach to realism that might have 
been constructed specifically for the horror fantasy: 
In the theatre, reality can be represented both in objective and in subjective 
forms. The actors may not use make-up - or hardly any - and claim to be 
'absolutely natural', and yet the whole thing can be a swindle; and they can 
wear masks of a grotesque kind and present the truth. (page 83) 
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How do viewers judge the modalities of this kind of realism? What kinds of social 
truths might they discover? Will they be representations of an ultra-conservative kind, 
as some commentators claim of horror; or of a more progressive kind, as others 
assert? And, again, where does the pleasure/fear complex figure in these text-reader 
relations? 
In order to address these questions, and to apply them to the specific cases of this 
study, I propose to adopt the model of the sublime; and in this chapter, to look at the 
semiotic mechanisms by which the sublime experience, the thrill of horror, is 
produced by text and reader. The advantages of the sublime as a descriptive model 
are, I suggest: 
• it proposes a theory of representation in which cognition and affect are inseparable. 
Though constituted as a philosophical category from the Enlightenment to the 
present day, this opens the way to reconstituting the sublime as a semiotic 
mechanism, which is how I want to present it. 
• it proposes a theory of representation which considers how that which is 
experienced as unknown, limitless, formless might be presented: presenting the 
unpresentable, as Lyotard puts it. 
• it proposes a theory of fear and pleasure in relation to the horror genre. 
• it invites a consideration of identity: how is the sublime experience differently felt by 
different individuals; what does it suggest about the nature of the self and its limits? 
• it is an aesthetic category, inviting a critique analogous to Pierre Bourdieu's 
critique, in Distinction (1984), of the Kantian aesthetic in general. 
• its own history is coterminous with the historical period over which the horror genre 
has developed; and its own growth manifests the same historical concerns which are 
represented within the genre. 
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One valuable feature of the sublime as a mechanism for description will be, this last 
point suggests, its complex history in European culture from the Enlightenment to the 
present day. A teenager's use of a modern horror film may seem a long way from 
the grand aesthetic debates of the late eighteenth century; but I think it is possible, 
even necessary, to see how modern genres and popular understandings of them 
carry the "sedimented traces", as Jameson (1981) puts it, of their antecedents -
small details in the picture of contemporary society and subjectivity described by 
Michel Foucault (1984): 
We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are 
historically determined, to an extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an 
analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as 
possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward "the 
essential kernel of rationality" that can be found in the Enlightenment and 
that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented toward 
the "contemporary limits of the necessary," that is, toward what is not or is 
no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous 
subjects. (page 43) 
This search, through a genealogical investigation, of the limits of how the 
contemporary subject is constituted, seems relevant to the sublime, itself is an image 
of transgression and liminality, and one of the mechanisms through which this 
contemporary subject is discursively constituted. 
Back to the two girls watching The Silence of the Lambs. This chapter will focus 
specifically on those questions about their relation to the text that can be described 
as sublime, in the senses I have outlined. If the sublime is a semiotic strategy, in 
what particular semiotic forms has it operated historically? And what social meanings 
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has it represented (or concealed)? 
And, from the perspective of social semiotics, it is no less important to consider how 
the pleasures and fears of the sublime might be socially determined. How do they 
relate to aesthetic pleasure and taste, and to the social roles and identities with 
which such preferences are articulated? What conditions of social control and 
regulation do the sublime and the horror genre reproduce or undermine? What limits 
of contemporary subjectivity do they build or breach? How can such observations be 
understood against the social and cultural continuities and transformations from the 
Enlightenment to the present day? These further questions will be considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
Lucy and Jessica: "you have to see what happens next!" 
Lucy and Jessica are talking to me about horror films. Lucy is an ardent fan - Jessica 
claims not to like them, though later in the interview she shows extensive knowledge 
of certain films. Lucy spends some time on The Silence of the Lambs (Demme, 
1991), a film she's watched on more than one occasion. She explains why she likes 
it: 
L: No, I - I really like the film Silence of the Lambs - but it just really scares 
me. I don't know why. Because it's not just the fact that - I mean I'm not -
like Predator - I'm not scared of, cos I know they're not true - but - I know 
there are people that - you know - might do that, and - the way that you see 
people mur - you see them being murdered, and you see all the blood 
down the well, and, you know, it's just the way he treats her, and the way 
he sews up the skin, and things - 
J: Yeah, and - 
L: I don't know, I suppose it's his voice as well - and the way they act, the 
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way they dress, the way they just basically [quietly] play the part. 
AB: But in real life it would be horrifying, wouldn't it? And you would 
run a ( mile to get away from it, so why - 
L: 	 (No but I mean, like - I'm thirteen, and I shut my eyes, when I, when 
you were in his house, and the way, still now, that I watched it a year ago, 
and I've watched it since, but still now, you know at the end, she has the 
binoculars where he can see in the dark - still now, whenever it's dark, like 
if we're playing a game in the pitch dark, or, I always think that he's 
somewhere and he's got the glasses, he can see me and I, I don't know, 
but they, they, they're the things that seem to scare me, because if ever 
I'm in the dark I just think, something can see me and I can't see it. I don't 
know why - might sound stupid - 
AB: No! doesn't sound stupid. 
A good deal of Lucy's account is about seeing and not-seeing. She doesn't simply 
relate the violent events of the film, or simply describe the spectacular images: she 
makes the events and images objects of the viewer's spectatorial act: "... the way 
that you see people mur - you see them being murdered, and you see all the blood 
down the well ...". In the grammar of her account, the spectator has become Actor, 
and the acts of murder in the film have become the Goal. 
A little later, however, the Actor is located more conventionally within the diegesis: 
... it's just the way he treats her, and the way he sews up the skin, and 
things ... 
So there is a shift of power between spectator and represented participant - one of 
the monsters of the film, Buffalo Bill, who skins his victims. If we continue to track the 
play of pronouns in Lucy's account, which so far have switched between signalling 
viewer and fictional character as in control, we find the picture becoming more 
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complicated as she moves on to the denouement of the film, the scene in Buffalo 
Bill's house where Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster) has tracked him down, only to 
become herself the hunted, at the mercy of his infrared night glasses: 
L: 	 No but I mean, like - I'm thirteen, and I shut my eyes, when I, when 
you were in his house, and the way, still now, that I watched it a year ago, 
and I've watched it since, but still now, you know at the end, she has the 
binoculars where he can see in the dark - still now, whenever it's dark, like 
if we're playing a game in the pitch dark, or, I always think that he's 
somewhere and he's got the glasses, he can see me and I, I don't know, 
but they, they, they the things that seem to scare me, because if ever 
I'm in the dark I just think, something can see me and I can't see it. 
To begin with, the viewer is not represented by the second person pronoun here, but 
the first person - has the universal viewer become more intimate, Lucy herself? 
Though she shifts between herself-as-viewer and other-as-viewer: "... when I, when 
you were in his house...". Secondly, the viewer is back in control, and all the action, 
at least at the beginning, is a kind of spectatorial drama, even structured around its 
own narrative, a diachronic sequence of her first viewing of the film ("I watched it a 
year ago"), subsequent viewings ("and I've watched it since"), and a continuous 
present, made up of her memories, the film-in-her-head, vividly represented by the 
dramatic repetitions of "still now ...", so evocative of the tellings of ghost stories ("And 
still of a winter's night, they say, when the wind is in the trees ... "). 
Even when the monster is at his most threatening, his actions ("... he's somewhere 
and he's got the glasses, he can see me ...") are subordinated to the main verb in 
the clause, which signals Lucy as Actor, in the controlling act of spectatorial 
mentation: "I always think ...". 
Illustration 7.1: The Silence of the Lambs 
Clarice Starling seen through Buffalo Bill's 
night-glasses 
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At the same time, the actions of the diegesis, always framed by the controlling 
viewer, operate within their grammatically subordinated context as if within the limits 
of the screen, showing the monster, the represented participant in the semiotic 
transaction. However , the Goal of his actions, ostensibly Agent Starling, has shifted 
to the spectator, Lucy herself, as if she's rewritten, or refilmed, the point-of-view 
shots to show, not Starling (illustration 1), but herself. The play of pronouns, though, 
is wider than these structures would suggest - not only the "I" of herself as spectator, 
the "me" of herself as victim/heroine, the "he" of Buffalo Bill - but also the "you" of the 
universal viewer (or perhaps me, the interviewer/teacher); and the "she" of Agent 
Starling (in an odd slip which reverses the seeing-seen roles: "she has the 
binoculars). Furthermore, in a pronominal extension which makes the social context 
of these textual transformations very clear, she refers to the "we" of herself and her 
friends, re-enacting the thrill of the dark: 
... still now, whenever it's dark, like if were playing a game in the pitch 
dark, or, I always think that he's somewhere and he's got the glasses ... 
A final point to note is that while the semiotics of the text operate around explicit 
revelation of horrific images and an equally disturbing concealment of them through 
complex images of darkness and sightlessness, Lucy operates her own version of 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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these options, choosing to see the images or not, her own director, editor, censor: 
... I'm thirteen, and I shut my eyes, when I, when you were in his house ... 
So, as in the account given by David Buckingham (1996) of one teenager's viewing 
of The Lost Boys, the viewer shifts rapidly between different points of view. In Lucy's 
account, however, these shifting points of identification move beyond the film, as the 
structures of the fiction are replicated in the spaces and rituals in which her own 
actual social identity is bound up. 
What about the sublime? As I suggested earlier, my concerns here are to do with the 
sublime as a social semiotic mechanism: how do texts and reader work with these 
structures to produce and control the meanings and their affective charge 
characteristic of the genre? And what social identities are bound up in these 
processes? To simplify - who, exactly, is feeling thrilled or scared, about what? and 
what part do they play in the production of this fear, and of the object of it? 
Edmund Burke (1757/1977) is very clear about the mixed emotions provoked by the 
sublime object, emotions he describes as a mixture of fear and wonder, which he 
finds allied in the word astonishment, and which he also links to terror: 
Indeed terror is the ruling principle of the sublime. Several languages bear 
a strong testimony to the affinity of these ideas. They frequently use the 
same word to signify indifferently the modes of astonishment and 
admiration and those of terror. 0%43os is in Greek either fear or wonder; 
8Elvos is terrible or respectable; at&co, to reverence or to fear. (page 257) 
And he remarks on the need for representational strategies of concealment: 
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To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be 
necessary. When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can 
accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes. Every 
one will be sensible of this, who considers how greatly night adds to our 
dread, in all cases of danger, and how much the notions of ghosts and 
goblins, of which none can form clear ideas, affect minds which give credit 
to the popular tales concerning such sorts of beings. (page 257) 
In many ways, this simple structure of a darkness - a space which is in one sense 
empty, but in another replete with imagined horrors - appears to be bequeathed 
directly from Burke's time to our own. Lucy observes the same structure in The 
Silence of the Lambs: the empty darkness of Buffalo Bill's house, replete with the 
threatened horror of the killer, and the partly-imagined, partly-remembered images of 
horror that have been briefly shown us: the bath of human skin; the killer sewing up 
the human skins. The "necessary obscurity" remarked on by Burke seems clearly to 
be a pre-requisite of the effect of horror in this film. Illustration 1 shows Clarice 
Starling seen through the killer's night-glasses, and the image is extraordinarily 
obscure, especially as a still. Already, though, it is equally clear that the fear caused 
by the darkness, the emptiness, is no less dependent on the monsters it suggests, or 
only partly conceals. Indeed, at the beginning of Lucy's account, she concentrates 
on starkly revealed images of horror rather than on concealed ones - the emphasis is 
on wide-eyed, shocked revelation rather than on concealment: 
L: No, I - I really like the film Silence of the Lambs - but it just really scares 
me. I don't know why. Because it's not just the fact that - I mean I'm not -
like Predator - I'm not scared of, cos I know they're not true - but - I know 
there are people that - you know - might do that, and - the way that you see 
people mur - you see them being murdered, and you see all the blood 
down the well, and, you know, it's just the way he treats her, and the way 
he sews up the skin, and things - 
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Here, as I have shown, the action of the sequence is subordinated to the action of 
spectation. And the object of the spectatorial experience is the event of the murder; 
but also vivid images: "all the blood down the well"; "the way he sews up the skin". 
These are brief images of extreme violence that can claim to represent important 
themes and ideas of the film, though in fact they account for an extremely small 
proportion of the footage. In this sense, they transcend the narrative structure, and 
are strung together by Lucy, in her act of reconstituting the essence of the film, to 
represent an important aspect of it for her: the nature of the monsters in the movie -
the horrors that haunt the darkness. They function as "synchronic syntagms" (Hodge 
and Tripp, 1986; Hodge and Kress, 1988), powerful images which viewers might use 
to assert a particular version of a text. In this case, Lucy is constituting a version of 
the monster for two reasons: to show how really horrific he is, and how bizarrely 
horrible his behaviour, and so to convince us of the shocking nature of the film and 
account for the fear it causes; but also to make a claim for the credibility of the 
monster. She is making a modality judgment; and for her, Lector and Buffalo Bill are 
highly credible because they could exist, at least in the appeal to social reality made 
by the slasher/stalker subgenre of horror that really began with Psycho. She 
compares this kind of monster to Predator (McTiernan, 1987) in which the monster is 
a kind of invisible alien, who only appears as a barely-formed ripple of light. She's 
making a point often made by girls - that monsters based on "real" stories of rape 
and murder are more frightening than fantasy monsters. Another girl, Chas, writing 
about the film, concentrates on the way Lector in particular is made more real by the 
construction of the bond between him and Starling, an almost sexual link. She points 
out that it appears in the only image in the film in which there is physical contact 
between the two characters (Illustration 2). The sublime thrill of this image can only 
derive from the chain of significance in the syntagmatic structures which produce this 
monster; the significance of the synchronic syntagm is to underline the ordinariness 
of this particular monster: the point Lucy and Chas are both making. 
Illustration 7.2: The Silence of 
the Lambs 
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The point I want to explore further, however, is the relationship between the 
revelatory images of horror - the monsters - and the images of concealment. These 
two, I will argue, form distinct categories, but are related dialectically. It will also be 
necessary to consider how these structures may have changed since the 18th 
century: they appear strikingly similar, and indeed part of the point here will be that, 
as Foucault argues of subjectivity, our engagements with fictions are partly 
determined by those of the Enlightenment and of the Romantics. However, there are 
also differences, which are no less important, and which redefine the boundaries of 
representations which explore the indistinct anxieties of the culture. 
Sublime Emptiness, Sublime plenitude: Kant's representation of limitlessness 
Lucy and her friends organize their play, their textual engagements, and their 
environment around the mechanics of concealment and revelation: a darkness that's 
frightening and delightful both in itself and because of what it might conceal. She 
shuts her eyes as she imagines herself in Buffalo Bill's house. She describes the 
living-room where they watch the film: 
L: ... But it was so scary because it was Ellie - it was when Ellie slept round 
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my house, and we were in the house on our own, and all the boys outside 
knew we were watching it, and we sat there in the corner, and it was just 
pitch dark, and it was just when she was in the well, and I was sitting there 
under the covers, and the boys knocked on the window - 
AB: [laughs] 
L: - and scratched - and I - my - I screamed so loudly, I just - 
AB: Which boys? 
L: They're just some boys in the village. You know Will Phipps? 
AB: Mm. 
L: He was one of them. Cos he - urn - and a boy called James Gardner - 
AB: So they were just knocking on the window to frighten you? 
L: And - they - cos that window - cos we haven't been at Swaffham Prior 
that long - urn - one of our windows still - just half the window - we didn't 
have enough material for the curtains - so half a window hasn't got curtain 
- if you see what I mean. 
AB: Mm. 
L: And - so we had no way of shutting it, and you just look out in the corner 
of your eye, and - 
AB: Were you there, Jessica? 
J: Mm. 
And after watching the film, Lucy sleeps at Jessica's house the next night: 
J: And then she came to my house and we slept in a tent in the garden, 
and she wanted the flap shut so that all the evil spirits or something 
couldn't get in, and I wanted it open so that the insects could get out. Then 
we just went back inside. 
So it isn't just that the film operates these structures of concealment and revelation: 
as we've seen, the same structures are operated by the viewer, and here, it is clear 
that she carries them well beyond the film into her life and relationships. This offers 
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us, I think, a way out of simply seeing the resonance of the sublime as pure affect, or 
as a purely internal experience of the psyche, explicable in terms of Freud's theory 
of pleasure, say, but not assimilable to the social or the historical. A more useful 
image is Volosinov's image (1973), discussed in Chapter 6, of the dialectical 
relationship between the psyche and "the ideological sign", in which the individual 
psyche internalizes ideological signs, they become part of the governing unity of the 
individual consciousness and are made to "ring with subjective tones", and, upon 
being expressed, return to the outer world of ideology and history. 
So Lucy appropriates the historic signs of the sublime, and they work for her, 
allowing social dramas woven of her own textual mechanics: the torn curtain of the 
vicarage, the village boys, Jessica's garden, the tent-flap. The girls recruit these 
fabrics, places, characters, to construct their own dynamic of concealment and 
revelation behind which lies the imagery of the film - this film, others they know and 
enjoy, and a set of cultural echoes stretching back to the Romantic sublime, through 
a series of transformations and distortions, seen from our historical moment, as 
Jameson suggests (1981), through a kind of x-ray, revealing the shadowy layers of 
accreted meaning. 
We are still left with some of the questions raised above. How exactly does this 
semiotic mechanism work? What meanings does it carry? How is it historically 
transformed? 
Kant produced conflicting versions of the sublime: a version constructed as rational 
and elevated, and a version constructed as vulgar and debased - a conflict important 
to my interest in questions of taste, pleasure, and a popular-elite dialectic; but also to 
the question of the semiotic nature of the sublime. 
James Donald, as we have seen, draws on a discussion of Kant's refined aesthetic 
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theory in The Critique of Judgment, which gives an account of the sublime in exact 
accordance with the Enlightenment ideal of the rational subject. By this stage in 
Kant's thinking, he has ironed out all the loose ends, and decided that the sublime 
consists of objects characterised by limitlessness (as opposed to the beautiful, 
characterised by form). The sensation of the sublime is a feeling of mixed fear and 
pleasure - awe inspired by the sense of limitlessness; pleasure by our rational ability 
to conceive of the total idea of it: 
The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object, whereas the 
sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it 
immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of 
limitlessness, yet with a super-added thought of its totality. (90) 
He distinguishes, as I have observed earlier, between the mathematically sublime 
and the dynamically sublime. The former describes the sublime response which, 
unable imaginatively to grasp the limitless, is able nevertheless to conceive of it 
through a triumph of reason - to measure it, as it were. 
The Dynamic Sublime is different, and consists of a dynamic tension between 
imagination and reason - a play of pleasurable and unpleasurable forces, as 
opposed to the apprehension of beauty, which is a state of "restful contemplation". 
As Kant's description unfolds, however, it looks as if this version of the sublime is 
more to do with a kind of comfortable (pleasurable) terror - a fear balanced by a 
certainty that we cannot be harmed (very much like that of the cinema, of course). 
The sublime is fearful; but we are not afraid - we are confirmed in our security 
against the terrors of nature: 
Spectacular forces of nature (rocks, storms, hurricanes) make our power of 
resistance seem trifling. But, provided our own position is secure, their 
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aspect is all the more attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these 
objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the height 
of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of 
quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure 
ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature. (page 111) 
The social nature of the sublime is betrayed here, and it is exactly the same point 
that Bourdieu makes about Kant's aesthetic in general - that it posits a refined 
aesthetic gaze open only to a privileged elite. The antithesis of this, the pleasures of 
ordinary people, seem to be indicated here in the Critique of Judgement, dismissed 
as the "vulgar commonplace", those unable to rise to the heights of the sublime. The 
questions begged are, of course, who gets to join this elite, and what are the 
qualifications for entry. Bourdieu argues convincingly that Kant, in spite of his 
attempts to present the "pure gaze" as a transcendent quality, betrays an 
inconsistent awareness that education and training play a part in its construction. 
Already, then, we can see contradictions in Kant's model. To summarise, these are: 
• a tension between his two different categories: in both, fear is caused by awesome 
limitlessness; but the pleasure has two different causes - in the capacity of reason in 
the one case; and in a kind of pleasurable tension between reason and imagination 
in the other; 
• the role of imagination seems contradictory: in the mathematically sublime, the 
imagination seems overcome by the sublime; in the dynamically sublime, it plays a 
more active role, balanced by reason; 
• in spite of the transcendent nature Kant claims for his aesthetic, it is clearly 
determined by a social hierarchy, as Bourdieu demonstrates; 
• there are hints of an aesthetically debased condition, the "vulgar commonplace", 
against which this refined form of the sublime is set. 
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These contradictions can be explained, I believe, by looking at Kant's project in its 
historical context. Briefly, my suggestion is that he is attempting to reconcile what 
are, in fact, irreconcilable desires of the European cultural elite of his time. These 
desires amount to a kind of cultural and philosophical cleanup campaign, an attempt 
both to acknowledge the imaginative power of recurring cultural forms and the 
unsettling social currents they might represent, and to deny the elements of them 
most inconvenient to the then dominant aesthetic and epistemological norms. The 
Enlightenment endorsement of the ideal of the rational, cogitative Cartesian subject, 
and the concomitant belief in the power of Reason as the ennobling constituent of 
such a subject, is clearly one desire, and, for Kant, an indispensable part of an 
aesthetic framework. At the same time, though, he betrays the excitement of the 
sublime as a description of the awesomeness of nature, a favourite topic for 
Romantic artists, allowing, for instance, a representation of the social and political 
explosion of the French Revolution (in the second year of which The Critique of 
Judgment was published). Carroll (1990) explains that the horror genre is often seen 
as the "underside" of the Enlightenment: the emotion to its reason, the dark side of 
its intellectual light. Though he is cautious about too simple conclusions of this kind, 
he acknowledges that there are interesting possibilites in this thesis. 
Of course, such a view needs to take into account that Enlightenment constructions 
of the self, in spite of the ideal of rational integrity which appears to us the dominant 
image from a distorting perspective of historical distance, were themselves 
contradictory. EJ Hundert (1997) points out how David Hume and Adam Smith, for 
instance, viewed the self as "a kind of theatre", and how, for them, "social life of 
necessity resembles a masquerade". He continues by describing Rousseau's 
opposition to such alienating notions of identity, and his assertion of "certain 
knowledge of supposedly singular inner states" (page 83) which, in turn, become the 
model for Romantic formulations of subjectivity. Against this kind of background, 
then, Kant's efforts to hold the self together become simply one of many, rather than 
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a typical representative of a tranquil consensus. Furthermore, such divergent 
accounts of selfhood in the supposed Age of Reason should warn us against too 
simple a perception either of newly fragmented identities in the late Victorian period, 
or of the divided subjectivities of Lacanian or postmodernist theory. 
If Kant's sublime is an attempt to repress different constructions of the self, it reveals 
similar fractures in its account of aesthetic pleasure. I have argued in Chapter 5, 
following Connor (1995), how Kant's aesthetic theory constructs an opposition 
between a privileged aesthetic based on sublimated pleasure, and a popular 
aesthetic based on unsublimated pleasure. This popular aesthetic is constructed by 
Bourdieu out of a close reading of repressions, suppressions, denials and silences in 
the text of The Critique of Judgement. The same is true, though Bourdieu doesn't 
attend to it, of the versions of the sublime constructed by Kant - they belong to a 
refined aesthetic, in which the sublime object might be fearfully formless; but is 
clearly intended to conform to a class of objects distinguished by their ennobling 
qualities, and distinguished from another class of objects described as vulgar. There 
is little more to go on in The Critique of Judgement, and we would have to operate on 
a good deal of inference if that were the only text. 
Much more revealing is a text produced before Kant had refined his account of the 
sublime: Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, written 
twenty-six years before The Critique of Judgement, and briefly explored in Chapter 5. 
Rather than the cleaned-up version of his later work, the Observations are exactly 
that: observations, constituted as sequences of exemplary instances and metaphors, 
rather than a framework of philosophical propositions. So they reproduce, in 
condensed form, the metaphors of the sublime characteristic of the period, and are 
representative of, rather than analytical of, the semiotic field of which gothic horror is 
a part, producing representations of horror, terror and the sublime embedded in 
theological and moral uncertainties of the age. It is often the case, in Kant's 
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exemplars, that the metaphors give semiotic substance to the blind spots of material 
existence; and they do it in two ways - by producing a metaphor of the area of 
invisibility or mystery itself; and by filling the unknown space with invented objects or 
creatures: 
Deep loneliness is sublime, but in a way that stirs terror. Hence, great far-
reaching solitudes, like the colossal Komul desert in Tartary, have always 
given us occasion for peopling them with fearsome spirits, goblins and 
ghouls.... 
(page 49) 
The semiotic options available at the time to authors of the Gothic novel, and later to 
directors of horror, fantasy and sci fi for constituting terror and awe in varying 
admixtures of images of emptiness, mystery, limitlessness and concealment on the 
one hand (space; the ocean; the underworld; the unnameable; the invisible); and 
fantasy creatures that might, at least in part, fill such spaces on the other - these 
options are outlined by Kant remarkably fully. He elaborates further, envisaging a 
continuum of perfect/imperfect, or natural/unnatural, along which the three kinds of 
the sublime outlined in the Observations (the terrifying, the noble and the splendid) 
each runs. The line which looks most revealing in respect of the horror genre is the 
terrifying sublime. Kant's description of the transformation of the terrifying from 
natural to unnatural betrays very clearly both the fascination of such images for the 
Romantic imagination and the attempt to construct a social hierarchy of taste which 
classifies certain types of representation as either elevated or debased, the historical 
forerunners of the modern cultural distinctions which Bourdieu so clearly reveals. 
Kant also associates such distortions of the pure sublime with the four humours; 
again, the conjunction of the sublime with what (to Kant) seems the most degrading 
influence - the melancholy - seems to produce the semiotic material we would 
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recognise as the stuff of horror and fantasy, reading almost like a recipe for a Poe 
story: 
In the deterioration of this character, earnestness declines towards 
dejection, devotion towards fanaticism, love of freedom to enthusiasm. 
Insult and injustice kindle vengefulness in him. He is then much to be 
feared. He defies peril and disdains death. By the perversity of his feeling 
and the lack of an enlightened reason he takes up the adventurous -
inspirations, visions, attacks. If the understanding is still weaker, he hits 
upon the grotesque - meaningful dreams, presentiments, and miraculous 
portents. He is in danger of becoming a visionary or a crank. (pages 66/7) 
The key determinant of purity/naturalness in Kant's portrait of the sublime is, 
predictably, reason; and it is in proportion to the apparent distancing from the rational 
that the sublime becomes, in his account, progressively degraded. Naturally enough, 
such a distancing is intolerable to Kant's efforts to resolve contradictory 
contemporary versions of selfhood; and at the same time a threat to the aesthetic 
rules permitting a distinctive culture for the bourgeois elite. Also, though, the 
eccentric eruptions within that elite of a Byronic preference for danger, revolution and 
amorality are recognised, perhaps, in Kant's willingness to entertain the notion of the 
sublime at all. It is a category so resistant to the taming force of reason, even in its 
tightly regulated form in The Critique of Judgement, that we wonder why exactly he 
doesn't just reject it outright. His philosophical justifications of it as the supreme 
confirmation of the power of human reason are much less convincing than his 
colourful evocation of the thrill of contemplating unpredictable, chaotic forces. 
Semiotically, Kant's treatise broadcasts the ambiguity, paradox and volatility 
characteristic of the sublime and the uncanny. Upon his structure of the 
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perfect/imperfect continuum, for instance, we could superimpose a semiotic structure 
of abstract/concrete: he associates with an elevated, pure (and therefore rational) 
form of the sublime such abstractions as 'solitude', 'height', 'depth', 'past', future'; 
and with imperfect, irrational forms a veritable junkshop of gothic props: bones, 
ghosts, tombs, relics. So the 'rational' becomes associated with the abstract 
unknowable; and the irrational with the palpable, the concrete, the visible. Intrinsic to 
these structures of perfect/imperfect, rational/irrational is, of course, the 
Enlightenment subject; and it is the threat to the integrity of this subject which most 
worries Kant: a "lack of enlightened reason" causes decline into "the adventurous" 
and "the grotesque", the subject becoming the opposite of the Enlightenment ideal -
a "visionary" or "crank". 
So Kant's construction of the perfect/imperfect continuum projects both an 
evaluation of forms of subjectivity and the tastes associated with them; and the 
semiotic mechanism by which these social phenomena are represented in the 
context of the sublime. 
It is the descendant of this mechanism that Lucy and Jessica operate in their uses of 
Silence of the Lambs. Their fascination with images of emptiness pregnant with 
potential horror, which they read both in film and in the rooms and gardens of their 
homes, betrays a lineage of imagery connecting them with Kant's sublime, a lineage 
in which the representations of fear and the unknown are used to negotiate and 
explore political and social uncertainties of the age, and the subjectivities bound up 
in these. 
Central to these semiotic mechanisms is the idea of the unknown: the thrill of the 
sublime, for Kant and the Romantics as for Lucy and Jessica, is the simultaneous 
pleasure and fear of deliberately contemplating the unknown, the semiotic operation 
of this contemplation being to both deny and to give form to the unknown object. 
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How might these processes be historically transformed? And what is the ideological 
purpose of a semiotic that allows simultaneous revelation and concealment, 
concession and denial? 
Firstly, of course, the object of fear and delight itself will change. A dominant 
hypothesis explaining the thrill of horror since psychoanalysis is that of the "Return of 
the Repressed", outlined briefly at the beginning of this chapter, and explored at 
more length in Chapter 8. For the moment, it is enough to observe that the nature of 
the social repressed will change with time. For the Victorian bourgeoisie, the image 
of Bertha Rochester represents the twin threats of madness and the Black woman. 
For 19th century Britain, the image of Frankenstein's monster is popularly evoked to 
represent the threat of Irish nationalism, as Chris Baldick argued recently 
(Frankenfest, Royal Institution,19th January, 1996); and later to represent a different 
rebellious proletariat in Fordist America (Moretti, 1988). For 50s America, the 
teenage werewolf represents the threat of the newly emergent teenager (Jancovich, 
1996). And later, it stands for the taboo of incest, argues James Twitchell (1985). For 
Lucy and Jessica, perhaps the higher modality of monsters based on a more 
documentary sense of sexual assault suggests a real concern and fear - and 
perhaps fascination - with precisely these features of the real world. Perhaps the 
monster-metaphor has become more transparent for them. 
These social anxieties can be articulated through the sublime precisely because of 
its capacity, as Kant made clear, to represent the limitless. For each of these kinds of 
social anxiety, the limitless is that which lies beyond the limits permitted by prevailing 
social norms: limits of taste, political opinion, sexual mores, the new power of 
hitherto powerless social groups. The limit is the closure which these norms would 
impose; the sublime pushes us up to the limit, as its derivation suggests: Sub limen, 
"up to the lintel". John Carpenter, director of Hallowe'en, describes the effect of 
seeing a film which took him to the limits of taste (The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, 
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Hooper, 1976 ): 
In 1976 I saw a movie that I thought went right up to the line of taste in The 
Texas Chainsaw Massacre. It rode the taste-line that separates something 
unspeakably awful from something that you can handle, and I recall after I 
saw it I went to sleep and I slept like a baby because it had, sort of, 
pacified my soul, I was able to go down into the depths of human depravity 
and come up and not really be damaged by it. (Carpenter, 1994) 
By now, then, the association of the sublime with the kind of ennobling qualities 
insisted on by Kant has given way to the possibilities of a sublime which, for cathartic 
purposes, courts images of depravity - much more like Julia Kristeva's image of the 
Abject, which she depicts as the other side of the sublime, "edged with the sublime" 
(1982). 
The Texas Chainsaw Massacre makes the point about the semiotic of concealment 
and revelation very well. Popular impressions of the film at the time were that it 
revealed images of horror in a disturbingly explicit way. In fact, however, a good deal 
is left to the viewer's imagination, as the cuts between shots imply the most extreme 
moments of horror rather than revealing them, as Carol Clover shows in a detailed 
discussion of the film (1993). 
However, the question of taste is a larger one which I will return to in the next 
chapter. My concern here is to identify the textual mechanics of such forms of 
revelation and concealment, and how they embody ideological structures and 
meanings in two particular ways. 
Firstly, such images operate dialectically on the classic principle of Eisenstein's 
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montage: the closed eye only works because of the after-image received by the open 
eye, or the predicted image it imagines is coming next. In the text, the forest only 
works because of the werewolf it contains; while the werewolf robbed of its 
contextual darkness (forest or city), would fail as a sublime image. We picture our 
anxieties, like Kant, by imagining an empty desert, then by filling it with ghouls and 
goblins. The ideological structures which force us to repress such anxieties also 
allow us, though obliquely, to picture them, allowing us also the options of confirming 
our fears and slamming the door on them; or of eroding the fear and pushing the 
door a little further open each time. As Metz remarked (1982) of Freudian repression, 
the censorship barrier is fluid and leaky, rather than fixed and solid. 
Secondly, however, the structures of taste which Bourdieu observes in Kant, and 
which he argues still dominate modern social structures of aesthetic preference, 
unsettle this dialectic. Kant refuses to accept one pole of the semiotic continuum, as 
we've seen, and privileges the pole characterised by images of emptiness. Over a 
hundred years later, Mikhail Bakhtin (1965/1984) sets up camp at the other end of 
this continuum of aesthetic and semiotic preference, asserting the benefits of the 
carnivalesque, of a "grotesque realism" which permits a visceral reversal of dominant 
aesthetic value and the refined, cerebral imagery in which it is represented. We need 
to ask, then, what are the effects of these two types of unsettling, and whether either 
kind can effectively banish its polar opposite. 
There are two kinds of impossibility here. Firstly, it is actually impossible really to 
represent limitlessness, or to construct images which are truly empty - only to 
suggest these qualities. So a category which seems to be beyond the semiotic is in 
fact brought within the semiotic; or, in psychoanalytic terms, the repressed is given 
conscious expression. 
The second kind of impossibility is that one pole of this continuum of empty/full, 
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unseen/seen, concealment/revelation, can actually do without the other, as Kant 
seems to try to do. This is, in fact, what the modern version of the 'pure' gaze 
critiqued by Bourdieu attempts, however, in an aesthetic which praises Hitchcock for 
building suspense without revealing the horrific object explicitly. The same aesthetic, 
of course, will condemn popular body horror for tasteless explicitness, as Philip 
Brophy (1986) condemns Cronenberg, Hooper and Landis for the excess of modern 
body horror: 
... the contemporary horror film often discards the sophistication of such a 
traditionally well-crafted handling of cinematic language. (page 8) 
It is this sophistication which Brophy describes as "the Hitchcock debt", and he 
constructs an evaluative opposition between what he describes as the "telling" mode 
of the more restrained aesthetic (Bourdieu's 'pure gaze'; Connor's 'sublimated 
aesthetic) and the "showing" mode of body horror, which he claims is 
"photographic", and which he presents as aesthetically degraded. 
This argument is unconvincing, because it rests on an unsustainable attempt to split 
the two poles of the continuum, as Kant also tried to do. Brophy offers no reason for 
us not to suppose that this is simply a matter of degree, or that the twin structures of 
revelatory excess and sublimated concealment aren't in fact interdependent. 
In fact, Hitchcock's most celebrated horror sequence, the shower episode in Psycho, 
demonstrably rests on a dialectic of concealment and revelation. The semiotic of 
concealment - the silhouette, shower curtain, and use of extreme closeup - only 
operate effectively in a montage that also employs shocking revelation - the knife, 
the blood, and the final shot of the dead, open eye (illustration 3). 
So, for Lucy and Jessica, the darkness of the tent and the night is completed by the 
Janet Leigh's "dead eye", from the 
shower sequence 
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"evil spirits" they imagine; the darkness of their game and of Buffalo Bill's house is 
completed by the monster it contains: the blindness of the heroine, by the allseeing 
nightglasses of the villain. If Hitchcock's sublime depends as much on the revelatory 
as on the concealed, although its aesthetic (or that of its champions) privileges the 
latter, then popular horror, in spite of the bad press attracted by its images of excess, 
also depends on images of emptiness. At this point, however, it becomes difficult to 
assign particular films easily to categories determined by taste. Carol Clover points 
out how the horror genre has become upwardly mobile in recent years, using, in fact, 
The Silence of the Lambs as an example (1992: page 232). 
Let us return, then, to Lucy and Jessica, to anchor and review some of the features 
of the sublime. to see how well it works as a descriptive model in their case. 
The film constructs images of sublimely terrifying spaces. Buffalo Bill's house 
inspires terror through Hitchcockian suspense, the narrative syntagm constructed of 
alternating point-of-view shots emphasising the enhanced sight of the killer and the 
blindness of the victim. This is the equivalent to Kant's empty desert; and, in terms of 
the semiotic mechanism, we might remember Burke's requirement that "to make 
anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary". This space has a 
curious ambiguity which, on the whole, is missing from the natural sublime spaces of 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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the Romantic imagination: it is rendered sublimely limitless by the darkness. It is a 
limited, formal, internal, familiar, domestic space made limitless, formless, external 
(in the sense of alien, exotic), unfamiliar by the darkness, the sublime chiaroscuro 
Deleuze observes of German Expressionist cinema; and by the formal operations of 
the point-of-view shots that signify alternating sight/blindness. 
But this is only half the story. The text is controlled also by the reader. Lucy makes 
her own sublime fear and pleasure, also by formal semiotic operations: she isn't 
simply positioned by the point-of-view shots, but displays shifting points of 
identification. Furthermore, she has her own version of the night-glasses, and can 
conceal or reveal the sublime image simply by opening or shutting her eyes; or by 
choosing to recall the film, replaying it mentally; or by building it into her games in the 
dark. Even more extensively, the semiotic structures of concealment and revelation 
are replicated in the environment, and lived through as if the movie is articulated with 
the narrative of the flapping curtain, the boys knocking on the window, the garden, 
the tentflap. 
This engagement with Silence of the Lambs seems largely to operate around textual 
representations of emptiness: darkness, blindness, suggestion. However, it would be 
untrue to leave it as a simple equivalent to Kant's desert. The "ghosts, spirits and 
ghouls" with which we populate the desert are there too. The text provokes us into 
imagining the killer who we're prevented from seeing; and the bath full of human skin 
of which we're given only a glimpse. And the other monster of the film, Hannibal 
Lecter, provokes in the mind of viewers images of the mask of human skin he uses 
to escape from prison (though, again, we're given only a glimpse of this); and of his 
cannibalistic habits (again, these are suggested rather than shown). This begins to 
look like the Hitchcock aesthetic Brophy promotes so vigorously - we are shown the 
sublime space, and the realisation of the monster is left to our imagination. And it is 
true, I think, that this movie does operate further towards the "empty" end of the 
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continuum. However, that it is quite possible for a viewer to reconstruct the movie in 
terms of shockingly replete images, rather than subtly elliptical ones - as Lucy herself 
does in the first few remarks she makes about why the film is so frightening. 
To summarise. My argument in this chapter has been that the fear and pleasure of 
horror texts, examined both from the point of view of the history of discourses of the 
sublime, and from the point of view of specific contemporary examples of audience 
behaviour, reveals a number of features: 
• the fear is a fear of the unknown, figured by signs of emptiness or of fantastic 
plenitude: Kant's empty desert, and the ghouls and goblins with which we fill it. 
• but the unknown will always represent a known anxiety; or at least an 
unconsciously-known anxiety (more of this in the next chapter); and this will be 
specific to each historical moment, each viewer, each text 
• the pleasure is partly occasioned by learning to cope with the fear, as Buckingham 
suggests; and as Freud also suggests in his image of the fort/da game in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (again, more of this in the next chapter) 
• coping with the fear - and finding the pleasure - is organised around viewing 
strategies which are analogous to the mechanisms of visual production; these are 
structured, in horror, around a dialectic of concealment and revelation, offering the 
viewer the possibilities of widely differing points of identification, as well as the 
controlling vantage point of directorial power 
• this dialectic allows, in principle, a dynamic of fear and pleasure dependent on 
continued repression of the object of anxiety; but also the reverse - an opening up, a 
confrontation of the object 
• the dialectic of concealment/revelation is historically aligned with structures of elite 
and popular taste, and an aesthetic of sublimated emptiness opposed to one of 
revelatory excess. This opposition can be read in terms of Kant's preference for the 
sublimated aesthetic, and in terms of Bakhtin's preference for its opposite, for the 
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carnivalesque, and grotesque realism. 
In the next chapter, I will examine how these structures can be aligned with Freud's 
arguments in his essay 'On The Uncanny', and how Volosinov's dialectic between 
the psyche and the ideological sign might be observed in the way young people read 
contemporary horror. In examining these readings, I want to see how the young 
people who have made them deal with images of liminality, with texts which 
represent the limits of experience and subjectivity, and of the semiotic which frames 
them. What boundaries in their own worlds does this allow them to transgress, 
imagine beyond, and bring within safe limits? 
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Chapter 8: Emptiness and Plenitude: semiotics of 
the sublime 
The previous chapter has explored how the sublime, from the Enlightenment to the 
present day, has allowed spectators to find appropriate representations of their fears, 
representations which permit them both to look beyond the limits of their experience 
and their subjectivity, and at the same time to transform and extend these by 
bringing such troubling questions within view, giving them semiotic form. This 
chapter will examine how these representations of limitlessness and limit are 
constituted in the act of reading a text through the continuum of revelation and 
concealment I have referred to. How are they realised in the cultural history of which 
the text is a part, and in the history of the individual spectator, and how do these two 
histories interact? Along with these questions, I want to examine Freud's ideas 
about the uncanny, and what they might contribute to a theory of the sublime. Finally, 
I will look at other more recent constructions of the sublime, in the context of theories 
of the postmodern. As in the last chapter, I want to examine these wider perspectives 
against the readings of a number of actual spectators. 
Beyond the lintel: the sublime and the "extra-semiotic" 
The idea of the limit, or boundary, indicated by the origins of the word sublime, raises 
a number of questions. If it is the limit of the known, how is it imposed? What is the 
"unknown" that lies beyond it? What is happening when we push against this limit, 
and when we perform the contradictory attempt to represent what lies beyond? Do 
these representations invariably result in opaque signifiers whose effect is to 
emphasise the mystery of the unknown, compounding its mythic obscurity, closing 
down repressed ideas, increasing fears, phobias, anxieties? Or are they a 
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progressive attempt to come to terms with the unknown, to give it semiotic form, to 
face up to the fears? 
This theme of an ineffable dimension, which would seem to defy representation (but 
which actually, as in images of, say, the divine, invites a proliferation of 
representational ingenuity in certain cultures, and injunctions against representation 
in others), appears in various forms in the theories of language, identity and culture 
to which James Donald (1992) refers. All these theories necessarily rest on the 
paradox that the unpresentable is, in some contradictory way, capable of 
representation, though only ever obliquely - hence the imagery of boundaries, 
transgression, ambivalence, inarticulacy which pervade the theories of Freud, 
Kristeva, Cixous and Foucault to which Donald refers; and hence, also, the 
pervasiveness of such imagery in horror texts themselves. How can we understand 
such ambiguous images? 
Theo Van Leeuwen and Gunther Kress, in an article (1992) on Barthes' theory of the 
photographic image, argue the case for approaching cultural analysis through 
looking at what is represented, and how the means of representation used by the 
text and its readers produce new meanings, new limits of meaning. They suggest 
that Barthes' strategy (by the late stage of Camera Lucida) of attempting to move 
beyond the semiotic, postulating an ineffable dimension of experience, identity, 
apprehension, is in the end mystificatory, throwing up new, exclusive myths instead 
of exposing the power structures of the old ones, which should be the proper 
business of semiotic analysis. Instead, they suggest, we should realize that the 
attempt to constitute areas of experience beyond the semiotic is in fact an illusion, 
since any such description is itself a semiotic act. In recognising this, they outline 
their strategy of a social semiotics, which is to analyse new meanings brought within 
the semiotic (and thus, democratically, made available to a wider audience), rather 
than to speculate on meanings driven beyond the semiotic (which would be elitist, 
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mythological, and in any case, false). 
Though Barthes' punctum, which constitutes the ineffable dimension criticized by 
Kress and Van Leeuwen, is not conceived of by Barthes in terms of the sublime, it 
does seem to share some of its characteristics: a semiotic opacity, a demand to be 
made sense of in affective rather than cognitive terms; a resistance to limit and 
frame. 
The issue between the two positions taken by Barthes and by Kress and Van 
Leeuwen clarifies how audiences' engagements with horror are to be understood. If 
we accept Barthes' image, it becomes easy to perceive the sublime as a kind of 
revelation, not to be reduced, resistant to decoding. This would allow us to make a 
distinction between one kind of response - to do with, say, relatively transparent 
features of the film, such as the power of the female protagonist; and a qualitatively 
different response to a set of much more opaque signifiers, those of the sublime 
itself, especially what I have referred to as the 'empty sublime'. More worryingly, 
though, it raises the question of who is able to perceive the sublime, and through 
what special talents - as Barthes' punctum, and his "third meaning" of the cinematic 
image, also beg the question of who exactly is equipped to perceive these obscure 
and ineffable meanings. Kress and Van Leeuwen's argument, on the other hand 
would oblige us to continue to struggle to bring the sublime within the realm of the 
semiotic - indeed, to recognise that by attempting to describe it at all, we have, to 
some extent, done exactly that. We would also have to acknowledge that images of 
the sublime do not operate through anything like Barthes' punctum or third meaning, 
but are a part of the semiotic process like any other set of signs, and thus 
susceptible to analysis and to comprehension without the need for special insights of 
an intuitive kind. 
Rather than just dispensing with Barthes' punctum, though, it is worth attempting to 
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recuperate some of its features. The attractions of Barthes' argument in Camera 
Lucida (1993) for an understanding of the sublime are: 
• the punctum is associated with an affect, as is the sublime 
• it is presented as in some way an unconscious response (this is clear enough in 
Barthes' distinction between it and the studium - the latter he invests with his 
"sovereign consciousness"; the former breaks through this, punctures it) 
• the distinction makes a Freudian division between types of social awareness and 
aspects of subjectivity associated with them: the studium, superego-like, is obedient 
to social morality; the punctum, id-like, is subversive and amoral 
• distinct categories of pleasure are associated with the two: liking/disliking with the 
studium; pain and ecstasy with the punctum (as well as a kind of Proustian nostalgia, 
which Lyotard, as Donald notes, associates with a postmodern vulgar sublime). 
The drawbacks are precisely those identified by Kress and Van Leeuwen - that 
Barthes deliberately mystifies the punctum, placing it in an ineffable dimension 
beyond the semiotic (he claims it is, unlike the studium, without code). Kress and 
Van Leeuwen argue convincingly that this description, for one thing, proves itself 
false in giving semiotic form to the punctum; and that there is nothing beyond the 
semiotic. 
This borderline of the semiotic is particularly crucial to horror films, and to their 
central semiotic and ideological strategy, which is, as I have argued, to 
simultaneously conceal and reveal images of terror. For this strategy to work, we 
need both to see and not to see, to open our eyes wide and to screw them shut. We 
need both the sensation of shocking, detailed presence, and of a giddy emptiness 
extending limitlessly into the distance. We need to be mystified by venturing beyond 
the semiotic; and to be reassured by bringing the terrifying object back to dry land. 
In fact, as I have argued in Chapter 7, these twin poles are not separate option, but a 
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dialectic, mutually dependent. I want to look at a concrete example of how this 
operates in the writing of one 13 year old girl as she writes about a horror film in an 
English lesson. Before I do this, however, there is another moment in the history of 
the sublime to review - again, prompted by Donald's essay - and that is Freud's 
theory of the uncanny. 
The Sublime, The Uncanny And Psychoanalysis 
If we set Freud's theory of the uncanny (1919/1990) ) against Kant's sublime, the 
historical transformation of the category emerges, at least for the purposes of the 
present study, as a transforming representation of subjectivity. For Kant, the sublime 
is a subjective experience; and the subject who is in part confirmed by their ability to 
experience the sublime is, as we have seen, the rational, cogitative Cartesian 
subject. The integrity of this ideal subject, far from being threatened by the 
formlessness of the sublime, is apparently confirmed by it, in the triumphant capacity 
of reason to conceive of the sublime at all. The sublime becomes another way to 
serve the metaphysics of self-presence which Derrida (1974) describes as replacing 
God as the determination of an absolute presence from which authentic expression 
derives: 
In the history of this treatment [of the metaphor of spiritual writing], the 
most decisive separation appears at the moment when, at the same time 
as the science of nature, the determination of absolute presence is 
constituted as self-presence, as subjectivity. It is the moment of the great 
rationalisms of the seventeenth century. From then on, the condemnation 
of fallen and finite writing will take another form, within which we still live: it 
is non-self-presence that will be denounced. (page 16) 
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The attempt to produce self-presence is, Derrida says, always doomed to failure, as 
it can only proceed through the medium of signs, the 'logic of supplementarity' which 
Derrida describes as the characteristic property of writing as it is conceived in the 
Western tradition. The transcendental ideal of self-presence, then, always becomes 
the divided self, just as the quest for the transcendental signifier becomes the divided 
nature of writing: the supplement is always both an addition, an extra presence : 
The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another 
plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. (page144) 
- but it also replaces, fills a lack, an attempt to fill the absence, the lack of the 
authentic presence: 
It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-ot, if it 
fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it represents and makes an image of, it is by 
the anterior default of a presence. Compensatory [suppleant] and 
vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes-
the-place [tient-lieu]. (page 145) 
Derrida's image of supplementarity, to make an analogy between it and the sublime, 
suggests two features of the sublime as it is transformed by the apparatus of 
psychoanalytic theory. The first, as I have already noted, is in the idea of the divided 
self. Just as writing both evokes self-presence and replaces it, adds to it and 
compensates for its absence, so the contradictory attempt to represent the sublime is 
an attempt to build and ratify an integrated self, as in Kant's project, and also a 
recognition of the fragile limits of such a self. 
The second is the location of the sublime object, as imagined in the semiotic act 
which represents the sublime, whether this be a text of fiction or, as in Kant's case, a 
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philosophical treatise. For Kant, it is out there - in Nature: the desert, oceans, 
mountains. It is imagined, therefore, as an emptiness, infinitely distant, a sign of 
absence: but also as a supplement to the rational self, and therefore an enrichment -
what Derrida describes as "a plenitude enriching another plenitude", and so a sign of 
presence (page 144). For Freud, the object of the sensation of uncanniness 
becomes the psyche itself, for which the class of uncanny images stand in 
substitution: so, from this moment, the object of the sublime can be located 
internally, its vast expanses and dark spaces becoming images of the mind. As 
Volosinov points out, the psyche can only exist through the material sign; but the 
sublime is that class of signs which point back into the mind, back to the imaginary 
darkness before the sign takes shape, evoking both the fear of an absence of the 
semiotic, and therefore of the self; and a relief that constitution of the semiotic, and 
thus of the self, has been possible. 
Freud suggests that the effect of the uncanny proceeds from two kinds of 
unconscious source: from repressed infantile complexes; and from primitive animistic 
beliefs which we have culturally superseded. He presents an image of the uncanny 
(unheimlich) place, which Clover (1992) adopts in her analysis of terrifying places in 
horror movies. Freud's association of this place with a maternal space 
(womb/vagina) explains its troubling nature in terms of oedipal conflict. Julia Kristeva 
develops the image in her metaphor of the chora, the womblike space where she 
locates her pre-symbolic semiotic, and which she associates with her notion of the 
abject, which she presents as, in a sense, the other side of the sublime coin (1982). 
It is this complex of metaphors of an emptiness pregnant with the semiotic of horror 
which I borrow for my model of the sublime. 
The sublime, then, constructed by Kant as a confirmatory instance of the integrated 
subject, is revealed historically as an instance of precisely the opposite - of the lack 
of such a form of subjectivity, rather, an image of divided subjectivity. It is Freud's 
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elaborate topography of the psyche which allows the return of those aspects of the 
sublime which Kant attempted to repress: the proliferation of popular imagery he 
condemns as "visionary" and "adventurous". This insistence of the sublime in popular 
imagination on producing images of irrationality that Kant perceived as a threat to the 
integrity of the self is clearly grist to the mill of psychoanalytic theory. Indeed, Kant's 
description of the sublime in his earlier treatise clearly recognises, in its imagery of 
the four humours, warring images of the self. The Freudian/Lacanian recognition of 
the divided self as both a threat and a necessary move into adult subjectivity 
provides a compelling account of some of the effects of images and narratives of 
horror. Freud analyses, for instance, the ambiguous nature of one particular signifier 
perennial to the horror genre - the double. Freud argues its initial benign effect as a 
narcissistic confirmer of the ego, and then its uncanny, threatening nature as an 
inexplicable throwback to that childhood time, now superseded. He makes the 
analogy between this growth from childhood to adulthood and the development of a 
society from one in which the primitive religious belief uses the soul as a double 
ensuring survival after death to one in which maturation beyond such belief 
transforms the figure of the soul into a troubling representative of that death: 
When all is said and done, the quality of uncanniness can only come from 
the fact of the 'double' being a creation dating back to a very early mental 
stage, long since surmounted - a stage, incidentally, at which it wore a 
more friendly aspect. The 'double' has become a thing of terror, just as, 
after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons." (1990: 
page 357) 
The ambiguous nature of the sublime is a theme also observed by Donald, in the 
texts he uses to trace his genealogy of ideas of the uncanny, the fantastic and the 
sublime. He even generates ambiguities in texts not explicitly productive of them-
so, in reponse to Jameson's suggestion that monstrous fictional figures represent 
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the 'Other', "evil because he is Other, alien, different, strange, unclean, and 
unfamiliar", Donald points out that it can be read quite the other way round - that the 
Other is both a necessary indicator of the limits of identity, and another facet of that 
identity, and thus "terrifyingly similar (as Freud suggests of the double). 
This offers us also a way of not only recognising the ambiguity of such texts, but also 
of stabilising such ambiguity, to some degree. Monstrous images or narratives of the 
Other unsettle, because they semioticize the hitherto unknown; but they also 
reassure - for the same reason; that is, they reduce the terror of the unspoken, the 
unseen, offering a degree of narrative closure. 
I will move, now, to a consideration of one example of how young people might 
interpret images of the sublime. 
The Empty Sublime: a Case Study 
Clare has watched The Company of Wolves, and is working with Johanna (whose 
work has been considered in Chapter 4), and Laura, on a commentary on the images 
they have chosen from the film. 
In this interview, Clare, having been fairly dismissive of the thrills of the gory bits, 
notices how the location of the "horror" in The Company of Wolves shifts from 
external to internal images: 
C 	 I just put [in her assignment], about, you normally think of inside as 




Yeah, but inside you're trapped, inside, like, people come in and they 
lock the doors and you're all trapped inside (and get all scared - 
C 
	
(I know, but in most films 
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and things if people are being chased (outside they run sort of inside 
J 	 (Yeah, like in the woods - 
C 	 Yeah, I mean that - 
J 	 - or dark - 
C 	 - like in that - 
J 
	
- get to somewhere - inside - 
C 	 - but then most of horror - basically all horror films - I mean some of 
it's based around true stuff, but - is - comes from - the imagination 
and that's inside - so - 
J 	 - psychos, psychos! [laughs] 
AB Why is the outside frightening? More than the inside? 
C 	 Cos you - it goes - 
J 	 Cos it's a bit - it could be anywhere 
AB It goes on and on - it's got no end - 
C 	 Yeah, whereas the inside - 
AB The inside? 




AB And how does that work in this film - in The Company of Wolves? 
This inside/outside business? 
C 	 Well she's - I mean all the time it's coming from her inside, and yet 
everything that's horrible, except at the end, is outside. 
AB And what happens at the end? 
C 	 Well it all changes, that she escapes outside - inside is - 
J 	 (she changes - 




(she turns into, sort of a - 
goes on the other side. Dunno, cos - 




	 Cos she's all safe - safe with her mum and like - her plans, and then 
she goes out and she's a completely different person - then she turns 
into a - someone weird. 
These girls' reading of Rosaleen's bedroom, inverted in the final sequence of the 
film to become, as they realise, the place of terror, recognises the paradox around 
which the sublime is structured. Clare has developed a structural understanding of 
how horror can be both interior and exterior; and how this might represent its origin in 
the mind. Her understanding - and that of Johanna - is perhaps related also to the 
representation of psychological horror in film ("psychos, psychos!"). 
Clare's final piece of writing, about an image showing Rosateen's bedroom, in which 
she dreams the story of the film (Illustration 1) seems to demonstrate that this 
complex syntagm of the sublime, in which the monster meets the empty space, and 
the exterior space collapses into its interior opposite, can be read with fascination by 
a teenager, and related to the structures of teenage female social and sexual 
identities in which she is implicated. 
Just before this shot, the camera pans slowly around the room at last 
resting on Rosaleen lying asteep.This shows the whole atmosphere of the 
room which seems dark and mysterious. The open window, I think tries to 
give an element of scariness even though it is only the beginning. By the 
time you get to this shot, you have already seen the main elements of the 
film, and looking out of the window you see the wood where the majority of 
the film is set. This shows a comparison to the safeness of the 
inside.Throughout the film, you see these comparisons, and it always 
seems that inside is more like reality than outside, which is where the main 
parts of horror happen. This reverses in the last scene,(set in the 
grandmothers house- Rosaleen and the wolf) In this scene, the inside is 
ANDREW BURN: PhD, London Institute of Education 1995-8 	 240 
unsafe and the outside an escape. Although we always think that horror is 
outside and that you are safe inside, actually the majority of horror comes 
right from inside us. I think that probably Angela Carter and Neil Jordon 
(sic) (directors/ writers) were thinking about this when they wrote and filmed 
this scene. 
The most obvious element of the film, seems its amount of comparisons, 
for example. there is the changes between light and dark and between 
inside and out. Everyone seems to come across as the opposite to what 
they are in reality. Rosaleen in the dream seems confident and in control, 
where as in reality she seems confused and upset. The family in reality 
seem rich, they have a large house etc but in Rosaleen's dream they are 
living in a small village house and seem much more "common".This is 
obviously an important concept in the film and perhaps shows what 
Rosaleen would like to be. I think there is a lot in this scene but it is a 
problem that a lot of its detail you do not realise until you watch it for the 
second time as most people only watch a film once. 
Illustration 8.1: 
Clare's chosen image from 
The Company of Wolves: 
Rosaleen's bedroom 
This response registers an identification with signifiers of adolescent anxiety and 
divided identity ("confused and upset" /"confident and in control"), as well as reading 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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the point-of-view, another form of identification, invited by the camera, planting 
herself as viewer in the "you" pronoun in the position of Rosaleen confronting the 
empty sublime outside the window. She also recognises, though she cannot resolve, 
the anomic implications of the fragmented social identities Rosaleen represents: both 
rich and poor, unhappy with both conditions. 
Clare's writing also reveals the semiotic opacity of the sublime - its definitive 
resistance to semiotic clothing; the difficulties and opportunities it offers as a 
signified. 
Related to it is the affect of the sublime, less obvious here than in responses to the 
spectacular images of transformation, but still, perhaps, distinguishable in Clare's 
efforts to describe the elusive and paradoxical effects of the horror she observes. 
This kind of observation, reading the emptinesses of the text with the excitement of 
new understandings, looks a little like Barthes' distinction between studium and 
punctum (1993:25 ff) - the more dutiful observations about Rosaleen's economic 
conditions perhaps corresponding to the former; the insights into the fleeting horror 
to the latter. In this context, it's important to remember Kress and Van Leeuwen's 
critique of Barthes' punctum (1989), discussed above. Is there any sense in which 
Clare's writing exemplifies the points at issue there? 
My suggestion is that she demonstrates something like a synthesis of the two 
positions. Her response contains the shift of perspective Barthes describes in 
apprehending the punctum, and some signs of the affective engagement it demands. 
On the other hand, she is trying hard to overcome its resistance to decoding, making 
the very attempt Kress and Van Leeuwen require - to bring the ineffable within the 
realm of the semiotic. The following aspects of her reading indicate what I take to be 
this balance between affective, intuitive engagement and explicit decoding. 
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• There is evidence of identification, at least indicated by her choice of these scenes 
of the girl's bedroom, and her interest in the fragmented nature of Rosaleen's 
identity: her unhappiness, her lack of control in the waking world, her fearlessness in 
the dream-world. 
• There is a sustained degree of conscious interpretation at a high level, a 
conceptualisation of the way the affect of horror is related to the composition of the 
syntagm, both synchronic and diachronic; of the way the camera constructs 
spectator point-of-view; of the levels of narrative indicating different modalities, and 
how these in turn construct the central character. In short, she is using a conscious 
and sophisticated grammar of film, which is capable of generating its own 
interpretative structures. She invents her own structural reading of the sublime, its 
main components being an opposition of exteriority and interiority. This degree of 
abstraction derives in part from the curricular project on horror of which this work is 
part. The concept of horror she is elaborating here sems to qualify both as what 
Vygotsky (1962) terms a "spontaneous concept" and as a "scientific" one. 
"Spontaneous", however, is misleading. "Horror" is a concept derived in the first 
place from social experience beyond the classroom. It has then become the 
equivalent of a "scientific" concept in the classroom, as it has been subjected to 
explicit enquiry, divided into a number of properties, examined through a series of 
hypotheses, observed in historical sequences, and so on. Clare has taken on this 
movement from social pleasure to a kind of scientific enquiry, and developed it 
further. Buckingham makes the point, however (1993c), that Vygotsky's notion of 
"scientific concepts" is flawed in two senses: that it posits an ideal of abstract thought 
which seems to be beyond any social context; and that it does not recognise 
sufficiently the social processes involved in such mental operations. In this case, the 
extract of interview above demonstrates the importance of Clare's talk and 
relationship with Johanna in formulating these complex ideas. Also, her writing 
shows that the abstract idea of the interior/exterior opposition she has developed is 
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still intricately related with affective engagement, pleasurable identification, and 
understandings which owe as much to subcultural involvement with film and TV as to 
the quasi-academic discourses of the classroom. 
• She recognises images of exteriority (woods) as signifying the 'beyond' of 
Rosaleen's subjectivity, and perhaps her own: a beyond of adult sexuality, but also a 
beyond offering an imagined escape from the interior of the home, both reassuring 
and threatening, a part of a set of anomic and disintegrating relationships within a 
modern wealthy family. She also observes images of interiority which invert, the 
domestic scene which becomes image of the psyche, of adolescent sexuality, of the 
ruptured hymen - the bedroom become the place of horror, as in Dracula, as in the 
babysitter narratives so popular with teenage girls. The limitlessness of the woods 
invades the limited space of the bedroom. She also picks up images of liminality, 
such as the window itself: "The open window, I think tries to give an element of 
scariness even though it is only the beginning". 
• She shows a preference for the empty sublime, a choice of this synchronic syntagm 
over that of the werewolf transformation scenes. Is this a preference of those aspects 
of the film that gesture towards the pure gaze, the art-house movie? Or is it a 
gendered choice, the image of the contemporary teenage girl's bedroom remaining 
more powerfully in her mind than the images of spectacular horror? I suspect that 
both are true: like many of the girls in these courses, she fixes on the "modern 
Rosaleen" as a point of identification and interest; but she's also choosing this part of 
the film because of an ambition to analyse a more difficult part, and avoid the 
(apparently) easier pleasures of the sequences of popular horror. However, in spite 
of its semiotic invitation to view it as sublimated, this end of the sublime is replete in 
every detail with the lurking signifiers of excess: the moon, the wolf, the scream: and 
the lingering semiotic of slo-mo and closeup. 
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The empty sublime and hypotactic narratives 
A further point to make about the "empty sublime" is that its pleasures and fears 
might be bound up with particular narrative structures and reading strategies. 
Broadly speaking, perhaps these can be described as the hypotactic structures and 
responses described by Hodge and Tripp (1986). The logic behind my suggestion is 
twofold. Firstly, that, while a "replete" image can be terrifying on its own, as a 
synchronic syntagm, even devoid of the all-important soundtrack, it is hard to see 
how a similar single frame showing the "empty" sublime can be terrifying on its own. 
It could only inspire fear (and pleasure) as part of a diachronic syntagm, deriving its 
power from the preceding sequence, from the soundtrack, from the process of 
gradually unveiling of visual and auditory clues about the hidden monster, or from the 
viewer's reading of its generic significance. Secondly, the mechanism of 
concealment, as in Brophy's argument about Hitchcock (discussed in chapter 7), 
seems to be associated with an aesthetic of sublimation, and structures of taste 
which repudiate the spectacular, the grotesque, and, by implication, the popular. Is it 
possible, then, to extend this argument to propose that such an aesthetic also 
prefers narrative complexity over simplicity, and opacity over transparency? 
In fact, there is no good case to be made here for simple value judgements, either to 
prefer supposed aesthetic values of "subtletly" or "complexity" as Brophy seems to 
do; or to invert such preferences in a championship of the popular, as Fiske (1990) 
does. For one thing, this apparent continuum of complexity/simplicity is far from 
clear, and it may be that texts appear complex or difficult (and the reverse) as much 
for reasons of culture as for any intrinsic complexity. For another, my argument 
throughout this study is that we need texts of all kinds; and they need, depend on, 
derive from each other, in the dialogic play that is the development of culture and the 
subjectivities that produce it and are produced by it. 
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However, the fact remains that readers experience texts as difficult or easy, complex 
or simple, and we need, in every case, to examine why this might be so. In The 
Company of Wolves, some clear patterns emerge. For instance, when asked to write 
a letter to an imaginary friend, describing the film immediately after watching it, there 
was evidence that both boys and girls could make good sense of the very hypotactic 
structure of the narrative. So we have: 
The story is a dream and the girl in a dream is the main part (boy) 
its about a girl who falls asleep and dreams her sister dies and she gets 
told a lot of stories about wolves the whole film is a dream (boy) 
The story has more than one story inside, but the main story is about a girl 
who meets a wolf when she travels to her granny's and when she gets 
there she is turned into a wolf, but during the story she tells people or her 
granny tells people stories about wolves. The whole thing is actually a 
dream by another girl. The story is quite complicated and the ending, is 
espeically difficult to understand. (girl) 
However, every single response in this activity by a girl follows broadly the same 
pattern: it identifies the dream structure with its subordinate narratives, and explains 
them, more or less at length. The boys' responses are much less consistent. One 
soon abandons an explanation of the structure, and sidesteps first to disparaging 
comments about the film in general ("its one of the worst, corniest, weirdest, crapest 
[sic] films ever") and then to a bit he liked ("the only realistic OK part was when the 
wolf came to his ex-wife (as human) and then transformed"). Another jumps straight 
to a brief account of the end; and then, again, to a 'best bit': "The best bit is when 
the man tears the skin off his face". 
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The response which signals most distance from and puzzlement about the film is this 
one, by Adam: 
This film is very odd to me. I find that I cant catch the grip of the film. I like 
the gore in it like when the old womens head gets choped (sic] off. The end 
was very complicated at the part when she was in bed. 
Adam's remarks capture neatly the contrast between the replete sublime, structured 
around spectacular images of popular horror ("I like the gore in it like when the old 
womens head gets choped off") and the empty sublime, characterised by narrative 
complexity ("The end was very complicated at the part when she was in bed"). It 
seems as though he is a reader who simply cannot cope with the complexity of the 
narrative, and is driven to paratactic reading strategies; but the situation, as his 
interview shows, is not quite what it seems. At first, Adam actually makes explicit his 
trouble with the extreme hypotaxis of the film: "This film is very odd to me. I find that I 
cant catch the grip of the film." When selecting his images for the final task of the 
project, he unhesitatingly chose (like many of the boys) the most spectacular scenes 
of transformation, which suggests that this repeated synchronic syntagm, which also 
functions as a secure generic paradigm locating this film as comfortably as it can be 
located within the horror tradition, allows Adam a set of meanings which are clearly 
appropriate to the film's inclinations to the popular horror genre; but which guarantee 
no access to its other social meanings, such as its feminist intentions, embodied in 
the central character. 
I interviewed Adam right at the end of the course, and reminded him of earlier 
remarks he had made about preferring the "little stories" to the "big one": 
AB Why's that? 
A 	 Cos the big one's too complicated - it's all up and down all the time. 
AB And d'you think that gets in the way of enjoying it? 
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A Yeah. 
AB In what way? 
A 	 You can't settle down to it. 
AB And d'you think that makes it not like a proper horror film? 
A No. 
AB So - what would you expect a proper werewolf film to be like? 
A 	 Just - starts off - and the - what happens is, it builds up to someone 
turning into a wolf, and then at the end they get killed. 
AB At the end? 
A 	 - or the good person gets killed - then it puts you on your edge at the 
end - it changes - then it doesn't tell you the rest. 
Adam seems pretty clear about both the problems caused for him by the complexity 
of this film, and the ways in which this makes it untypical of the traditional genre, 
which he describes quite accurately, including the partly open endings of modern 
horror: "then it doesn't tell you the rest". 
More surprisingly, though, there comes evidence later in the interview that Adam 
does have ways of reading the less accessible structures of the film: 
AB What do you think of the girl in this film? 
A 	 She's alright. She's - like Red Riding Hood - yeah. And she - no-one 
takes notice of her - like her big sister, her mum and dad. 
AB So what does she do about that? 
A 	 Just stays in her bedroom - locks herself in. 
And later: 
AB Do you remember what happens at the end of this film? 
A 	 She turns into a wolf. 
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AB And then what happens after that? 
A 	 Erm - she runs off. 
AB And then you see her back in her bedroom - remember? 
A Yeah. 
AB And what happens after that - d'you remember? 
A 	 They jump through her mirror - the picture on her wall. 
AB So what's happening there? 
A 	 Her dream's coming real - true. 
AB Is that like - ? [Nightmare on Elm Street, discussed earlier in the 
interview] 
A 	 - yeah. 
AB How is it the same? 
A 	 Cos they both dream, and it becomes real. 
So Adam is capable of making sense of the structures of subordination in the film - at 
least the dream syntagm - and of aspects of the social identity represented in the 
heroine - and to relate them to generic paradigms of horror and fairytale. The moot 
points are: what implications does this have for pedagogy (partly answered by my 
teacherly probings in the interview!), since Adam's insecure grasp of the structures 
clearly needs support and development; and to what extent is the preference for 
paratactic structures more to do with taste and pleasure than to do with 
comprehension? 
There is clear evidence that, for several of the boys, as for Adam, this impatience 
with the complexity of the film is to do with tastes and preferences, constructed in 
relation to popular horror films. In another interview, Harry and Dylan are adamant 
that, with the possible exception of the transformation sequences, this film is 
unsatisfactory ("crap"!) in relation to horror films they know and like: 
H 	 Think it's a crap film. 
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AB What would it need to be better? 
H Not completely weird - think it's a bit weird - weird storyline -
AB Does that make it not like a horror film, d'you think? 
H N - no - 
AB Do you expect horror films to be - 
H - yeah - a lot of horror films are weird - but this is weird in, like, a non-
scary way, sort of thing. 
D Yeah. 
AB Weird in what way? 
D Like teddy bears that kill people. 
AB Yeah - 
H - and her going up and getting eggs, and finding stone babies. 
AB So all that bit, you think, to make it a proper horror film you'd do 
without? 
H Yeah. the only good bit - is the transformation. 
Harry in particular is expressing the 'tough' attitude that has been noticed in male 
responses to horror, both by researchers (such as Wood, 1993) and by the young 
people themselves: Clare and Johanna have a clear picture of how boys watch 
horror together: 
J 	 Trying to show themselves macho - 's a real macho thing. 
Harry betrays this attitude by ambiguous feelings about the transformation scenes. 
At one point in the interview, the reluctant admission that they were frightening 
comes after a long pause, and is accompanied by a self-conscious laugh: 
H No - it was funny, sort of where - completely stupid - where - [pause] 
- bit scary [laughs as he says the words]. 
AB A bit scary as well? 
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h, sort of [very quietly]. 
The image Harry chose to digitise and work on (Illustration 2) was from one of the 
transformation scenes. the only scenes he felt truly belonged to the horror genre: 
My image is taken from about a quarter of the way through the film. This is 
the scene where the lady's ex-husband comes back from being a wolf. and 
she has remarried.The husband then gets angry and transforms into a 
wolf. The 2nd husband comes back and finds the wolf just about to attack 
his wife and kids so he gets an axe and chops of the wolfs head. This 
scene is a good part of the film because it's quite scary. and is about the 
only part to do with the horror genre in the film. 
        
Illustration 8.2: 
Harry's chosen image 
from The Company of 
Wolves: the first 
transformation scene 
   
   
        
Like Adam. then - though in stronger terms - Harry registers a rejection of what I 
have called the empty sublime in favour of the powerful pull of the transformation 
sequences. This choice invites a number of explanations. Firstly, as I have 
suggested, he may be rejecting the complexity of the narrative, not, perhaps, 
because it is too difficult for him: but perhaps because any pleasure in it (and fear) is 
diluted by the art-house aesthetic which it signals. 
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Secondly, his reading may be subversive, rejecting (as the tone of his interview 
shows) a text chosen by the school's official culture, as well as the forms of 
response invited by that culture. The preference for the sequences furthest from that 
culture, and closest to the aesthetic of popular horror, represents the other side of 
this rejection. 
Thirdly, his preference may be a gendered reading, registering a lack of interest in 
the imagery of teenage girlhood that pervades the empty sublime, the outer narrative 
structure (the girl's dream), and the Red Riding Hood syntagm. 
I will now consider, then, the other end of the structure of emptiness/plenitude. Can it 
be associated with paratactic reading strategies, as it seems to be in Adam and 
Harry's case? Or with gendered choices? Or with a popular aesthetic? 
Sublime plenitude: werewolves in closeup 
Here is another commentary, this time on the second transformation scene 
(Illustration 3), by Sarah: 
In this image the werewolf has just been hit by Rosaleens grandmother. 
He is almost going to change into a wolf, but he doesn't. The camera is 
looking straight at the werewolf, even though he is on the floor after being 
hit. He has stopped being the victim and is now becoming the monster, so 
we can not look down at him. the lighting is very dark and gloomy so the 
only things that can be seen clearly are the mans face and the wolfs 
tounge [sic].The tounge has light glistening on it to show how long and 
slimy and disgusting it is and also to draw attention to it. The audience 
should be quite scared and disgusted when they see this image, because it 
Illustration 8.3: 
Sarah's chosen image from The 
Company of Wolves: the second 
transformation scene 
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shows something that still seems to be totally human suddenly revealing 
that inside it is a monster. the man doesn't seem to mind or be frightened 
by what is happening to him. 
this image is important because it shows that in this film the werewolf is 
inside and doesn't grow on the skin. Also it shows that the whole werewolf 
changes. even his Lounge. and he turns into a real wolf. That is one of my 
favourite things about this film. there are no fake looking monsters, just 
real wolves. It doesn't use the old fashioned werewolf's head on a mans 
body. or a larger werewolf which is supposed to look scary but just looks 
unreal. The transformations in this film use real wolves and are gory and 
realistic. 
The first point to make about Sarah's work is to look at her choice of image. In this 
course, the students have been asked, in pairs, to look at two themes: werewolf 
transformations and the representation of women. Sarah has worked with lain: and 
they have decided that lain will cover the representation of women, and Sarah will 
deal with the transformation sequences. If a preference for one or the other of these 
can be seen as a gendered reading, then we need also to allow for such preferences 
to invert. 
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This image, then, represents the replete sublime: the imagined monster with which 
we fill the dark spaces, in the binary structure which Burke and Kant both describe. 
And, if we accept Deleuze's use (1992) of Kant's dynamic sublime, this is an image 
which signifies sublime limitlessness by its use of an intense chiaroscuro in which the 
intensity of both dark and light suggest the infinite: 
These are the moments of the sublime, the rediscovery of the infinite in the 
spirit of evil: in Murnau, in particular, Nosferatu does not merely pass 
through all the aspects of chiaroscuro, of back-lighting and of the non-
organic life of shadows, ... but he reaches a climax when a powerful light (a 
pure red) isolates him from his shadowy background, giving him an aura of 
omnipotence which goes beyond his two-dimensional form. (page 53) 
The effect of sublime terror and pleasure is caused, Deleuze suggests, by both the 
intense concentration of the image, and by the breakdown of organic form it sets in 
motion. 
There are difficulties with Deleuze's analysis. It recalls, in its description, the 
ineffability of Barthes' punctum and third meaning, and has the effect of mystifying 
this experience in its reference to the spiritual effects of the dynamic sublime on the 
cinema audience. This seems unnecessary: it is quite possible to give a materialist 
account of this semiotic process, bearing in mind Kress and Van Leeuwen's critique 
of Barthes. This would allow us to describe the process as one in which the text 
represents a threatening intensity of evil through dramatically heightened contrast 
and colour, coupled with representations of dissolving form, equally threatening to 
the viewer's sense of the stability of the natural order (a sense which, as Carroll 
points out, did not exist in such a way before the Enlightenment). 
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If we apply this to Sarah's image, these properties are quite apparent: the darkness 
of the background; the Caravaggesque lighting; the signifiers of dissolving natural 
form (the tongue, hair, eyes of the transforming werewolf). In fact, Sarah's analysis 
needs little adding to it. She remarks on the darkness of the background; and on the 
intensity of light: "the tongue has light glistening on it to show how long and slimy and 
disgusting it is, and also to draw attention to it." (Deleuze also remarks on 
"glistening" effects in Metropolis and The Bride of Frankenstein: page 52). 
Sarah also refers in some detail to the affect of the spectacular sublime image. She 
describes the text-reader relation constructed by the camera angle: 
The camera is looking straight at the werewolf, even though he is on the 
floor after being hit. He has stopped being the victim and is now becoming 
the monster, so we can not look down at him. 
And she makes it clear that the audience is expected to feel "quite scared and 
disgusted when they see this image". This registers the usual sublime affect of fear; 
but adds disgust, which keeps her view closer to Kristeva's abject, or to Carroll's 
insistence that disgust is the criterial "art-emotion" of our response to "art-horror". 
Sarah goes further, explaining what, in her view, causes this fear and disgust: 
"because it shows something that still seems to be totally human suddenly revealing 
that inside it is a monster". Again, her view is close to Carroll, who argues that our 
fear and repulsion is causes by images that offend against the natural order, creating 
unnatural monsters by processes of "fission" (dismemberment, animated parts of 
bodies, split creatures) or "fusion" (combinations of animals, or human and animal, 
such as the werewolf). Sarah, though, goes further than Carroll in her suggestion 
that the particularly frightening thing about this image is that the monster seems to 
come from inside the man. Our anxiety about the dissolving limits of the human 
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frame and identity is intensified by the idea that the transform is inside, and is 
extruded in a frightening imitation of birth trauma. 
There are other interesting features of Sarah's commentary. Though she doesn't 
directly address the question of pleasure, she gives some clues. The giveaway word 
is, I think, "favourite"; and she uses the word in a context that suggests that the high 
affinity she has for the modality of the sequence is one of the sources of pleasure: 
this image is important because it shows that in this film the werewolf is 
inside and doesn't grow on the skin. Also it shows that the whole werewolf 
changes, even his tounge, and he turns into a real wolf. That is one of my 
favourite things about this film. there are no fake looking monsters, just 
real wolves. It doesn't use the old fashioned werewolf s head on a mans 
body, or a larger werewolf which is supposed to look scary but just looks 
unreal. The transformations in this film use real wolves and are gory and 
realistic. 
The first point about this is that it upsets conventional notions of realism, presenting 
a view of realism that must accommodate exotic fantasy, itself representing, 
perhaps, the "causal complexes of society" which Brecht (1977) required in his 
definition of realism. Mark Jancovich (1992) recruits Brecht in his defence of the 
social and psychological realism of horror: 
In this way, there is no necessary opposition between fantasy and realism 
proper. The preoccupation with repression and forms of physical and 
psychological transformation which distinguish both the Gothic novel and 
horror in general, can make these forms closer to Brecht and Lukacs' 
definition of realism than many more conventionally 'realistic' (or 
'naturalistic') forms of writing. (page 21) 
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But there seems to be more needed for the kind of satisfaction Sarah is describing. It 
is not just that the fantastic image can represent certain social or psychological 
"truths" - it is that the fantastic image demands a semiotic of realistic detail to assert 
its modality: the tongue, the light glistening on it, the "real wolves". Kress and Van 
Leeuwen (1996) describe how modality in the visual semiotic is rendered in particular 
coding orientations, realised in modality markers such as colour, representation of 
detail, depth, illumination, brightness. In their scheme, this image would belong in the 
naturalistic coding orientation, asserting the high modality of the fantastic object by 
insisting on the kind of naturalistic detail that Sarah observes. 
There seems to be a paradox here. Is this an image in which Sarah simply goes 
along with the kind of representation of reality most common in our culture, behaving 
as if the werewolf is real, and therefore not exploring its metaphorical significance in 
the sense Brecht requires? (Moretti argues of the monsters of horror that they are 
metaphors, but that the audience has forgotten this, and takes them literally). Or is 
the reverse possible? That a modality based on naturalistic detail is essential to 
generate the affective charge of the monstrous image, without which its complex of 
social and psychic significance cannot operate? 
Perhaps it is even more complicated than that. Though it is certainly arguable that 
images of the replete sublime require modality markers of naturalistic detail (hence 
the intensive discourse about "special effects" typical of young people's modality 
judgements of such images), it is also arguable that other semiotic elements pull in 
different directions. The short depth of field of this image, for instance, ensures that 
while the face and tongue are rendered in graphic detail, the background (Kress and 
van Leeuwen's marker of contextualization) is left dark and indistinct, suggesting, 
perhaps, the more abstract context of fantasy; and also, perhaps, the empty sublime 
space from which the monster emerges. 
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Another paradox is that of the framing. The emphasis on closeup detail - hence 
spectacular revelation - has the contradictory effect of constricting the frame, limiting 
the representation of the entire creature - hence concealment. The cinematic history 
of werewolf transformations is notable for this contradictory effect: the shocking 
closeup on eyes, hands, teeth, splitting flesh constitutes an extreme revelation, a 
terrifying excess; at the same time, we never see the whole transforming creature, 
only the parts which stand in metonymic substution for the whole, so that the closeup 
montage has the effect of a suspense sequence. Even in images of such glaring 
revelation, we are left to imagine the whole, never given the satisfaction - or 
diasppointment - of an establishing shot. 
A final point to make about this image of transformation is to do with the cinematic 
history of the genre. Sarah suggests this point when she refers to "fake-looking 
monsters" and "the old-fashioned werewolf's head on a man's body". The modality 
of the image for her depends on the technical effects of modern body-horror, which 
allow for new meanings to be made from the transformation sequence - in particular, 
the effect that the wolf seems to come from inside, as Sarah notes, rather than being 
grafted on to the outside (as in other sequences she has seen from older films). 
Sarah's reading of this image of the replete sublime, then, shows us that 
straightforward assumptions about the "simplicity" of such images are not tenable. 
There is nothing intrinsically "simple" about such an image; and certainly not about 
the sequence of moving images of which it's a part (and we've said very little about 
this). It does seem that such images attract the kind of paratactic reading strategies 
displayed by Adam and Harry; but, though the pleasures of popular horror are there 
for Sarah as well, her reading strategies are no less "complex" than Clare's. So what 
can we say, finally, about the significance of the model of the sublime for which I 
have argued? 
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Transforming the grotesque: towards a postmodern sublime 
The politicized aesthetics of the popular, as presented, for instance, by John Fiske, 
employ Bakhtin's theory of carnival to justify a privileging of the popular. In a similar 
way, Bourdieu argues for a reversal of the Kantian aesthetic, relying also on a model 
of Bakhtinian carnival. There are clear attractions in this stance. The chilly formality 
of elite culture, with its concert halls, its sacralization of culture, its sublimated 
pleasures, are all repudiated, and a vision of the popular realm, characterised by 
warmth, intimacy, and the liberating dissolution of barriers between spectacle and 
spectator is instituted in its place. Such a hypothesis provides a clear vindication of 
popular horror, its images of grotesque excess consonant with Bakhtin's "grotesque 
realism", its gory transformations and diabolical imagery redolent of Bakhtin's 
carnival hell, the delighted terror it inspires evocative of carnival laughter. 
We do not need to lose the attractive features of this analysis - in a sense, they are 
all demonstrably there. The problem with the analysis is its simple insistence on a 
strictly polarised view of popular and elite culture; and the related assumption that 
Bakhtin's model, itself a transformation of an idealised mediaeval peasant aesthetic, 
can simply be transplanted unchanged in a quixotic unseating of bourgeois aesthetic 
values. The question is, then, how are these poles related, if not in a simple 
opposition, or relationship of denial? 
Clare and Sarah's work offers some clues. In both pieces of writing there are 
suggestions of a hybrid discourse, of what Bakhtin (1981) describes as the 
"contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of 
language" to be found within any utterance. Both of them display a discourse of 
academic analysis, the language of the secondary English classroom, the 
terminology of "Media Studies": image, camera, pans, concept, audience, 
transformation. And this discourse signals the distance between text and viewer 
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Bourdieu observes of the Kantian "pure gaze". But there's also the language of the 
pleasures of popular horror: scariness, disgusted, fake, favourite. Even the word safe 
for Clare, used of Rosaleen's bedroom, is articulated with her reading of popular 
horror films (she specifically mentions in interview The Hand That Rocks the Cradle). 
And these parts of their text signal a closing of the gap between text and audience, 
more characteristic of the intimacy between actor and audience Bakhtin describes in 
his account of carnival. 
Similarly, the film itself represents a hybridity of textual reference and aesthetic 
appeal. In some ways, it's an art-house film, the sets of Anton Furst based on 
Bruegel's depictions of peasant life, its imagery densely symbolic. In other ways, it 
employs the generic markers of poular body-horror, especially in the werewolf 
transformations, which recall John Landis' American Werewolf in London. 
It is arguable, further, that the popular and elite poles depend on each other in a 
dialectic: but not an easy mutual cross-fertilization. Rather, the embattled condition 
Bakhtin refers to as a feature of his dialogism. The challenge for education, for this 
Year 9 lesson in horror, is not so much to privilege one pole over the other, but to 
ensure that the collision of discourses and aesthetic preferences allows the greatest 
opportunity of progress for each individual student. The cave must hide the monster; 
the monster needs the cave. The aesthetic preferences of different social groups will 
pull towards one or the other. In this context, the collapse of opposed aesthetic 
categories into each other often presented as characteristic of the postmodern 
(Featherstone, 1990) could be productive rather than confusing for pedagogic 
purposes, subversive as it is of the National Curriculum's "heritage" model of culture. 
The postmodern sublime is imagined in various ways by different commentators. 
Jean-Francois Lyotard produces a sophisticated formulation of a postmodern, avant-
garde sublime, in which the terror and limitlessness of nature in Burke's account is 
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reformulated as the infinite power of capitalism, destructive of traditional community 
and individual values - but also, in collusion with the avant-garde, of reactionary 
established rules: 
There is something of the sublime in capitalist economy. It is not academic, 
it is not physiocratic, it admits of no nature. It is, in a sense, an economy 
regulated by an Idea - infinite wealth or power. (1994, page 287) 
Another postmodernist account - Fredric Jameson's - similarly substitutes a different 
awesome limitlessness for Burke and Kant's spatial infinities, or Freud's profound 
depths of the Unconscious. For Jameson, like Lyotard, this new sublime is 
consequent upon global capitalism, and is a force ambiguously poised between 
negative, destructive effects and positive energising ones; but it is constituted, unlike 
Lyotard's, by the very technology of representation, production and reproduction, 
itself: 
Yet something else does tend to emerge in the most energetic 
postmodernist texts, and this is the sense that beyond all thematics or 
content the work seems somehow to tap the networks of the reproductive 
process and thereby to afford us some glimpse into a postmodern or 
technological sublime, whose power or authenticity is documented by the 
success of such works in evoking a whole new postmodern space in 
emergence around us. (1991, page 37) 
James Donald proposes a formulation of the postmodern sublime (quoted in Chapter 
6) rooted in a new politics of community, in which horror films are symptomatic of the 
uncertainty and instability of culture and identity in a community characterised by 
heterogeneity and Bakhtinian heteroglossia, an ideally dynamic society which resists 
attempts to impose the political will of one group on the whole community in tandem 
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with the closure or perfection of culture (as in Lyotard's vision of the Nazis' 
monstrous perversion of the sublime). 
There are obvious attractions in this analysis. Horror becomes a metaphor for 
shifting identities expressive of an anti-totalitarian community, opposed to the the 
semiotics of closure which are expressive of totalizing forces. There is a utopian pull 
in Donald's vision, however, which I want to resist, in the interests of a more focused 
account of contemporary classrooms. His view of horror as a representation of the 
instability of social identities, however, is a theme developed by others. Mark 
Jancovich (1992), as we've seen, sees modern body-horror as representative of a 
liberating dissolution of boundaries of the self in an era of increasing state regulation 
of private identity. He returns to this theme (1996) with an exploration of the idea that 
it is the representation of transforming teenage identities in films such as / Was a 
Teenage Werewolf that makes such films so attractive to young audiences - an idea 
also subscribed to by John Fiske, who relates such images of physical 
transformation and ugliness to Bakhtin's grotesque realism. 
Noel Carroll, on the other hand, is dismissive of the thesis of horror as a figuration of 
postmodern dissolving identities. He point out that popular images of the fractured 
self are not the exclusive right of the postmodern, but are much older, citing Jekyll 
and Hyde, or the Platonic view of the conflict between reason and emotion. 
What can we take from these wideranging ideas? What evidence is there for any of 
them in the work and talk of Clare and Sarah, Adam and Harry; and in the images 
they are reading? I propose to look at three specific ideas. 
Firstly, the sublime as a representation of modern subjectivities. Carroll is right, I 
think, to be cautious about the postmodernist claim to exclusive rights over the 
divided subject. After all, Kant himself spends some time on the conflicting forms of 
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subjectivity aligned with different forms of the sublime. And it is true that the 
Enlightenment ideal of the unitary subject is often over-simplified. As I have 
mentioned in Chapter 7, E.J. Hundert (1997), argues that Enlightenment narratives 
of the self were varied and contradictory, characterised by an 18th century promotion 
of a "theatrical plasticity" of the self in the newly emergent commercial public sphere; 
an image repudiated by Rousseau's assertion of the prototype Romantic identity 
(itself, ironically, self-dramatized). Perhaps it would be better to describe the 
postmodern self as one whose narrative of both dissolution and identity is framed by 
the Freudian topography of the psyche, discursively constituted in the ways that 
Lacan and Foucault describe. This allows us, in particular, to account for the 
progression, in images of the sublime, from a concentration on images of exotic 
exteriority (deserts, Arctic wastes) in which the self is presented as an explorer, to 
images of domestic interiority in which the sublime space can represent the psyche 
itself. Those sublime images of bedrooms and baths, clowns and dolls, which Clare 
and Lucy recognise and appropriate as part of their own furniture of subjectivity, 
constitute a particular, gendered rendering of the sublime limits of teenage identity, 
perhaps. 
The appeal of the werewolf - to Harry and Adam, but also Sarah - is harder to locate 
in a history of subjectivity. It looks, at first sight, stubbornly resistant to history, locked 
into a folkloric timelessness. However, it yields when pressed. The narrative of the 
transforming subject it presents, for instance, undergoes clear changes. The 
ideology of youth which emerges in postwar America, for instance, clearly produces 
the metaphors of the threatening but appealing teenage werewolf produced by the -
also very culturally specific - B movie environment of the AIP studio, as Mark 
Jancovich (1996) argues. Further, the technology of werewolf transformation 
sequences enables new representations of the transforming self, and new audience 
pleasures and fears. As Sarah notes, the special effects of The Company of Wolves 
allows for a representation of an emergence from within of the monster, not possible 
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in the previous transformation sequences of the Hammer Studio, or of Mamoulian's 
Jekyll and Hyde. Such technical progress would seem to permit the more effective 
representation of the Freudian/Lacanian birth of the self, as opposed to the grafting 
on of external appearances, more reminiscent, perhaps, of the theatricality of the 
Enlightenment self described by Hundert. The further development of sequences of 
sublime transformation is neatly captured in Terminator 2 (Cameron, 1991) where 
the "old" mechanics of transformation, the ripped skin revealing the steel and 
circuitry of the cyborg, are set alongside the "new" mechanics of transformation in 
the liquid metal effects of morphing through which the second terminator is 
constructed. Such a juxtaposition allows for a more threatening, mercurial vision of 
dissolving identity to be contrasted with a relatively reassuring image of a more 
conventional flesh-and-metal android. It may be, further, that these processes recall 
Jameson's postmodern sublime, to be found in the dizzying possibilities of the 
processes of reproduction themselves. 
And secondly, the collapse of popular and elite cultural forms into each other; what 
Connor describes (1990) as the "pick'n'mix aesthetic". In fact, it is hard to locate this 
phenomenon comfortably in the postmodern moment, especially in regard to the 
horror genre. In fact, such confusion of boundaries is quite characteristic of the genre 
in the pre-modern moment: Victorian melodrama was patronised by all social 
classes; the gothic novel was an uncomfortable bedfellow for the dominant "realist" 
novel; a classic tale of Victorian horror, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, was regarded as 
culturally light-weight by its author. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the genre, 
certainly within the history of cinema, is particularly unstable in its refusal to be easily 
located on the elite-popular continuum. The Company of Wolves itself is an odd 
example; but helpful in the sense that elements of its composition pull in different 
directions, towards art-house and towards popular body-horror. The effects of this, 
as Harry and Adam's responses show, can be to unsettle the audience, provoking 
conflicting loyalties. Other readers, however, such as Clare and Sarah, can live 
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easily with the mixed aesthetic, moving more comfortably between different sets of 
references, different discourses of response and interpretation. 
A third question, of which we are reminded by Jameson's and Lyotard's views of a 
sublime which offers progressive potential, is about the ideological effects of such 
generic instabilities. From the social semiotic point of view, this becomes, perhaps, a 
question about the ideological effects of genre; though we might articulate this with 
the aesthetic question of the opposition between cultural pleasure and cultural value 
explored by Steve Connor (1992). Hodge and Kress (1986) give a social semiotic 
account of genre which analyses it as a logonomic system, "a set of rules 
prescribing the conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify 
who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) 
meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities 
(how, when, why)" (page 5). They stress that the imposition of such restrictions is 
only effective to the extent to which it is not contested: 
Attention to the detail of semiosic process reveals countless instances of 
contestation, where smaller-level shifts in power have significant effcts, 
leading to modification in the structures of domination, at times tracing the 
success of dominated groups, at times the success of the dominant. This 
process is well described in Gramsci's work on hegemonic structures and 
their establishment. (page 7) 
If this genre can permit a confusion of boundaries, in which the tastes dependent on 
the hitherto privileged ground of Hitchcock can mingle with the excesses of 
Cronenberg and Craven, and if this provides openings, albeit interstitial, for young 
people to negotiate real pleasures rather than dutiful ones, and appropriate images 
adequate to the range of social identities they need and which excite them, rather 
than the more limited range the official culture would impose on them, then perhaps 
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there is room for real progress. And in school, if we are to justify such texts as 
objects of study, we need to live with necessarily confused notions of taste, pleasure 
and cultural value. The sublime is a category of liminality and transgression, and 
such cultural fare is always risky for schools. Without risk, though, there is no hope of 
progress: perhaps, with Connor, we need to "inhabit the paradox". 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion -The Leaky Spectatorium: 
Boundaries of the Visual 
We spectate from the boundary. Not an elaborate cricketing metaphor; rather, an 
attempt to picture where we are located, all of us, as we recruit the moving image to 
our tireless endeavour to produce ourselves anew, each day, in a world of sign and 
subject always changing, colliding and colluding. This metaphor of boundary, though, 
if it is to represent with any adequacy what has been described in this thesis, needs 
to evoke not only locations of marginality. It has to be a place capable of location at 
both centre and margin - at one moment a border, at the next the tightrope in the 
centre of the circus arena. 
This boundary, this edge, has appeared many times in this thesis: in the liminality of 
the sublime; in the spectatorial choices between sublimated pleasures and hedonic 
ones; in spectatorial attempts to steer between polarised social identities, roles of 
obedience and subversion, of identification and refusal, of home and school, of hero 
and villain. It is Kristeva's dividing line between abjection - a diarrhoeic degradation 
of the self - and the sublime - an elevating transformation of the self. It is "the 
shadowy borderlands" of Donald's postmodern popular sublime. It is Metz's leaky 
boundaries between dream and waking, conscious and unconscious, repressed and 
permitted. It is Bakhtin's dissolving divisions of the spectacle, the edge of the stage 
over which the excess of the dramatic fiction spills, over which the excess of the 
audience's participative energy surges. It is Volosinov's boundary between the inner 
life of the organism and the outer life of the ideological sign. 
For teachers, this place of boundaries is the classroom, a network of borderlines 
which energise the pull between home and the workplace, childhood and adulthood, 
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and a concentrated version of many of the cultural tensions at play in society at 
large, amplified by the politics of curriculum and pedagogy. David Buckingham 
describes (1993) the arrival and development of media education, concerned from its 
first moments with popular culture. He sets it in the context of the Leavisite project of 
"inoculation" against the popular; but is also critical of the "radical" approaches of the 
70s which perceived young people "as passive victims of ideological manipulation"; 
and of "progressive" approaches which were simply celebratory of young people's 
responses to the media. He argues for an approach rooted in better understandings 
of young people and the media, derived from detailed audience research: an 
approach which recognises young people's expertise in the media, and which makes 
careful distinctions between different kinds of engagement with text, depending on 
differences of social cultural contexts, and between the different forms of response or 
consumption, as distinct from production. 
This thesis bears out a good deal of this. Even within a single classroom, it makes it 
clear that we cannot afford to make simple assumptions about undifferentiated 
audiences, but must, rather, pay close attention to different experiences, literacies, 
pleasures, allegiances. We must be careful about the cultural status of the texts we 
choose to include in our curricula - the lesson of The Company of Wolves is, I think, 
that the confusions of boundaries between popular and elite texts can be highly 
productive; and, as Buckingham points out, the choice is not between teaching 
Shakespeare or soaps, but rather what we do with them. 
Gunther Kress, writing from a similar tradition of cultural studies as that embraced by 
Buckingham, makes a specific point about the recognition of the visual, going so far 
as to say: 
... we are at a crucial point in the history of western literacy where the 
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supremacy of written language as the dominant form of public 
communication is challenged by the resurgence of the visual mode of 
communication. In this situation groups of children are coming with 
different predispositions into their first years of school: some oriented 
strongly to speech and writing; others oriented equally strongly to speech 
and the visual. (1993b [no page references]) 
A major part of the argument of this thesis has taken its cue from Kress's insistence 
on the importance of the visual mode, and has posed questions about what new 
model we might develop of a classroom, and associated pedagogies, that include the 
visual, even make it central to the educational enterprise. The classroom, a space 
modelled initially on the mediaeval monastic scriptorium, a model perennially 
reinvented in successive ideals of academic and educational value, becomes also, 
with the onset of modernity, an auditorium, incorporating the technologies of the 
auditory, along with those features of selfhood shaped by the auditory. Steven 
Connor (1997) argues the influence of the auditory mode on modern subjectivities, 
carried on the technologies of the telephone and gramophone (culturally gendered 
as male and female modes respectively, he argues), and continuing despite the 
explosion of the visual in cinema and television, to appear in forms like the Walkman, 
which translates the city into auditory terms, "auditizes the urban" (page 211). We 
can imagine how the classroom as auditorium grows with these technologies, 
accommodates these new subjectivities. In the post-war English classroom, the 
scriptorial resource-bank acquired an acoustic supplement to the literature 
curriculum - records of classic literature, including archive recordings of the stars of 
modernism, on the brink of new technologies of reproduction: Eliot, Joyce, Thomas, 
Pound. At the same time the moment of Leavisism proposed an endorsement of the 
folk traditions of Britain accompanied by a refusal of the emergent acoustic culture of 
50's and 60's popular music. David Holbrook's English for Maturity (1961 and 1967) 
captured this feeling, and was influential in the training of English teachers. 
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Holbrook's approach showed passionate commitment to the pupils of secondary 
modern schools, embraced the traditions of popular dissent represented by Ewan 
McColl and A.L. Lloyd; and constructed an ideal classroom in which the new 
technologies of the auditory brought such voices into the array of representational 
resources available to school students: an expansion of the scriptorial model of the 
classroom into an auditorial model. At the same time, this pedagogy is profoundly 
conservative, of course, in ways which are well-documented, and are effectively 
those of Leavisism in general: a view of audiences as passive and suggestible; and a 
wholesale subscription to the mass media critique that Scrutiny shared, though from 
a quite different political analysis, with Theodor Adorno (1941). More interestingly, for 
the purposes of my argument, Holbrook's mistrust of contemporary popular culture 
emerges as a refusal of the visual. Holbrook savagely repudiates the turn to the 
visual already observable in classrooms of the sixties: 
... the word is out of date. It is a visual age, so we must have strip cartoons, 
films, filmstrips, charts, visual aids. Language is superannuated.... 
Some teachers fall for the argument.... 
We must never give way: we are teachers of the responsiveness of 
the word. ... The new illiteracy of the cinema, television, comic strip, film-
strip and popular picture paper they accept as the dawn of a new era. 
(pages 36 and 37) 
The simplistic association of the visual with the popular ignores some obvious 
difficulties, of course - that popular culture exists also in an auditory and verbal form, 
as popular music; that the visual is a form of expression for artistic expression valued 
by elite groups, in the form of painting, sculpture, certain kinds of photography, and 
so on; that cinema has its own distinctions of aesthetic preference, its own 
hierarchies of taste; that the word is also a visual medium. These aside, however, it 
is evident that, in the time since Holbrook's view was influentially presented, a good 
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deal has changed - but that new versions of their stance are still with us. Attitudes to 
the visual have, in some ways, been reversed, thanks to the arguments and 
practices of cultural theorists and exponents of the visual within the pedagogy of 
English, and of the newly emergent media studies described by Buckingham. 
However, ambivalence towards the visual media (and towards popular culture in 
general) is still observable in English classrooms of the nineties and the debates 
about cultural value which inform them (such as the BFI's commission of enquiry, 
1993, which acknowledges the importance of visual media but fails to resolve the 
question of value). It is against this ambivalence that writers such as Kress and 
Buckingham propose their argument: a powerful plea for the visual, and for the 
popular. 
How do classrooms accommodate the kinds of predispositions Kress observes in the 
schoolchildren of today? How do they respond to the explosion of the visual in the 
new technologies of the digital media and information technology? An obvious ideal 
is for teachers to move towards an inclusive attitude to the hugely expanded array of 
semiotic resources; and there is plenty of evidence that what Kress calls the 
"admirably pragmatic" work of teachers (1994) is accomplishing exactly that. It would 
be a mistake, however, to adopt a pedagogic optimism that ignores the tensions still 
evident, the boundaries still to be carefully negotiated. The classroom orientated to 
the visual could be described, as I have argued in Chapter 6, as a spectatorium. 
Spectatorium, like auditorium and scriptorium, has the benefit of stressing the 
material engagement of those in the room, who become receivers and producers 
simultaneously of the text. At the same time, it raises the historical problem of the 
relation between text and audience. The scriptorium emphasises the production of 
text - yet its monastic original necessitated, in the act of copying, the act of reading. 
The auditorium emphasises the reception of text - but strongly implies the presence 
of textual production by the conceptual gap it leaves: in its first OED definition, it is 
only a partial space, "the part of a public building occupied by the audience". It also 
Pleasures of the Spectatorium 
	 271 
implies talk, the oral production of text: its second OED definition is "the reception-
room of a monastery". We can imagine, then, that spectatorium will imply similar 
slidings between reading and writing, speaking and listening, imaging and watching. 
How, then, might this apply to the classroom; and what are the tensions, 
contradictions, liminalities, which it might embrace? I can only make a brief sketch 
here in an attempt to answer this question - a sketch arising out of the work in this 
thesis on the nature of visual literacies, visual pleasures, the classroom as a visual 
space, and the nature of the social identities which inhabit this space, absorb and 
rework these visual signs. Such a sketch must gesture towards the need for further 
work on this area. This thesis shows, as Chapter 3 argues, that the new technologies 
of the visual allow for the making of new, powerful meanings. Even the relatively 
simple process of the digital still image gives a power of selection, transformation, 
and, as Barthes suggested, intervention in narrative time, to school students -
powers only before available to film critics or academics, who, even then, might have 
been dependent on selections of stills already made by film archivists or publicity 
executives. 
Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) argue: 
If schools are to equip students adequately for the new semiotic order ... 
then the old boundaries between 'writing' on the one hand, ... and, on the 
other hand, the 'visual' arts ... should be redrawn. This will have to involve 
modem computer technology, central as it is to the new semiotic 
landscape. But, above all, it is crucially dependent on having the means of 
analysis, the means for talking about the 'new literacy', about what it is we 
do when we read and produce images.' (page 33) 
With this in mind, the work of young people and of teachers observed in this study 
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suggests a number of strategies which will need to be central to a new pedagogy of 
the visual. These will include: 
• a theorization of the visual which recognises analogies with language and other 
semiotic codes; which recognises the dialogic relation between the reception and 
production of texts; and the development of systems of analysis able to be used by 
young people; and a common understanding of this theory across school subjects, 
especially in those areas where the analysis and production of visual texts is central 
to the curriculum 
• a selection of visual texts for work in schools which reflect the same kind of criteria 
as those that might be applied to verbal texts (literary and non-literary); and a 
recognition, especially, of the need to include both elite and popular texts, as well as 
those (an increasing number, if the postmodernist hypothesis is correct) which 
confound such distinctions 
• a use of appropriate technologies of representation, especially the newly available 
technologies of media production (video cameras, non-linear editing equipment, 
multimedia and website authoring packages) 
• a recognition and understanding of the experience of the visual brought into school 
from all areas of visual culture. 
This last point raises, again, the question of boundaries. Chapter 4 showed Johanna 
juggling social roles that cannot be confined to the viewing context of the classroom. 
They spill out into the unofficial social spaces of the school; out into the street and 
home - or rather, into the classroom from these spaces, returning to them a little 
changed. Similarly, the images and visual competences, the "predispositions" Kress 
remarks on, come from home, television, cinema into the classroom, bringing all the 
questions and dissonances, as well as the productive possibilities, of an encounter 
between the visual experience of the popular and that of the official curriculum, albeit 
an offshoot informed by what has been described in Chapter 1 as the "internal 
critique" noted by Richard Johnson. I suggest that the classroom is - not simply, but 
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in a rather particular way - another social context in which meanings are made and 
explored, cultural affiliations are exposed, tested and negotiated, and, yes, forms of 
subjectivity are questioned, opened up, confirmed or disconfirmed. All this within a 
complex system of open and hidden procedures, incorporating their own special 
repertoires of communication and social ritual, and built on interlocking tensions 
between adult and child, different social classes, institution and family, state and 
street, and so on. However benign it is or is not, it is a real part of the culture of 
schoolchildren: binary oppositions between 'street' culture and school are 
indefensible. The social contexts in which a teenager might have to discuss, defend 
or mediate her cultural affiliations are wide-ranging and heterogeneous: an argument 
with a grandparent; a party of a new friend (perhaps with different tastes); a holiday 
abroad; a part-time job; a school French exchange; the family; a boyfriend; a youth 
club; school, both curricular and extra-curricular; leisure pursuits - sport, or dance, or 
playing a musical instrument. 
Other boundaries are apparent also. The dividing line between childhood and 
adulthood is thrown into relief by a film with an adult certificate, even in an edited 
version. In terms of the general relation of fiction to questions of morality and 
censorship, this dividing line is profoundly ambiguous, impossible to pin down. How 
to teach adult texts - and which texts to choose - has been a matter of great difficulty 
for teachers at a time when the cultural politics of the nationally-regulated English 
curriculum prescribes an increasingly-dominant diet of adult literature for secondary 
students, and at the same time encourages a moral climate which denies the 
sexuality of the young, represses discourses of sexuality in teenage literature, and 
demonises children who disrupt nostalgic constructions of the innocence of the child. 
The obvious discursive domain affected by this is that of sexuality, where, while a 
discourse of apparently liberated sexuality obtains in society at large, school and 
children's literature (and film) remains in the grip of repression and silence. This 
position is complicated if we accept Stephen Heath's argument in The Sexual Fix 
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(1982) that the apparently liberating explicitness of such discourses (literature, 
popular fiction, sexology) is really a kind of coercion, essentializing the experience of 
sex in repetitive, normalizing representations which oblige us to conform to their 
narrative of sexuality. His plea, though, is for people to resist, not sexuality, but the 
deceptive 'naturalness' of these discourses; to fragment and problematize the 
smooth surface they offer; to dissent from the uniformity of their account. 
There are two points relevant to this study. The first is tangential, but apposite. The 
Company of Wolves is a story and film about sexuality. The story is actually more 
'explicit' than the film - about menstruation, nakedness, and the sexual act. The 
word, however, is less of a problem than the visual image in the regulatory 
processes of censorship - especially when the verbal discourses of sexuality are 
aided by the alibi of cultural value. So, in this classroom, the reading of the Angela 
Carter story has never been a problem - a similarly explicit rendition in film (of, for 
instance, phrases such as "His genitals - ah! huge!") presumably would be. 
The second, larger, point is this. There is an analogy between the semiotic of 
sexuality and the semiotic of the sublime, as it has been described in Chapters 7 and 
8. In particular, I have argued that the semiotics of the sublime turn upon a textual 
mechanics of concealment and revelation, and related forms of audience 
engagement. In Freudian terms - and the Foucauldian terms employed by Heath -
these mechanics permit both repression and the return of the repressed. The 
semiotic of concealment and revelation which produces the affective energy both of 
the sublime and of the erotic, then, exploiting the intensification of affect noted by 
Freud (1915), and shaped by the history of social appropriations of the imagery of 
sex and terror over the last three centuries, is bound to be a controversial domain in 
the classrooms of the late twentieth century. 
In simple terms, the questions discussed above of the value of the visual and the 
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ethics of the sublime (or the erotic) become, in the question of an imaginary governor 
or parent, "Why are you showing them videos instead of reading books; and why are 
you corrupting their minds with horror films?" 
Images of the sublime and the erotic evoke the risks and dangers of the adult world; 
parents and schools have a difficult moral balance to strike between protecting 
young people from such risks and allowing them space to consider them. A social 
value of imaginative fictions, inside the classroom as outside, from fairytale to horror 
film, must be that they provide the resources for young people to imagine their own 
social futures, roles, identities. Inevitably, this psychic and social drama, this 
internalization of the signs at hand, and re-production of their own new signs, will 
include signs of danger, the unknown, the frightening, the thrilling, even the evil, the 
morally illicit. How else can they prepare for adulthood? Bazalgette and Buckingham 
(1995) argue: 
Children - like everyone else - need to be able to come to terms with the 
fear of annihilation, of power (their own as well as other people's), of 
anger, and of sexuality. (page 3) 
In this thesis, it has been far from clear what images of the sublime are used to 
represent, either in the texts or in the work of these young spectators. It is clear, 
however, from the words of Lucy and Jessica in Chapter 7, for instance, that these 
images, and the powerful narratives they produce from them, belong to a web of 
signification, affect and transforming subjectivity that incorporates the films they 
watch, the lessons they attend, the dolls in their bedroom, the games they play. This 
is one of the ways in which they produce themselves, their relationships, their 
morality, their pleasures. It is clear, therefore, how leaky is the spectatorial 
experience of the classroom - how impossible it is to divorce it from the culture 
Raymond Williams famously described as "a whole way of life" (1961, page 46). 
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The value of the visual, finally, remains a complex question, to which this study can 
only hope to make a small contribution. The fears of Holbrook about the vulnerability 
of the word were, of course, ill-founded, and that, if Kress is right about the new 
resurgence of the visual. it must also be argued that the spectatorial space of the 
classroom will subsume . not simply replace, the earlier models of scriptorium and 
auditorium. The image I choose to represent this multiple literacy comes from a short 
film made by a group of girls after finishing their project on The Company of Wolves. 
They have gone into the editing suite next to my classroom to make a trailer for the 
film, using an analogue editing system with a digital vision mixer. Two things about 
their finished trailer strike me. Firstly, the visual sequence makes extensive use of 
the digital still funtion and the mix function of the vision mixer - they mix very slowly, 
lingering on superimpositions of one shot on another. Their first sequence consists of 
two digital stills, showing two closeups of female characters: Rosaleen's dead sister, 
and the the grandmother (illustration 1). These have been mixed with, respectively, a 
scene of wolves running through the forest: and the first werewolf transformation 
scene. The mix makes the images of the female characters a little more "solid" than 
the moving scenes, which. in addition to the fact that they are closeups, makes these 
Illustration 9.1: still images within Alex's trailer for The Company of Wolves, 
showing their foregrounding of female characters. The first traces of the mix 
between the grandmother and the transformation scene can just be seen. 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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images stronger in the whole composition, a form, perhaps, of the quality of salience 
used by Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) to denote relative weightings of elements of 
visual composition. This reordering of and selection from the film text not only 
creates a new montage, then, but a new synchronic syntagm, which depends for its 
meaning on the articulation of two images related by another kind of "vertical 
montage", one which constructs the impression (as, indeed, is materially the case) of 
an image laid on top of another (evoking, perhaps, the image of the palimpsest which 
Barthes uses to describe the still). The selection of the female characters, followed 
by another still of Rosaleen's face, seems, in the light of the work of these girls, as 
well as the discussions of the representation of women in the film, to signify their 
recognition of the importance of these related female roles: two roles to be 
surmounted or replaced: victim, narrator/wise woman; and the stronger role which 
replaces them: strong heroine (Clover's Final Girl), and dreaming narrator - it seems 
to make explicit the narrative envelope of the film, and to foreground the 
representation of teenage female identity that, for these viewers, is at the centre of 
the text and their engagement with it; and now, their literal remaking of it. 
The other point is one which this thesis has not had space to develop, but which is 
implied by parts of the argument of this final chapter. That is, the importance of the 
auditory. As Eisenstein realised in his image of vertical montage, an opposition 
between word and image is fruitless; and, in practice, as in this work of these girls, 
there is no such opposition. Their work is informed by reading, by viewing, by talk 
and writing; and, in the construction of their trailer, their editorial work on sequences 
from the film involves both an editing of the film's soundtrack, especially its music; 
and the addition of their own voiceover: 
A young girl, entering into womanhood, exploring her dreams and fantasies 
of the future. Love, lust and mystery, all incorporated into a chilling drama, 
created by Angela Carter and directed and adapted by the skilled hands of 
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Neil Jordan. 
This is a fantasy tale of a girl's curiosity and eagerness to explore different 
worlds unlike her one, in the enchanting and always mysterious 
surroundings of the forest, always believed to be infested by the werewolf. 
The Company of Wolves, coming to a cinema near you! 
Alex's voice indicates many meanings, intricately related to the chain of texts of 
which this forms one part. The words show an understanding of the film's narrative, 
themes and imagery ("entering into womanhood,"; "Love, lust and mystery"); the 
imagery of the empty and replete sublime ("enchanting and always mysterious 
surroundings of the forest, always believed to be infested by the werewolf"). But this 
text also indicates the social nature of such symbolic work, and of the pleasures 
associated with it. The slight thrill of the voice at the risky mention of sexuality; the 
parodic overtones of the use of the trailer voiceover (the final word, "you!", is drawn 
out in mock spookiness), and the expert awareness of this genre. The pleasure of 
making this material transformation of the text, the fun of working, unsupervised, with 
friends: these are social pleasures of the spectatorium, pulling together practices of 
classroom, friendship and the workplace. 
Connor (1997) argues that, in the end, a simple opposition between the visual and 
auditory modes, and the forms of subjectivity structured around them, is untenable. 
Rather, he proposes an image of subjectivity which articulates the two. He borrows 
Michel Chion's term, the acousmetre, which is neither the screen voice to be seen 
and heard (of a character on screen), nor that of the unseen voice dissociated from 
the diegesis (the voiceover, Chion's acousmatique). It is, rather, the voice of an 
unseen presence within the diegesis - examples being a voice from a tape-recorder 
on screen, the voice of Polonius behind the arras, or the voice of the Invisible Man. 
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Connor's emphasis is on text rather than audience, and he continues to 
problematize the visual by an exploration of acoustic imagery in Joyce and Beckett. 
Nevertheless, the image of the acousmetre as a metaphor for the modern spectator 
has some merit: invisible in the text (and, literally, in the cinema); but a voice behind 
it, in a shifting play of identification, appropriation, transformation. In this particular 
case, it represents more powerfully than ever the dissolving boundaries of the 
spectatorial space. Alex and her friends, already beyond the limits of the classroom, 
move beyond the boundaries between screen and cinema, theatre and auditorium, 
spectacle and audience, as Bakhtin (1965/1984) describes: 
In fact, carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not 
acknowledge any distinction between actors and spectators. (page 198) 
Alex and her friends have stepped through the screen, manipulated the visual, 
employed the acoustic features of a visual technology to speak from behind the 
latterday arras of a horror film trailer, to speak of present tastes and pleasures, and 
imagined futures of womanhood and sexuality. Like the Wizard of Oz, she'll have to 
come out from behind the curtain, to resume her more usual size and social role. But 
the acousmetric act, the voice in the image, has changed a little part of her mind, and 
as a text in the public sphere, can change a little part of the mind of others -
including, for instance, my own. 
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